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Abstract 
Barnes, Corey Lorenzo. PhD. The University of Memphis, May, 2016. Un-
Lockeing the Beauty which Prejudice has Overlaid: On Alain Locke’s Philosophical 
Anthropology, Value theory, and the Movement Towards Cosmopolitanism. Dr. Bill E. 
Lawson, PhD. 
This work is an elucidation of Alain Locke’s philosophical anthropology and value theory 
as devices to combat racial superiority, which Locke took to be the greatest challenge to 
the possibility of establishing a cosmopolitan community. For Locke, the possibility of 
establishing a cosmopolitan community implies healthy social and political relations, 
which themselves imply respect. However, respect is denied to members of certain races 
because they are perceived to be the bearers of inherently inferior cultures, which are 
grounded in values. Locke needs a philosophical anthropology that combats the idea of 
distinct differences in races that are caused by either nature or God, and a value theory 
that displaces value-hierarchies. These two, taken together, provide the grounds for 
establishing a cosmopolitan community. 
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Locke’s Fundamental Concern: 
“[D]emocracy, looked at nationally or internationally, is seriously beset with internal 
inconsistencies, political, social, and cultural. It is weakened by these all the more as it 
tries to pull itself together as a corporate body of United Nations fighting a world defense 
of democracy. The net prescription is mandatory advice to correct these shortcomings at 
the earliest possible moment and in the most immediately practical ways, both for health 
and strength in the arduous war effort and for vision and moral authority in the making of 
a just and successful peace.” 
––Alain Locke (“Color: Unfinished Business of Democracy”) 
  
“It is not our differences that divide us. It is our inability to recognize, accept, and 
celebrate those differences.” 
––Audre Lorde (Our Dead Behind Us: Poems) 
In the first epigraph above, we see Alain Locke’s faith in establishing a 
community wherein perpetual peace among humans is secured. We also see Locke’s 
commitment to democracy, a system that Locke takes to be freedom- and equality-
affirming. Moreover, the epigraph shows us Locke’s faith in democracy’s being a 
political system that ought to be spread throughout the world because of its power to 
produce a community wherein peace is secured. Despite the many benefits of political 
democracy, in the epigraph Locke alludes to particular problems that weaken both the 
faith in, and the justification for, democracy as a freedom- and equality-affirming system. 
These problems, it would appear, threaten to stop the spread of democracy. And insofar as 
these problems weaken democracy, and threaten to stop its spread throughout the world, 
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these problems threaten the possibility of establishing a community wherein peace among 
humans is secured.  
The title of the work from which Locke’s words were taken gives us a clue about 
the particular problems––call them internal inconsistencies––that threaten 
cosmopolitanism by threatening the legitimacy of democracy. For Locke, these problems 
are race-related. And Audre Lorde’s words indicate why race is a problem for the 
possibility of establishing a cosmopolitan community. Particular ideas about human races 
take racial differences to divide humans permanently, particularly on the issue of culture. 
Certain cultures are perceived as being better than others, and all human races necessary 
produce certain better or worse cultures. When viewed in this way, human differences 
cannot be celebrated or appreciated. Racial differences are considered permanent and 
value-laden, such that the differences can be cashed-out in terms of differences in 
humans’ worth. Certain races become more worthy of certain freedoms because of the 
idea that human differences imply human inequality. Locke was deeply concerned about 
racial differences being viewed this way because democracy, and thus cosmopolitanism, 
rely on human equality. Locke’s concern with the possibility of establishing a 
cosmopolitan community, given race-related problems that deny what the community 
presupposes, is the subject of this dissertation. 
The argument of the dissertation regards conditions that are necessary in order for 
a cosmopolitain community to be established in the world. Specifically, I argue that in 
Locke’s work as a whole we find a principal commitment to establishing a cosmopolitan 
community, and that both his philosophical anthropology that regards race and value 
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theory support this commitment. For Locke, there are two principle reasons to commit to 
establishing a cosmopolitan community. First, establishing such a community is 
imperative given the proximity of people/nations to each other in the world. For Locke, 
human survival depends on peace, and peace implies a particular type of community. 
Second, Locke thinks that cosmopolitanism is the completion of our move from 
individual families to larger communities such as states/nations. As I argue in chapter 
one, Locke thinks that people have a natural desire to assemble that is completed in a 
cosmopolitan community.   
Cosmopolitanism is the subject of the first chapter of this dissertation. I open the 
work with an examination of Immanuel Kant’s conception of cosmopolitanism. I open 
with Kant because he marks the beginning of the modern sense of cosmopolitanism, 
which is a sense that Locke engages. In so doing, I largely neglect ancient conceptions of 
cosmopolitanism that have been introduced by Stoic philosophers. Further, I think that 
from Kant’s work we can construct a minimal conception of cosmopolitanism. By 
minimal conception, what I mean is that Kant’s work gives us a basic conception that all 
types of cosmopolitanism must incorporate.  
Moreover, I begin with Kant’s conception because Kant illustrates, in a very real 
way, the possibility of being committed to both cosmopolitanism and the type of ideology 
that fundamentally denies the possibility of its establishment. The essential thesis of this 
dissertation is quite intuitive, namely that (for Locke) cosmopolitanism is inconsistent 
with ideas of racial superiority. And this could lead us to think that one who is committed 
to cosmopolitanism cannot possibly be committed to racial superiority. Kant gives us 
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both the modern notion of cosmopolitanism and the scientizing of race that justifies 
inequality and disrespect in a manner that his own conception of cosmopolitanism denies. 
In a real way, Kant shows us how easy it is to commit to radically contradictory views. 
Thus, looking at Kant’s cosmopolitanism gives us a deeper appreciation for what Locke 
was up against, namely theorists who might support cosmopolitanism on the one hand 
while having a deep commitment to racial superiority on the other. In this way, Locke’s 
work can cause us to think more deeply about the consistency of the commitments that 
we hold if we support cosmopolitanism. 
Now, Kant’s views on cosmopolitanism show us that in order for such a 
community to be established, there must be respect between people and nations that is 
implied by healthy social/political relations. Social and political policies must be set up in 
a way that promotes certain relations between peoples and states, and this implies that 
people within those states, and the states themselves (in relation to their dealings with 
other states), respect each other. When we respect others, what I maintain is that we 
perceive, have an attitude of acknowledgement towards, and treat other persons as 
deserving bearers rights that are equal to our own.  And what this requires is that we see 1
 When fleshing out an understanding of respect that is implied by cosmopolitanism, I 1
diverge slightly from the metaphysical notion of dignity and respect that Kant gives us. 
For example, in Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals Kant claims that respect is “a 
feeling wrought by means of a rational concept” when there is an immediate cognition 
that something is a law for me. In Critique of the Power of Judgment, respect is “the 
feeling of our incapacity to attain to an idea that is a law for us.” Here, respect is a 
moral feeling of admiration or the affect of astonishment. What Kant gives us is a 
metaphysical understanding of respect (and dignity) that is grounded in rationality. 
Without engaging in a debate regarding metaphysical claims about dignity and respect, 
I follow A.I. Melden’s more political notion of dignity and craft a notion of respect 
from it. My thinking is that the end of any metaphysical debate about dignity and 
respect leads to this political notion. Insofar as this is the case, I suggest that we begin 
with a political notion of dignity and respect.
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others as fundamentally equal to us. I think that this notion captures the democratic spirit 
that Locke wants to preserve, along with its being a notion that seems to run through his 
work.  
After illustrating a minimal notion of cosmopolitanism, particular social and 
political relationships that cosmopolitanism implies, and the notion of respect that these 
relationships imply, I show Locke’s agreement with Kant’s minimal conception of 
cosmopolitanism. Further, I show what could be an expansion of the minimal conception 
in Locke’s work through principals of tolerance and pluralism. Still further, I show 
Locke’s arguments that democracy is a cultural constant and that cosmopolitanism is a 
logical extension of a fundamental human desire to assemble. With regard to democracy’s 
being a cultural constant, I illustrate Locke’s thinking that there are fundamental values 
that undergird every community. This thinking licenses us to conceptualize ourselves as 
more similar than different. Recognizing these fundamental similarities in value-systems 
should foster more respect for people with different overlaying values in their value-
systems.  For Locke (it would appear), democracy, as a concept that promotes the basic 2
equality of persons, is a cultural constant. This, in part, grounds his thinking that political 
democracy is necessary for the establishment of a cosmopolitan community. 
Now, the problem of racial superiority is the chief problem that challenges the 
establishment of a cosmopolitan community. Racial superiority (or at least the type that 
Locke engages) relies on two primary beliefs. First is the belief that there are inherent 
 Overlaying values will be those values that are built upon cultural constants. They will 2
be what has been influenced by the socio-historical circumstances that communities 
have faced.
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differences between people. These differences are either natural or divinely-mandated. 
Second is the belief that there are fundamental differences in peoples’ value-systems that 
accord to racial divisions. The different value-systems can be rank-ordered because value 
is both real and objective. Insofar as different races’ value-systems can be rank-ordered, 
the different races’ worth as human beings can be rank-order. Value-differences cannot be 
reconciled between the races because certain races, as either products of nature or God, 
produce certain culture-products necessarily and unfailingly. This makes certain races’ 
values either ungraspable (if they are superior races) or lacking respectableness (if they 
are inferior races). What derives from racial superiority is that it becomes justifiable to 
treat members of certain races without respect. The problem that Locke’s work takes on is 
the inconsistency of cosmopolitanism and racial superiority, which denies what is 
fundamental to cosmopolitanism, namely respect. Essentially, Locke wants to uproot the 
challenges to the type of community that secures peace.  
Philosophical anthropologies that either justify or challenge unequal perceptions 
and treatment of different races because of a necessary correlation between culture and 
race are the subject of chapters two and three. In chapter two I look at three figures. First 
I look at Kant’s philosophical anthropology. I look at Kant because, similar to modern 
cosmopolitan theory, Kant marks the beginning of a shift in thinking. Kant marks the first 
in a lengthy list of academics who sought to make racial divisions a matter of scientific 
inquiry. And insofar as Locke responds to scientific conceptions of race, I find that it is 
important to begin by examining the views of the figure that scientized race. Secondly, I 
look at Johann Friedrich Blumenbach. Blumenbach is important because Blumenbach 
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gives Arthur de Gobineau––the figure who Locke is chiefly concerned with––a nuanced 
conception of degeneration. Finally, I examine Gobineau’s philosophical anthropology. A 
part of the reason why Gobineau’s philosophical anthropology is so problematic for 
Locke is because, in addition to arguing the divine superiority and thus inferiority of 
certain races, he also argues that respect accorded to inferior races, and along with it 
cosmopolitan commitments, lead to the degeneration of states. To conclude chapter two I 
show that all three figures give us clear conceptions of racial superiority that block the 
establishment of a cosmopolitan community.  
To solve the problem that racial superiority poses to cosmopolitanism, Locke 
needs a theory of human races that denies the inherent superiority of any particular race. 
This theory must undercut the natural or divine superiority of certain races by severing 
the necessary correlation between culture-products and races. In other words, Locke 
needs to deny what Kant, Blumenbach, and Gobineau assert. We might think of this as 
Locke’s philosophical anthropology as it regards race. Locke’s philosophical 
anthropology is the subject of chapter three. Essentially, Locke conceptualizes race as a 
product of culture (as opposed to the reverse), and as a product of culture, race depends 
on history and social development.   
Now, Locke cannot simply end with a philosophical anthropology that refutes the 
anthropologies of the figures presented in chapter two. Locke needs a theory of value that 
can allow for differences between racial groups (which are, for Locke, obvious and 
appreciable, though not permanent and natural/divine). Locke needs a value theory 
because he denies both that we should eliminate the concept of race/race-talk and that 
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there is no correlation between race and culture. Locke’s socio-historical conception of 
race requires a value theory to move past the problem that racial superiority poses to 
cosmopolitanism. This theory of value must allow respect for racial and cultural 
differences, and must be one that does not support the view that particular differences in 
values imply a value-hierarchy where one set of values is less respectable than others. In 
so doing, the theory denies the superiority or inferiority of those who possess particular 
value-systems. 
Locke’s value theory is the subject of chapter four. What I show is that Locke’s 
relativism is a position in-between value-objectivity and value-subjectivity. We can think 
of Locke’s relativism as a position that, though it denies that value is either correct or 
incorrect in the way that objectivists tend to, also denies that the value conferred upon 
objects is dependent on the valuations of individual agents in the way that subjectivist 
positions tend to. For Locke, we can assert a type of quasi-objectivity of values in 
community through the way that community teaches us to perceive objects through 
language and use.  
In all, the dissertation attempts to systematize Locke’s work in a way that has not 
been done before. What this means is that it connects parts of Locke’s thinking over a 
very large span of his life. For instance, this work shows how Locke’s belief in 
democracy and cosmopolitanism are consistent with his relativism, and shows why he 
thinks that we have reasons to support cosmopolitanism despite a relativism that appears 
to go against objective normative claims. It shows how his philosophical anthropology 
undergirds his value theory and cosmopolitan theory. 
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The value of Locke’s thinking is that it causes us to question what commitments 
must we have, and likewise what commitments we must abandon if we are truly/
consistently committed to cosmopolitanism. One can very easily substitute racial 
superiority for religious superiority and question whether our commitments to particular 
religious ideas are consistent with our commitment to cosmopolitanism. One can raise 
questions about issues of gender or sexuality and cosmopolitanism. One can question 
how cosmopolitanism squares with rectificatory justice. In short, if cosmopolitanism is 
something that we either are committed to or ought to be committed to, then Locke forces 
us to ask what other commitments we must abandon or accept in order be consistent in 
what we are committed to. I now turn to the issue of cosmopolitanism.  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Chapter 1 
Cosmopolitanism and Its Race-Related Discontents: 
“As the new international dimension comes into our lives with its transforming changed 
scale and perspective of human group relations, it begins to dawn upon us that, if 
democracy is to survive, it can do so only on an international basis and over a common 
denominator of liberty, equality and fraternity for humanity at large.” 
––Alain Locke, “Color: Unfinished Business of Democracy” 
“The Negro question is too often put forward merely as the Negro question. It is just as 
much, and even more seriously, the question of democracy. The position of the Negro in 
American society is its one great outstanding anomaly.” 
––Alain Locke, “Should the Negro be Encouraged to Cultural Equality” 
Introduction: 
It is my argument in this dissertation that chief among Locke’s concerns over his 
life was cosmopolitanism. And further, Locke has the goal of combatting racial 
superiority, which he took to be the greatest obstacle affecting the possibility of 
establishing a cosmopolitan community. What I would like to show is that Locke’s 
philosophical anthropology and his theory of value were both attempts to set conditions 
for the possible emergence of a lasting peace among the world’s human population by 
combating racial superiority. Taken together, Locke’s philosophical anthropology and his 
value theory seek to lead to progressive racial contacts, and ultimately to the possibility 
of a cosmopolitain community, by proving the falsity of inherent traits distributed to 
humanity by nature or God and the type of value-hierarchy that is implied by natural or 
divinely-mandated racial differences that together undergird theories and practices of 
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racial superiority. For Locke, the type of value-hierarchy that is implied by racial 
superiority causes a lack of respect for those who are thought to be inferior. However, 
Locke understood that respect is necessary if a cosmopolitan community is to be 
established.  
If we are attempting to get at Locke's thinking, and in rendering it applicable to 
today's world, we must understand particular background concepts and arguments that are 
operating in both Locke's thinking and the world in which Locke is writing. These will 
involve both the historical moment as it regards race and race-contacts that Locke lived 
and worked within, along with Locke’s own ideas regarding race and race-contacts.  The 1
first of these, namely the historical moment as it regards race and race-contacts, refers to 
the state of affairs regarding race in America, as well as across the world. The second of 
these, namely Locke’s own ideas regarding race and race-contacts, refers to Locke’s 
particular conception of race and the state of affairs regarding racial-tension. I take 
Locke’s own ideas regarding race and race-contacts to undergird his conception of 
cosmopolitanism and our ability to establish such a community.  
Prior to understanding race and race-contacts, there is the issue of 
cosmopolitanism that must be fleshed out. We need to understanding what 
cosmopolitanism is, and why it is inconsistent with particular views about races. 
Additionally, there is the issue of what healthy social and political relations are, if in fact 
they are implied by cosmopolitanism. Moreover, there is the issue of the concept of 
 In addition, if our goal is to render Locke's theory of value useful, there will be a need 1
to see overlap between the historical moment within which Locke lived and worked and 
our present racial/societal condition. 
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respect, specifically what it means to respect another person. Locke’s thinking on the 
inconsistency of holding both cosmopolitanism and racial superiority hinges on the 
notion of respect, insofar as cosmopolitanism relies on a particular understanding of it 
that is rejected by those committed to racial superiority. 
I have three principle aims in this chapter. First, I would like to elucidate a 
minimal conception of cosmopolitanism.  My reasoning for introducing a minimal 2
conception of cosmopolitanism is as follows: examining every conception would make 
this work quite expansive. However, Locke’s argument that cosmopolitanism is 
inconsistent with racial superiority can be asserted by looking at principals that gives 
cosmopolitanism its nature, and then showing cosmopolitanism to be contrary to racial 
superiority. In deriving a conception of cosmopolitanism that every type of 
cosmopolitanism must accept, and then in showing that cosmopolitanism relies on certain 
ideas that are inconsistent with racial superiority, one can show that every type of 
cosmopolitanism is inconsistent with racial superiority; if every type of cosmopolitanism 
relies on this minimal conception, and this minimal conception is inconsistent with ideas 
of racial superiority because it necessarily affirms what is explicitly denied in these 
ideologies, then every conception of cosmopolitanism is inconsistent with racial 
superiority because every conception must affirm what is explicitly denied in ideas of 
racial superiority. In providing a minimal conception of cosmopolitanism, I largely 
neglect classical cosmopolitanism, as conceptions introduced by the cynic Diogenes of 
 What I seek to show is a minimal concept of cosmopolitanism that undergirds all 2
specific concepts of cosmopolitanism. I seek to illustrate the core concept of 
cosmopolitanism that all who are committed to the concept must embrace.
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Sinope and the stoics, and focus on the modern and contemporary conceptions of 
cosmopolitanism that began in the time during which Kant wrote.   3
Secondly, I show how the minimal conception implies relations that we might 
take to be healthy or progressive. Thirdly, I demonstrate that healthy social and political 
relations imply respect between agents. For Locke, this respect is denied by racial 
superiority because of the value-hierarchy that grounds the ideologies. And it is this 
hierarchical structure that Locke's value theory participates in displacing, thereby proving 
racial superiority false, and allowing for respect between peoples that allows for the 
possibility of establishing a cosmopolitanism community. 
After presenting a minimal conception of cosmopolitanism that we can take from 
Kant’s work, I seek to sharpen the conception, showing principals that can be inferred 
from it by looking at Locke’s conception of cosmopolitanism. I argue that Locke accepts 
the essential idea of Kantian cosmopolitanism (as he must, insofar as he has a concept of 
cosmopolitanism and Kant's conception gives us a minimal conception). However, Locke 
sees the completion of the idea as embracing more of an effort at pluralism and tolerance 
than Kant might be said to embrace. Thus, by sharpening the conception a bit, Locke 
distances himself from Kant, and would perhaps refer to Kant’s complete conception as 
uniformitarian (when it is fleshed out beyond the minimal conception that I will 
elucidate). For Locke, Kant’s conception is incomplete in theory, and further cannot be 
put into practice. 
 For the distinction between the two types of cosmopolitanism, see the introduction and 3
Martha Nussbaum’s “Kant and Cosmopolitanism” in The Cosmopolitan Reader, edited 
by Garrett Wallace Brown and David Held (Malden: Polity Press, 2010) 27-44.
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Kantian Cosmopolitanism: Hospitality, Freedom, and Respect: 
This chapter has aims of giving a minimal conception of cosmopolitanism and 
showing that the possibility of establishing a cosmopolitain community––in the modern 
and contemporary sense––implies healthy social and political relations, which themselves 
imply respect accorded to all human agents. Insofar as we are looking at 
cosmopolitanism in the modern and contemporary sense, we should begin by reviewing 
Kant’s conception of the cosmopolitan community and the conditions necessary to bring 
it about. My reasoning is that Kant (along with the lesser known Martin Wieland) marks 
the beginning of the modern sense of cosmopolitanism. Further, Kant’s work appears to 
give a minimal conception of cosmopolitanism that fits the constraints of the present 
work. Still further, Kant’s conception has had a major impact on our world, insofar as his 
work is the guiding idea behind the formation of the United Nations, and appears to 
present the view that most contemporary thinkers on cosmopolitanism engage in some 
way. Additionally, Locke’s own understanding of cosmopolitanism derives from Kant’s 
conception. And as such, Kant’s conception is one that is important for understanding 
Locke’s. Locke accepted and rejected parts of Kant’s completed thinking, which is to say 
that Locke wrestled with Kant in many ways. 
Kant gives us versions and descriptions of cosmopolitanism in a number of 
works.  However, one of Kant’s latest, and in fact his fullest, description is given in an 4
 One can find descriptions for the different versions of cosmopolitanism in “Idea for a 4
Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim (1784), Critique of Judgment (1790), “On 
the Common Saying:That May Be True in Theory, But it is of No Use in 
Practice” (1793) Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch (1795), Metaphysics of 
Morals (1797), and The Contest of the Faculties (1798).
!14
essay entitled, “Perpetual Peace.” Kant’s ultimate goal in the essay is to provide reasons 
for why humanity has an obligation to seek measures to secure peace and freedom in the 
world, thereby ending all hostilities (meaning wars) between nations.  In so doing, Kant 5
seeks to set the conditions for which peace and freedom in the world can be met, and 
attempts to argue what a lasting peace in the world looks like.  
Kant gives us particular conditions that are necessary for peace and freedom at the 
outset of the essay, insofar as he gives us the kind of state that is able to secure peace and 
freedom. Kant claims that nations who are able to secure peace and freedom in the world 
must govern their citizens with a republican constitution. Kant defines a republican 
constitution as that constitution that satisfies three criteria. First, a republican constitution 
is one that is founded on the principles of freedom for all members of society. Second, a 
republican constitution is one where each member of the state depends on a single 
common legislation. Finally, this constitution is one wherein there is legal equality for 
each member of its society.  Kant thinks that a state can only aim at establishing peace 6
and freedom in the world if there are certain values endorsed by a state in its governing 
constitution. 
Kant seems right to constrain the possibility of establishing a cosmopolitan 
community by limiting the community to a confederation of republican states. A state 
needs freedom as a social value if it is to value freedom (and peace) in relations between 
states, as well as practice it in its relations with the citizens of other states. If a state does 
 Immanuel Kant, “Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch,” in Kant: Political Writings, 5
trans. Hans Reiss, ed. H.B. Nisbet (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991) 93
 Ibid, 99.6
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not have a freedom-valuing constitution, then it seems right to think that such a state will 
not concern itself with the freedom of other states’ citizens, and therefore will not commit 
to a constitution of lasting peace in the world that is grounded by certain freedoms for all 
human beings. Further, a state’s citizens seemingly need to embrace a freedom-affirming 
constitution if the state’s goal of seeking a lasting peace in the world is to be supported in 
practice. If citizens’ values generally reflect the political values of the state's constitution, 
and the state's constitution is not freedom-affirming, then it seems to follow that the 
citizens of such a state will not affirm a cosmopolitan constitution, either abstractly as a 
possibility or in practice when engaging other non-citizens.   
Now, we can take a few things away from the above insofar as it relates to what 
healthy social and political relations look like under the type of constitution that must 
govern states committed to a cosmopolitan community. For Kant, healthy social relations 
are the result of all citizens being governed by a common constitution. A state committed 
to cosmopolitanism cannot be fractioned. Thus, the possibility of establishing a 
cosmopolitan community requires social stability. And what this seems to imply is that 
the citizens of the state value certain ideals and understand both themselves and others in 
certain ways that do not separate them irrevocably. As such, certain beliefs about 
citizens––the belief that certain people are either inhuman or a lesser kind of humanity, 
that certain groups' culture and values are fundamentally unworthy of respect, or that 
certain people should not have certain rights––cannot exist in a state where there is social 
stability, and thus where there is a commitment to cosmopolitanism. These beliefs seem 
to separate people in ways that, of necessity, bring social instability.  
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Further, primacy is placed on the freedom of citizens in a state; a citizen’s 
freedom is a nonnegotiable social and political value. A state cannot have disparities in its 
commitment to the freedom of its citizens, where certain citizens are thought to be 
worthy of certain freedoms while others are not. A state that is committed to freedom 
seems to promote equal rights for all of its citizens, insofar as inequalities in rights seem 
to produce social instability by leading to fundamental differences in both ideals and how 
citizens within the state understand themselves and others. Citizens must be committed to 
the ideal of equal freedoms for all citizens within the state in order for a cosmopolitan 
community to be established. And further people seem to need to understand themselves 
as deserving neither more nor less of the freedoms of others. There seems to exist the 
possibility of social instability through a loss of faith in a constitution that all citizens 
need to affirm if there are inequalities in freedoms within the state.  
Thus, underlying the idea of freedom is the idea that such a state must value the 
social and political equality of all of its citizens. Healthy social and political relations 
imply a state of affairs whereby citizens can expect equal treatment before the law. No 
one can be expected to promote a contract between nations that promotes peace if he/she 
is treated unequally before the law of his/her own state. And likewise, no one can be 
expected to promote a contract between nations that promotes peace among all 
individuals in the world if he/she does not conceptualize all human beings as worthy of 
equal treatment before the laws of his/her own state.  
With the preceding in mind, one can see Kant making claims about relations 
within the state that rely on, or imply respect between the state and its citizens, between 
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citizens and their fellow citizens, between citizens and non-citizens, and between the state 
and non-citizens. This is particularly true if (and I will adopt this notion throughout) “the 
dignity of a person is not a matter pertaining to some precious internal quality of his 
nature as a human being––his rationality or his autonomy––but that sense he displays of 
his own status as a being who is authorized by his rights to conduct himself in the 
expectation that his rights will be honored by others…”  From this understanding of 7
dignity, I accept the following definition of respect (as it applies to another’s dignity): 
Respect, as applied to a person because of an inherent dignity, would be the perception 
of, attitude of acknowledgement towards, and treatment of a person as a deserving bearer 
of rights equivalent to the respecting agent's. Respect in this sense appears to be implied 
by healthy social and political relations, and is required for cosmopolitanism.  The 8
possibility of a cosmopolitan community, in its dependence on a state’s having a 
republican constitution allows us to see that the possible establishment of a cosmopolitan 
community implies social and political relations that are healthy, and this implies that 
people have respect for others. Just what sort of treatment this respect entails will become 
clear below. 
Now, with regard to a definition of a cosmopolitan community, Kant tells us that 
“a constitution based on cosmopolitan right, in so far as individuals and states, coexisting 
in an external relationship of mutual influences, may be regarded as citizens of a 
 A.I. Melden, Rights and Persons (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977) 194.7
 This concept of respect is a very minimal concept that will be fleshed out at the end of 8
the current chapter, where I argue that Locke's understanding of reciprocity, tolerance, 
and democracy derive from an understanding of the fundamental cultural constant of 
respect, which is a value that necessarily undergirds every "coming-together" of a group 
of people, and thus the formation of a state. 
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universal state of mankind.”  A cosmopolitan community, at its foundation, “concerns not 9
the interaction between states, but the status of individuals in their dealings with states of 
which they are not citizens. Moreover, it is concerned with the [political] status of 
individuals as human beings, rather than as citizens of states.”  This is one of the key 10
distinctions between a cosmopolitan constitution and an international constitution, which 
concerns interactions between states.  Thus, we might say that a cosmopolitan 11
constitution concerns the issue of world citizenship, wherein we may infer a concern with 
rights not conferred to an individual because he/she is a citizen of a particular rights-
conferring state, but concerns the rights of individuals as human beings simpliciter, which 
are conferred to them by an agreement between a multiplicity of states.  
Kant seems to think that a cosmopolitan community is not an absorption of all 
states into a singular state. We should not think of individuals as world-citizens because 
states relinquish their right to govern in an absorption into a larger state. In a critical 
passage, Kant tells us the following: 
Peoples who have grouped together into nation states may be judged in the same 
way as individual men living in a state of nature, independent of external laws; for 
they are a standing offence to one another by the very fact that they are neighbors. 
Each nation, for the sake of its own security, can and ought to demand of the 
others that they should enter along with it into a constitution, similar to the civil 
one, within which the rights of each could be secured. This would mean 
 Immanuel Kant, “Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch,” 98-99.9
 Pauline Kleingeld, “Kant’s Cosmopolitan Law: World Citizenship for a Global Order,” 10
in Kantian Review 2 (1998) 72.
 It is an open question as to whether a cosmopolitan constitution can be included into an 11
international one, or whether it must be distinct. This is a debate that I will not deal 
with. I take Kant to have thought that it could not be, and though Locke seemed to 
waver on this point, I see no reason to engage the debate here. My aim is to show what 
Kant took a cosmopolitan constitution to be and to entail, and is not, necessarily, to 
defend it.
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establishing a federation of peoples. But a federation of this sort would not be the 
same as an international state. For the idea of an international state [being a 
univocal or singular state] is contradictory, since every state involves a 
relationship between a superior (the legislator) and an inferior (a people obeying 
the laws), whereas a number of nations forming one state would constitute a 
single nation. And this contradicts our initial assumption, as we are here 
considering the right of nations in relation to one another in so far as they are a 
group of separate states which are not to be welded together as a unit.   12
Kant begins this passage by making a critical observation about states that have not 
established some kind of constitution between them that aims at a lasting peace, namely 
that there is a constant threat of hostility that likens to the threat that morally obligates 
individuals to form a state. States without a constitution between them that aims at a 
lasting peace are in a sort of state of nature. Kant argues that states can and ought to 
demand that other states enter into a constitution wherein states can be secure, just as 
individuals contract with one another to form a state for their security. In fact, Kant seems 
to think that a contract leading to cosmopolitanism completes the original contract 
formed by individuals in their movement out of the state of nature. And thus for Kant, 
this command seems to have normative force. As such, Kant grounds the basis for both 
international and the cosmopolitan constitutions in social contract theory, where the 
formation of the contract implies a categorical command of reason.  However, in such a 13
contract between nations, Kant thinks that states do not contract with each other to form a 
singular state, whereby states give up their own right to autonomous decision-making as 
 Immanuel Kant, “Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch,” 102.12
 Ibid, 121-122.13
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it regards its laws and political values. Kant wants to preserve a state’s right to self-
determination, even in its commitment to a cosmopolitan constitution.   14
Given what has been discussed, we may begin by asserting that a cosmopolitan 
community is a community formed by a contract between autonomous states aimed at 
preserving or promoting peace, which is defined as the end of all hostilities (wars). This 
contract confers certain rights to individuals as human beings irrespective of their 
particular states. Each state in the contract maintains its own autonomy in matters relating 
to the governance of its citizens as citizens of their respective states. 
Now, we just averred that cosmopolitanism is concerned with interactions 
between individuals as human beings, and that this concern extends across borders. We 
might add that cosmopolitanism “covers any kind of communication, interaction, trade, 
or business. It applies to travel, migration, intellectual exchange, as well as to commercial 
endeavours.”  In short, cosmopolitanism concerns the political rights that individuals 15
have in virtue of their being world citizens. What remains to be settled is which rights 
Kant thinks humans have that transcend state-borders.  
Kant tells us that the content of a cosmopolitan constitution––the political right 
that humans have as citizens of the earth––is the right to hospitality. In another critical 
passage in “Perpetual Peace,” Kant tells us the following: 
 On this point, Kant seems to break with his earlier statements on a cosmopolitan 14
community that he provides in “Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan 
Purpose,” whereby Kant envisions the cosmopolitan community as a strong state-like 
federation. On Kant’s break, see Pauline Kleingeld’s essay entitled, “Kant’s Changing 
Cosmopolitanism.”
 Pauline Kleingeld, “Kant’s Cosmopolitan Law: World Citizenship for a Global Order,” 15
75.
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As in the foregoing articles, we are here concerned not with philanthropy, but 
with right. In this context, hospitality means the right of a stranger not to be 
treated with hostility when he arrives on someone else’s territory. He can be 
turned away, if this can be done without causing his death, but he must not be 
treated with hostility, so long as he behaves in a peaceable manner in the place he 
happens to be in. The stranger cannot claim the right of a guest to be entertained, 
for this would require a special friendly agreement whereby he might become a 
member of the native household for a certain time. He may only claim a right of 
resort, for all men are entitled to present themselves in a society of others by 
virtue of their right to communal possession of the earth’s surface.  16
Kant distinguishes philanthropy from right. With regard to right, which is the form of 
cosmopolitan constitutions, Kant thinks that we can never demand that we be embraced 
by other nations. States have a right to turn down appeals for settlement made by 
individuals. That we desire to settle within a state, or be taken in by members of another 
state, is beyond what we can demand. For Kant, we can only demand that we are able to 
make appeals to nations, and that when we make appeals we will not be harmed for the 
appeals' having been made. Thus, Kant makes cosmopolitan right a negative right; it is a 
right not to be harmed when we pass beyond the borders of our states and enter other 
states. Cosmopolitan right is a right to visit, which reduces to a right that an individual 
has to present him/herself to other states (the right to resort) and to attempt to establish 
contacts with states that an individual is not a citizen of.   17
Now it may appear that Kant’s negative definition of the cosmopolitan right to 
hospitality, as the content of the cosmopolitan constitution, is too limited. However, as 
Kleingeld notes, Kant’s negative definition of cosmopolitan right has broader 
 Ibid, 106.16
 Pauline Kleingeld, “Kant’s Cosmopolitan Law: World Citizenship for a Global Order,” 17
75.
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implications than one might think. Recall Kant’s claim from the block-quote above that a 
person “can be turned away, if this can be done without causing his death, but he must 
not be treated with hostility, so long as he behaves in a peaceable manner in the place he 
happens to be in.” Kleingeld informs us that: “When refusing a person at the border is 
impossible without the person being killed, admission is obligatory. And one cannot 
legitimately send a person back to a country where she or he will die or be killed as a 
result of being sent back.”  Thus, the cosmopolitan right to hospitality may produce an 18
obligation of a state to accept refugees and political prisoners from other countries when 
sending them back to these countries would be tantamount to killing/harming them. In 
short, there are certain positive duties that derive from the negative definition that Kant 
provides.  
Kleingeld reads Kant as not merely telling us that we must stop short of taking 
active measures (such as killing or maiming) to harm an individual in his/her attempt to 
visit, but further tells us that we must not allow the individual to be harmed by rejection. 
Kant constrains states to assure that no harm be done to the individual in the state’s 
denying entry to the individual. Kleingeld writes: “Kant draws this implication himself in 
a draft for Perpetual Peace, mentioning that people who are forced by circumstances 
outside their control to arrive on another state's territory should be allowed to stay at least 
until the circumstances are favourable for their return.”  Kleingeld justifies her reading 19




sailors on a ship seeking refuge from a storm in a foreign harbour, thus in effect stating 
that cosmopolitan law implies the right to a safe haven.”  My argument is (and one can 20
already see this formulating) that this implies a certain sort of respect conferred to all 
individuals. Respect is an implication of the healthy social and political relations that the 
possibility of establishing a cosmopolitan community implies.  
Kleingeld seems to be aware of a central issue governing cosmopolitanism and 
respect, namely that a lack of equal respect conferred to all individuals that is implied by 
racial superiority is a problem for the possibility of establishing a cosmopolitan 
community. Kleingeld frames this issue in terms of the credibility of Kant’s cosmopolitan 
law. Kleingeld writes that: “Kant's view that states have the right to reject visitors for any 
reason unless it causes their destruction raises the question of whether this does not make 
cosmopolitan law too restrictive. For example…are states free to reject foreigners on 
racist grounds [so long as it does not cause their destruction]?”  Kleingeld reasons that 21
Kant’s cosmopolitan law would be unreasonable if it did allow for racists grounds in 
rejecting foreigners. And Kleingeld tells us that this question must be answered in the 
negative if Kant’s notion of cosmopolitan right is to be defended.  
In defending Kant’s conception of cosmopolitan right, she argues that Kant’s 
notion allows that certain groups of people can be rejected because they are members of 
that particular group. However, we need legitimate reasons to reject particular groups of 




European traders on the grounds that allowing Europeans access to Chinese and Japanese 
goods might lead to colonial efforts by European nations. Thus, in rendering Kant’s 
thinking on a state’s right to deny entrance on the basis of membership in a particular 
group, we must distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate reasons for excluding 
these members of different groups. “Arguably, such a distinction could be drawn in terms 
of whether or not the exclusionary law or policy respects the rights of others, and whether 
its criteria are related to the actions and proposals of the foreigner rather than being based 
on an arbitrary, irrelevant characteristic.”  Kleingeld argues that we cannot exclude 22
members of a group merely for their being members of a particular group, as this “a 
priori” rejection would nullify the very right that constitutes the state’s cosmopolitan 
commitment. 
What Kleingeld ultimately realizes is that Kant’s cosmopolitan right relies on 
respect for freedoms referring to the dignity inherent in every person. This includes 
innate equality, which is “the independence from being bound by others to more than one 
can in turn bind them.”  Kleingeld tells us that this is an appropriate grounding and 23
justification for the idea, and “implies precisely the two aspects central to Kant’s 
understanding of the hospitality principal: that prospective visitors have no right to 
intrude into the sphere of freedom of others against their will, and that neither states nor 
individuals have the right to refuse visitors when this would lead to the annihilation of 





above another, and with the second aspect, no state can disrespect a visitor. If this respect 
for every person's freedom––along with the innate equality of each––is denied, then 
hospitality, which is the content of cosmopolitan right, is impossible. Respect for freedom 
is lacking where arbitrary discriminations are made based solely on race, insofar as those 
who belong to the race being denied entry are not perceived, acknowledged, or treated as 
deserving bearers of this cosmopolitan right. And this seems more than possible where 
racial superiority is the norm, which seems to be why Kleingeld sees the need to reject 
this potential interpretation of Kant’s thinking.  
The idea that the establishment of a cosmopolitan community implies healthy 
social and political relationships, which implies respect, along with the idea that racial 
superiority cancels this possibility is further at the heart of Kant’s rejection of European 
colonial efforts.  The idea of colonization, which includes ideas about the unfitness of 25
non-white peoples to hold land, the idea that whites have a rightful claim to land and 
resources irrespective of its possession by non-whites, the idea that certain lands had not 
yet been “discovered” until whites settled there, that whites ought to conquer non-white 
land and peoples, etc. are all staples of racial superiority. And Kant recognizes both that 
these efforts and ideas illustrate a lack of respect that seems implied by the community 
 Like Kant’s rethinking on the sovereignty of states from the “Idea” to “Perpetual 25
Peace,” Kant’s latter work illustrates a change in his thinking on the consistency of 
colonial efforts and cosmopolitanism, whereby Kant, in his latter work, rejects the 
notion that colonial efforts are consistent with the establishment of a cosmopolitan 
community. In “Idea,” Kant’s thinking is that European legislations will govern the 
world, and this is in accordance with the telos of the world. Thus, colonial efforts 
further the aim of nature. This thinking contradicts Kant’s stark rejection of colonialism 
in “Perpetual Peace,” where Kant holds that colonial efforts conflict with the concept of 
right. On this issue, see Pauline Kleingeld’s “Kant’s Second Thoughts on Colonialism,” 
in Kant and Colonialism: Historical and Critical Perspectives, ed. Katrin Flikschuh 
and Lea Ypi (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014) 44-67.
!26
that he thinks ought to be established in the world. Further, Kant seems to recognize that 
colonization causes social/political instability, which is a clear sign of unhealthy social/
political relations that seems to deny the possibility of establishing a cosmopolitan 
community. In a word, Kant seems to understand that racial superiority is inconsistent 
with the establishment of a cosmopolitan community that is morally required. 
 Now, before moving to Locke’s engagement with Kant, along with his own 
conception of cosmopolitanism that will guide his theory of value, I would like to add a 
bit more content to Kant’s conception, content that will be filled out with an examination 
of Locke's conception. Without these additions, it is unclear how Kant’s conception of 
cosmopolitanism leads to a lasting peace insofar as it is unclear as to how the principal of 
hospitality leads us to the end of all hostilities. This is because Kant’s principal of 
hospitality aims at answering a specific set of political questions: “What are the rights 
and duties of states toward foreigners? And what are the rights and duties of individuals 
or groups toward foreign states? Do they have a right to enter foreign states…. And do 
states have a right to take possession of foreign territory if the individuals using it do not 
form a state?”  Kant’s principal of hospitality is not intended to complete the view of 26
what cosmopolitanism entails, insofar as cosmopolitanism requires characteristics of the 
community of individuals that comprise it. Cosmopolitan right is a necessary, but not 
sufficient element of a condition of lasting peace. In order to establish a lasting peace, 
more is needed. 
 Pauline Kleingeld, Kant and Cosmopolitanism: The Philosophical Ideal of World 26
Citizenship (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012) 73.
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At the very beginning of an important text on Kant’s cosmopolitan thinking, 
Kleingeld writes that: “In his Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View of 1798 he 
writes that they [Germans] are hospitable toward foreigners, they easily recognize the 
merits of other peoples, they are modest in their dealings with others, and they readily 
learn foreign languages. Finally, ‘as cosmopolitans,’ they are not passionately bound to 
their fatherland.”  With this perhaps inaccurate description of German people, 27
particularly in their being rank-ordered above all other peoples, Kant gives us more of his 
thinking on what the cosmopolitan’s character is. Here, in addition to endorsing 
hospitality––perhaps one that extends beyond accepting the state’s principal of 
hospitality––to endorsing a more personal conception of hospitality, Kant seems to aver a 
willingness to cultural recognition and perhaps even cultural sharing (reciprocity), 
fairness and humbleness in engaging others, as well as tolerance. Kant thinks that these 
are the characteristics of a cosmopolitan.  
Now, whether Kant was committed to the values illustrated in the last sentence, 
which is to say, whether Kant consistently endorses them in his works, namely cultural 
recognition, reciprocity, and tolerance, is an unsettled question in the literature on 
Kantian cosmopolitanism. As we will see in the next chapter, Kant provides a type of 
thinking about the world’s human population that deeply supports white-supremacist 
ideology. Kant provides a scientific justification for both inherent and permanent racial 
differences and racial hierarchies that get taken up by later thinkers who look to use his 
scientivizing anthropological investigations to justify racial superiority. And in 
 Ibid, 1.27
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scientivizing race in this way, Kant makes claims about the cultural worth and values of 
groups within the hierarchies that would render a cosmopolitan community impossible. 
That Kant was committed to racial superiority is not an issue that is typically debated, but 
generally conceded. The issue is whether Kant conceptualized racial superiority as 
consistent with his moral/cosmopolitan claims or whether Kant changed his views on 
race in order to endorse a consistent cosmopolitan theory.  
Against theorists such as Robert Bernasconi and Thomas McCarthy, Kleingeld 
argues that Kant does in fact change his views, and further that he embraces cultural 
recognition, reciprocity, and tolerance.  Essentially, Kleingeld's argument is that Kant 28
seemingly realizes the inconsistency of his earlier conceptions of cosmopolitanism after 
engagements with, and critiques from, Georg Forster and Johann Herder.  Kleingeld 29
argues that Kant gives up his notion of the racial hierarchy that he provides in his early 
writings on race that influences his earlier conceptions of cosmopolitanism.  She argues 30
that Kant grants races such as Negros and Indians that he devalued earlier in his writings 
greater intellectual capacity and the right to sign contracts.  Further, Kleingeld notes that 31
Kant extracts moral capacities from his conceptions of racial differences in his later 
 Kleingeld engages in an interesting debate with Bernasconi on Kant’s commitment to 28
racial and cultural inferiority. See: Thomas McCarthy, Race, Empire, and the Idea of 
Human Development (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Pauline 
Kleingeld, “Kant’s Second Thoughts on Race,” in Philosophical Quarterly, 57 (229):
573–592 (2007); Robert Bernasconi, “Kant’s Third Thoughts on Race,” in Reading 
Kant’s Geography, ed. Stuart Elden and Eduardo Mendieta (Albany: State University of 
New York Press, 2011). 
 Pauline Kleingeld, “Kant and Cosmopolitanism: The Philosophical Ideal of World 29
Citizenship, 92-123.
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writings, and that he promotes both blood-mixing and cultural sharing in his later 
political writings.   32
These changes may or may not be inferable from the evidence that Kleingeld 
provides, insofar as she seems to overstate both the evidence from Kant’s own words and 
certain silences or omissions of discussions of race in Kant’s later political writings. For 
example, that Kant grants Africans and Americans (Natives) the right to sign contracts 
does not license the inference that Kant thinks they are intellectually equal to whites or 
that there is no racial hierarchy in his thinking. Kant does take Africans and Natives to be 
to be respect-worthy insofar as they must be contracted with. However, equality to 
whites, and thus worthiness of respect in the sense that seems to be a requirement for 
cosmopolitanism is questionable. Further, that Kant rejects colonization does not license 
the inference that he thinks whites must respect non-whites, particularly in the sense of 
respect that I have argued is required for the possible establishment of a cosmopolitan 
community. 
 Now, if the possibility of establishing a cosmopolitan community (or a consistent 
cosmopolitan theory), in implying healthy social/political relations, implies respect, 
which requires equality, then what needs to be established is not merely that Kant thought 
that non-whites were intelligent enough to put their mark onto paper, or that they should 
not be enslaved or have their land and resources taken from them, but that they were 
equivalent to whites––that they must be respected in the same way. And it is not clear that 
Kant is committed to this claim, particularly when reading Anthropology from a 
 Ibid, 115-123.32
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Pragmatic Point of View, where he seems to place Germans atop a more advanced racial 
hierarchy––one whereby both broader construed races and sub-races within the white 
race are ranked ordered.   33
Beyond all of this, it is not clear, as we will see when engaging Locke’s thinking 
on cosmopolitanism, that Kant promotes reciprocity/cultural sharing or tolerance. In 
Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason (which is a work published around the 
time of his cosmopolitan writings) Kant promotes a clear hierarchy of cultural products 
and religions that seems to lead to the idea that both reciprocity/cultural sharing and 
tolerance are undesirable. So, from Kleingeld’s discussion of the differences between 
Kant, Forster, and Herder, it is clear that both Forster and Herder endorse the kind of 
respect necessary for the establishment of a cosmopolitan community (or in Kleingeld's 
terms, a consistent cosmopolitan theory). However, it is unclear that Kant ever does. And 
this distinction between Forster and Herder (on the one hand) and Kant (on the other) can 
be seen when distinguishing Locke’s thinking from Kant’s. 
Lockean Cosmopolitanism: Moving Beyond What Separates the US: 
Kant’s writings give us an appropriate background for understanding the type of 
community that Locke is committed to establishing, and thus the type of community that 
Locke fears cannot be established due to racial superiority. Fundamentally, this is a 
community of states that are each jointly committed to ending all hostilities (wars). These 
states, each one sovereign, have a republican constitution that satisfies three criteria. 
 Immanuel Kant, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, in Anthropology, 33
History, and Education, ed. Günter Zöller and Robert B. Louden, Trans. Mary Gregor, 
Paul Guyer, Robert B. Louden, Holly Wilson, Allen W. Wood, Günter Zöller, and 
Arnulf Zweig, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007) 407-415.
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First, their respective constitutions are founded on the principle of freedom for all 
members of society. Second, each state is one wherein each member of the state depends 
on a single common legislation. Third, each constitution grants legal equality for every 
member of its society. Additionally, we have states that are hospitable to non-citizens. 
Finally, within the state, citizens possess a willingness to cultural recognition and perhaps 
even cultural sharing (reciprocity), fairness and humbleness in engaging others, as well as 
tolerance. We have seen how the establishment of such a community implies certain sorts 
of relations, and how these relations imply respect between them.  
Locke, in his writings on cosmopolitanism, embraces this basic idea.  Still, 34
Locke has a somewhat extended conception that shows us certain other commitments that 
this basic idea implies. Locke wants to hold more of a culturally and religiously pluralist 
and tolerant position that is not grounded in what he calls a uniformitarian theory of 
culture, religion, and values that might be attributable to Kant when Kant’s notion is 
filled out. What I mean to say here is that Locke takes this basic conception to its furthest 
logical conclusion, showing what a commitment to it implies. 
Now insofar as Locke worked on both race and value theory for the entirety of his 
mature life, my argument (that Locke’s philosophical anthropology and his value theory 
seek to provide a grounding for cosmopolitanism by combatting racial superiority) only 
makes sense if in fact Locke had a conception of cosmopolitanism that can be seen 
throughout his entire mature life. And though Locke doesn't use the term 
“cosmopolitanism” very early in his mature life, he has a clear conception of it, one that 
 In fact, the argument here is that every theory of cosmopolitanism embraces this basic 34
conception.
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can be traced to a series of lectures delivered a year before his Harvard dissertation on 
value theory was defended.  
Locke conceptualizes a cosmopolitan community in the fifth lecture of a series 
delivered at Howard University that have been put into book-format and entitled Race 
Contacts and Interracial Relations.  This conception emerges at the same time as his 35
understanding of racial superiority, and follows very complex conceptions of society, 
beginning with an argument regarding the incipience of societies, their nature, and 
dilemmas that afflict them. In presenting and evaluating Locke's conception of 
cosmopolitanism, I would like to begin with his understanding of society, and then show 
how his conception of cosmopolitanism develops from his understanding of society. 
Locke’s theory of society, which gives us particular insights into principles 
fundamental to his thinking on cosmopolitanism, emerges out of a theory of how 
societies form. For Locke, much like W.E.B. Du Bois’ work written nineteen years before 
his, societies begin, not so much with a contract created by individuals aimed at 
protecting their lives, but by humans naturally coming together on the basis of kinship 
ties.  Here, Locke must assume a sort of loose collection of individual families existing 36
 In Race Contacts, Locke uses the term “culture-citizenship,” as opposed to world-35
citizenship or cosmopolitanism. However, what he seems to mean by it, the method of 
achieving it, and its benefits seem to be in-line with his later works where he explicitly 
uses the term. 
 See W.E.B. Du Bois, “The Conservation of Races.” In this essay, Du Bois argues that 36
races are more socio-historical than biological (though they begin in biology insofar as 
they begin with families). For Du Bois, races emerge as differences in the “ideals of 
life” (the values, strivings, traditions/rituals, etc.) begin to crystalize. Races begin as 
families (and thus have something to do with biology). However, as these families 
begin to share a common history and “ideals of life,” growing into cities and then into 
larger nations, the emphasis on blood lessens. Here, we are able to see that the 
formation of the state begins in families forming bonds, but is realized in the 
confraternity shared between members embracing common “ideals of life.” 
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before the formation of the state, one in which has no set traditions or value-systems, 
whose only concern is with their own wellbeing. In conceptualizing the incipience of 
race-practices, Locke asserts that: “The basis of all social organization is upon some sort 
of kinship; in that sense [,it is clear] that kinship is really at he root of human society.”  37
What Locke claims is that social organization requires cohesiveness––a type of 
familiarity or affinity with each other wherein the members think themselves to be linked 
to each other in some fundamental way. A few lines later, Locke writes that: “A primitive 
civilization made its [kinship] naturally, there being very little infusion of new blood[.] 
Anything large enough to constitute a city or state or tribe had this ethnic relation and 
was of one kith and kin.”  The way that the primitive civilization, in its incipience, was 38
linked together was by blood.  
Locke, again like Du Bois, calls any conglomeration of members a “people”: “If 
you will stop to consider ‘peoples’ as a sort of term that mediates between the [kinship] 
type and the larger ethnic group, what we mean by ‘people’ in the political sense is 
simply the large group or collective of folk that do more or less have a common 
consciousness.”  A people understand themselves and the world in a particular sort of 39
way, and it is on this basis that they are bound together. In the beginning of a peoples’ 
history, there is an emphasis placed on blood. As a people flourishes and develops, they 
become defined by common values, emphasizing less kinship bonds. Locke’s thinking on 
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cosmopolitanism begins here, with the understanding that the world is fundamentally 
constructed of peoples, which we can think of as collective agents who have different 
ways of understanding and thus valuing the world. Locke’s cosmopolitanism is centered 
on bringing them together, and doing so without either disrespecting particular people(s) 
or homogenizing differences. A cosmopolitan community, for Locke, must preserve 
difference as a project aimed at world-scale unity. 
Now, as opposed to Kant, Locke cannot ground the normative force of 
establishing a cosmopolitan community in the same normative principal that causes/
commands rational agents to contract with each other. For Locke, states do not emerge 
out of a contract. And thus, as opposed to Kant, cosmopolitanism cannot be the 
completion of our contract to secure our lives. However, Locke seems to think that we do 
in fact have a reason (perhaps even a normative reason) to establish a cosmopolitan 
community. And like Kant, Locke thinks that we have a reason for establishing a 
cosmopolitan community that traces back to the formation of states, albeit not one 
grounded in contract theory. 
 For Locke, again, states begin with individual families coming together on the 
basis of kinship ties. These families blossom out to form larger communities on the basis 
of similarities in values. However, one might wonder why families blossom out in this 
way. Why do families form larger communities with other families if they are not 
contracting to better secure their lives? Locke thinks that families bind with each other on 
the basis of values because of a natural desire that people have to assemble into 
conglomerates. Locke argues that there is a natural tendency in humans to amalgamate. 
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For Locke, arbitrary distinctions on the basis of race or class “keep people from 
following the natural tendencies which would lead to complete assimilation and 
absorption.”  Locke seems to think that people have a social nature such that humans 40
both desire community with others and social approval, which seems to be the only 
reason why “complete assimilation” is the end of this natural tendency. People tend to 
want to be with others, and tend to want to be looked upon favorably, which both leads 
them into larger conglomerations and would lead to “complete assimilation” if not 
checked. 
Now, though Locke wants to say that the natural tendency is good, insofar as it is 
through this natural tendency that we can hope that humans establish a cosmopolitan 
community, he does think that this natural tendency needs to be checked. Locke does 
think that complete assimilation of all groups is undesirable, and must think that it is 
unnecessary for establishing and living in a cosmopolitan community. Locke tells us that: 
“All of the fundamental tendencies of earlier civilizations are counter tendencies to 
[assimilation] and run against the current of the natural instincts of human beings. So 
much so[,] that the civilized human being has these distinctions ingrained in his 
disposition by centuries of heritage.”  The tendencies of earlier civilization (Locke’s 41
example is India’s caste system) are social divisions that counter the natural tendency to 
amalgamate. Locke continues: “The distinctions are not harmful in themselves, but 





clear, when we investigate Locke's philosophical anthropology as it regards race in 
chapter three, distinguishing between in-group and out-group members is not, in itself, 
negative or unprogressive. The practice becomes negative or unprogressive when it leads 
to disrespecting members of out-groups. In fact Locke thinks that distinctions are quite 
helpful in cultural expressions, particularly art, insofar as they are a means through which 
respect between groups can either be formed or cultivated, and as such are good for the 
aim of establishing a cosmopolitan community.  
As a result, for Locke, not everyone has to embrace the same values, expressions, 
tastes, religions, sexual orientations, etc. And this is a fundamental aspect of Lockean 
cosmopolitanism. More than merely being tolerant of human difference, human unity will 
be grounded in human difference. With regard to assimilation, Locke speaks of this 
concept as what would occur if there were no blocks on people following this natural 
tendency. And what this seems to signal is the strength of the natural tendency to 
associate or assemble into conglomerates. Though complete assimilation should be 
checked, it is because of this natural tendency that we can establish a cosmopolitan 
community. 
There is support for the claim that we have a reason for establishing a 
cosmopolitan community that traces back to the formation of states, albeit not one 
grounded in contract theory. In looking at the formation of states from individual families 
coming together on the basis of value because of a natural inclination to assemble, Locke 
comes to the conclusion that there are fundamental values that all human communities 
have in common. Locke calls these cultural constants (or cultural cognates). For Locke, 
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these are core values that undergird any human community, without which the 
community would not exist. These values must exist at every stage of a community's 
“life” (local community, state, empire, etc.), and thus must be, either explicitly or 
implicitly, embraced by the members of the community. This being the case, Locke 
thinks that we have something of an obligation (perhaps merely a practical obligation) to 
embrace and develop them. If we accept that we are beings who desire social assembly 
(community), and constants are necessary for that end, then we have something of an 
obligation to embrace and develop these constants to the end of satisfying the desire. 
Locke's ultimate claim seems to be that establishing a cosmopolitan community is the 
logical extension, or the completion, of embracing and developing cultural constants that 
aim to satisfy the desire to assemble into conglomerates. Thus, if we have something of 
an obligation to embrace and develop fundamental values––cultural constants––that 
allow a collection of families to be a people, then we have an obligation to establish a 
cosmopolitan community, as this is the highest level of embracing and developing these 
constants. 
Locke gives us his thinking on cultural constants in a few places in his corpus. In 
an essay entitled, “Cultural Relativism and Ideological Peace,” Locke attempts a 
clarification of the cultural relativist position in order to present “the prospects and 
techniques of ‘an enduring peace.’”  Here, I take Locke to mean, in addition to Kant’s 43
notion of ending all hostilities (wars), solving value conflicts that have the potential to 
produce animosity or resentment. Locke’s goal is to layout certain conditions and 
 Alain Locke, “Cultural Relativism and Ideological Peace,” in The Works of Alain 43
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something of a methodology for establishing peace, not only between nations but 
between citizens within nations. What Locke offers is a way in which in-group members 
(irrespective of how this is defined by those members) can amicably relate to members of 
out-groups. And in this clarification, we see Locke’s commitment to much of Kant’s 
vision of cosmopolitanism, along with a bit of an extension of it.  
Locke shows us his agreement with Kant’s latter claims regarding the 
characteristics of a cosmopolitan, namely that the cosmopolitan is tolerant, humble, and 
endorses principles of recognizing and sharing cultural products, while also grounding his 
argument for why we have a reason to establish a cosmopolitan community due to 
cultural constants. In the article mentioned above, Locke writes that “the relativistic 
philosophy nips in the psychological bud the passion for arbitrary unity and conformity. 
This mind-set, we know only too well and sorrowfully, constitutes the intellectual base 
and ideological root of all those absolutistic dogmatisms that rationalize orthodoxy.”  By 44
relativism, Locke does not mean a merely subjectivist position that finds no unity or 
universality in human experience. There are cultural constants. As such, there is 
universality in human experience. Still, relativism rejects absolutism, which is a major 
barrier to Locke’s pluralism and cosmopolitanism. “Absolutes are concepts, or principles 
that are thought to pertain to all human beings, at all times. Absolutism then is the belief 
that the things (at least some of the things) that one values are ultimately justified (or 
justifiable) independently of social or historical conditions, and that the professed values 
apply equally to all human beings regardless of any actual social or historical 
 Ibid.44
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differences”  Locke’s relativism is “a more authentic universalism––that is, a provisional 45
generalization, always open to revision, that is derived inductively from a fair sampling 
of the rich variety of perspectives cultivated by the numerous cultural traditions 
inhabiting our globe, and never a universalism arrived at a priori as some particular 
perspective universally imposed.”   For Locke, a relativistic philosophy “contradicts 46
value dogmatism and counteracts value bigotry without destroying the sense of active 
value loyalty.”   47
Much like Kant in his consideration of the relationship between patriotism and 
cosmopolitanism, Locke thinks that it is important for people (whether citizens––in 
Kant’s case, or communities––in Locke’s case) to be loyal to the ideals of their group 
without overvaluing their group’s ideals in a way that leads to a failure to respect others. 
What Locke thinks is that “absolutism in all its varieties––religious, philosophical, 
political, and cultural––despite the insistent linking together of unity and universality, 
seems able, so far as historical evidence shows, to promote unity only at the cost of 
universality. For absolutism’s way to unity is the way of orthodoxy, which involves 
authoritarian conformity and subordination.”  What Locke requires is our toleration of 48
 Jacoby Adeshei Carter, “New Imperatives for World Order: Alain Locke on Pluralism 45
and Relativism,” in Philosophic Values and World Citizenship: Locke to Obama and 
Beyond, ed. Jacoby Adeshei Carter and Leonard Harris (New York: Lexington Books, 
2010) 217. Absolutes and absolutism with regard to value will be discussed more 
completely in chapter four.
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others’ ideals, from an understanding both that overlaying values (ideals) are a 
development of socio-historical circumstances and that they govern others’ behavior, 
making them important to others, just as our values govern our behavior.   49
Moreover, Locke agrees with Kant’s notion of cultural reciprocity.  Locke tells 50
us that:  
The principle of cultural reciprocity, which, by a general recognition of the 
reciprocal character of all contacts between cultures and of the fact that all 
modern cultures are highly composite ones, would invalidate the lump estimating 
of cultures in terms of generalized, en bloc assumptions of superiority and 
inferiority, substituting scientific, point-by-point comparisons with their 
correspondingly limited, specific, and objectively verifiable superiorities or 
inferiorities….  51
In this passage we see a few things. First, we see Locke pointing to the idea that 
cosmopolitanism is severely challenged by superiority, which reduces to value 
superiority.  Second, as we will see in chapter three, Locke thinks that cultures are 52
highly composite, meaning that cultures form through a process of intergroup contact and 
sharing. (Further, intergroup sharing allows cultural development and it, along with the 
respect for differences––a sort of essentialism––progresses cosmopolitanism by 
producing/cultivating respect between people.) Locke thinks that if we understand the 
composite nature of cultures and cultural development, then we are more likely to be 
 We may understand “overlaying ideals (values)” as those values that separate people, 49
but that are built upon the cultural constants that make our people possible. On pg. 551 
of “Cultural Relativism and Ideological Peace,” Locke says that these “overlaying 
ideals” produce “deceptive but superficial institutional divergence.”
 Again, it is not certain that Kant promotes this idea. For Kleingeld, Kant comes to 50
appreciate cultural reciprocity towards the middle of the 1790’s.
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open to reciprocation deriving from an attempt to understand others’ cultures. What we 
see here is the idea that earnest attempts at understanding and sharing promotes respect, 
or the perception of, attitude of acknowledgement towards, and treatment of a person as a 
deserving bearer of rights equal to our own. But more than that, cultural reciprocity 
seems to lead to a deeper since of hospitality (in the Kantian sense), where it becomes 
much more likely that out-group members will become guests for having presented 
themselves. And this would perhaps be more likely on both an individual and state level. 
Now, Locke thinks that coming together in this way is possible once we see that, 
fundamentally, we all (as groups and individuals) embrace particular “functional” values. 
What this amounts to is that all communities’ cultures are built on certain values, and all 
reasonable individuals within these communities embrace these values. In a critical 
passage, Locke asserts the following that promotes a greater level of reasonableness in 
our interrelations: 
The principle of cultural equivalence, under which we would more wisely press 
the search for functional similarities in our analyses and comparisons of human 
cultures; thus offsetting our traditional and excessive emphasis upon cultural 
difference. Such functional equivalences, which we might term “culture-
cognates” or “culture-correlates,” discovered underneath deceptive but superficial 
institutional divergence, would provide objective but soundly neutral common 
denominators for intercultural understanding and cooperation….  53
Again, Locke thinks that there are fundamental similarities in our cultures’ value-systems, 
and that these similarities ultimately trace back to the ways in which communities are 
formed. Locke claims that these constants are the bases by which we can understand 
(perhaps even in the strong sense of sympathizing with) each other, and are the reasons 
 Alain Locke, “Cultural Relativism and Ideological Peace,” 551.53
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why cooperation is possible. If cosmopolitanism requires understanding and cooperation, 
which seem to be entailed in both Kant’s and Locke’s argument, then these constants go a 
ways in explaining how cosmopolitanism is possible. 
Now, Locke does not explicitly say what these cultural constants are. For 
instance, Locke suggests that it is the job of science (here, I think that Locke means 
anthropology) to investigate different cultures to find cultural constants, and can 
investigate these cultures properly if doing so from a culturally relativistic framework.  54
Further, while thinking that our noticing differences in value-systems does not necessarily 
lead to constructing value-hierarchies wherein others’ value-systems are ranked lower 
than ours in a way that causes our disrespecting them, Locke seems to think that belief in 
fundamental differences in value-systems increases the chances of constructing value-
hierarchies and would decrease the natural tendency to assemble. Thus, noticing that we 
are more similar, fundamentally, than we are different allows us to search out differences 
by socio-historical circumstances as opposed to essential composition. A socio-historical 
explanation for value-differences seems to allow us to better appreciate others’ value-
systems through seeing them as “not-so-different” from our own.  
Though Locke does not explicitly state what these cultural constants are, and even 
seems to aver that they have not yet been discovered, we can infer both from his words 
and his thought on the formation of the state certain values that there must be cultural 
constants. We know that Locke thinks that people have an inclination (and a desire) to 
assemble into conglomerates. Thus, in answering the question of which values are 
 Alain Locke, “The Ethics of Culture,” in The Works of Alain Locke, ed. Charles 54
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necessary for a community to exist, we need to first ask which values satisfy the desire to 
assemble. A better way to get at this is to ask which values would people promote insofar 
as they desire to move from individual families to larger assemblies? This would allow us 
to see which values must be constants.  
From this idea and Locke’s own words, it would appear that people would desire 
democracy such that democracy is a cultural constant. Now, by democracy Locke means 
two things. First there is political democracy, wherein political power is vested in the 
citizens of the state. Democracy in this way is government by the people. However, in 
addition to political democracy, Locke has more of a fundamental understanding of 
democracy that conditions political democracy. Consider Locke’s words:  
In fact, it will be a tragedy as catastrophic as military defeat itself should the 
Atlantic charter turn out to be another deceptive mirage of war rationalization. For 
it not to be, it will need to become the long-awaited Magna Carta of the colonial 
people, an international bill of rights for all minorities, and a revolutionary 
extension of the democratic principle of equality to cover the parity of all peoples, 
races and nations.  55
Here, Locke seems to builds democracy in the political sense on a more basic form of 
democracy. Here, democracy has a “principle of equality.” Consider Locke here: “Just as 
the foundation of democracy as a national principle made necessary the declaration of the 
basic equality of persons, so the founding of international democracy must guarantee the 
basic equality of human groups.”  Political notions of democracy rely on a more basic 56
notion of democracy, one essentially characterized by the equality in freedoms and the 
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essential equality of persons in treatment before the law. By democracy being a cultural 
constant, Locke would mean something like the presumption that, as a human I am equal 
to all others. My voice is just as important as all others, and my rights and freedoms do 
not exceed, or are not judged below, others’ rights or freedoms. And this reading seems to 
be confirmed by Locke’s thinking that there are five types of democracy, namely local, 
moral, political, economic, and cultural.  If there are five types of democracy, with 57
political democracy being one type, then we are seemingly licensed to infer that there 
must be an understanding of democracy that unifies the five types; there must be a 
definition of democracy that allows us to categorize each of them under the concept.  
Now, Locke shows many convergences with Kant in this passage. In the essay 
from which this passage has been taken, Locke is describing world democracy. And we 
can take him to think that world democracy conditions cosmopolitanism. Locke tells us 
that:  
[I]f the new democracy is to be realized, are irresponsible national sovereignty, 
power politics, military and economic imperialism, racialist notionals [sic] of 
world rule and dominance, the persecution of particular minorities and the bigotry 
of cultural superiority. This is a formidable list, but it seems to be the indicated 
strategy of the war as well as the imperatives of the peace. These are the stakes of 
world democracy….  58
Like Kant, Locke seems to recognize that cosmopolitanism requires certain types of 
states, as Locke tells us that it is an imperative that we spread political democracy in 
order to counter totalitarianism.  What Locke sees is growing momentum for certain 59
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types of government that cannot possibly produce a cosmopolitan community. Thus, it is 
up to democratic nations to restore and create confidence in democracy so that 
cosmopolitanism becomes possible. We may infer from this that Locke thinks that certain 
forms of government are necessary in order for cosmopolitanism to be established. Locke 
supports the basic Kantian vision of the type of commitments a state must have in order 
to contribute to establishing a cosmopolitan community. 
 In the passage, Locke seems to recognize that political democracy, which is the 
type of government necessary to establish a cosmopolitan community, implies certain 
types of relationships. Locke tells us that: “The net outcome, it would seem, is an 
objective finding that democracy, looked at nationally or internationlly [sic], is seriously 
beset with internal inconsistencies, political, social, and cultural. It is weakened by these 
all the more as it tries to pull itself together as a corporate body of United Nations 
fighting a world defense of democracy.”  Locke thinks that these relations imply respect, 60
defined principally by the equality of persons, and that the lack of respect is the reason 
why there are internal inconsistencies.  Locke argues that: “Morally speaking, then, the 61
crucial issue is whether our vision of democracy can clear-sightedly cross the color line, 
and whether we can break through the barriors [sic] of color and cultural racialism to 
reach the necessary goal of world democracy. Certainly here, both nationally and 
internationally, color becomes the acid test of the basic honesty and self-consistency of 





perception and treatment of non-white people, creates the instability that challenges the 
establishment of world democracy.  
Now, nothing stated licenses the inference that democracy is a cultural constant. 
In other words, I have yet to say why Locke thinks that democracy is a cultural constant. 
In a very little article wherein he gives us the five distinct phases of democracy (local, 
moral, political, economic, and cultural democracy), Locke states:  
Thinking Negroes, of course, know much about what democracy is not, and have 
a more workable conception of what democracy truly means than those who have 
just enough to be content with or those to whom it is just a commonplace concept 
and way of life. Democracy, of course, is one of the basic human ideals, but as an 
ideal of human association it is something quite superior to any outward 
institution or any particular society; therefore, not only is government too narrow 
to express democracy, but government from time to time must grow to realize 
democracy.  63
For Locke, particular African Americans know the antipodal of democracy because of 
what they experience in America. Still, Locke considers democracy to be one of the basic 
human ideals. By this, Locke must mean either that democracy is an ideal fundamental to 
the human spirit or that it is a cultural constant. For reasons that will be discussed in 
chapter four, namely that Locke is not committed to value-realism, Locke cannot think 
the former. Further, Locke suggests that democracy is an ideal of human association. 
What he seems to suggest to us is that the basic ideal of democracy, as one that implies 
the basic equality of persons, conditions associations between persons. In short, he seems 
to think that the ideal of democracy is assumed in associations, and is necessary in order 
for associations to function in any productive or progressive way. 
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Suggesting that democracy is a cultural constant is not at all absurd. One can 
imagine that when we freely form groups or associate with others there is an assumption 
that our voices will be heard, that we will be considered equal to the other persons who 
we associate with, and that the freedoms that our associates enjoy will not be denied to us 
for our associating with them. If so, then we would seemingly refrain from the 
association. And though communities, people, states, etc., do not practice them perfectly, 
or even very well at all, there seems to be a basic assumption by those forming the 
various groups that they should. Moreover, this ideal could be said to condition 
revolutions, protest when “injustices” have occurred, or peoples’ welcoming political 
democracy when given the opportunity, and seems to be at work in micro-communities 
where associations are free (even within undemocratic states). 
Now, it is clear that Locke does not think that democracy is the only cultural 
constant. In “Pluralism and Intellectual Democracy,” Locke claims that:  
There would also be the further possibility of a more objective confirmation of 
many basic human values, and on a basis of proof approximating scientific 
validity. For if once the broader relativistic approach could discover beneath the 
expected culture differentials of time and face such common-denominator 
“universals” as actually may be there, these values would stand out as 
pragmatically confirmed by common human experience. Either their observable 
generality or their comparatively established equivalence would give them status 
far beyond any “universals” merely asserted by orthodox dogmatisms. And the 
standard of proof would after all not be very different from the accepted scientific 
criterion of proof;— confirmable invariability in concrete human experience.  64
Here, Locke tells us that with an investigation, principally one grounded in value 
pluralism with corollaries of tolerance and reciprocity, we are able to discover a 
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multiplicity of core values that undergird what can only be human social-experience. He 
thinks that many of the values that we hold will then show themselves, in a justifiable 
way, to be universals. And it is clear that Locke thinks that we both can and need to 
discover them. Consider Locke once more: 
Since we cannot banish our imperatives, we must find some principle of keeping 
them within bounds. It should be possible to maintain some norms as functional 
and native to the process of experience, without justifying arbitrary absolutes, and 
to uphold some categoricals without calling down fire from heaven. Norms of this 
status would be functional constants and practical sustaining imperatives of their 
correlated modes of experience; nothing more, but also nothing less. 
Locke took there to be many cultural constants that connect different cultures and peoples 
by showing humans’ experience to be more similar than different. My goal has not been 
to give us Locke’s entire view on the matter of cultural constants. It is doubtful that 
Locke’s view was complete on the issue. Rather, I took as my aim to show that Locke 
thought there to be cultural constants that ground human experience.  
Locke relies on cultural constants to show us the possibility of cosmopolitanism 
by showing us the similarities or the connectedness of humanity and human communities. 
Further, Locke seems to show us that a cosmopolitan community is the logical extension, 
or the completion, of embracing and developing cultural constants. Thus, if we have 
something of an obligation to embrace and develop fundamental values that allow a 
collection of families to be a people, then we have an obligation to establish a 
cosmopolitan community, as this is the highest level of embracing and developing these 
constants. However, we are able to see the challenge that racial superiority poses to 
establishing this kind of community that we seem to have some sort of obligation to 
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establish. In Race Contacts, Locke states that “race prejudice is really fundamentally 
based upon the differences in social culture and the differences in type of civilization.”  65
Racial prejudice emphasizes racial differences in a rank-ordered system, rank-ordering 
human worth by that system. And Locke tells us that this is done biologically.  What 66
biologically rank-ordering human worth in accordance with fundamental or essential 
differences in values produces is a denial of respect to certain peoples.  
Locke’s thinking on society and racial superiority leads us squarely to an 
investigation of its cause, a cause to which I not turn. I would like to investigate the 
philosophical roots of racial superiority, looking at how the idea of non-white inferiority 
arose out of a scientivizing of racial difference. These racial differences get cashed out in 
terms of value-differences, which are natural and insurmountable. And insofar as they 
are, non-white inferiority is thought to be permanent. This will (in the third and fourth 
chapters) lead to Locke’s engagement with racial superiority on anthropological and 
axiological grounds.  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Is it Because I'm Black: Racist Theories and Practices: 
“And always the study of the abnormal seems to establish what is really normal. If we 
regard certain of the reactions of race contacts as abnormal phenomena in society, 
perhaps, in society, we not only gain a scientific notion of what they themselves are, but 
gain in addition a knowledge of what the normal functional reactions of human society 
are and should be. In the light of the abnormal, the normal constitutes itself.” 
––Alain Locke, Race-Relations and Interracial Contacts 
Introduction: 
The title of the present chapter, “Is it Because I’m Black,” is the title of a very 
moving song written by Syl and Jimmy Johnson. The lyrics of the song speak to the lack 
of respect for African Americans that derive from ideas of racial superiority. And while 
African Americans have made important gains in achieving equal treatment in America, 
and while we have made important strides towards cosmopolitanism in political relations, 
racial superiority continues to be one of (if not the) most significant hurdles to achieving 
a cosmopolitan community. As we will see, racial superiority is grounded in the belief 
that there are differences between human races such that certain races produce (either 
necessarily or arbitrarily) particular cultures with specifically different values, and that 
there is a hierarchy of human values that allows for the human beings that make up these 
races to be rank-ordered, many of which place white peoples at the top of the order. As 
such, racial superiority has an anthropology regarding race (as well as a value theory) that 
is behind it, one that it has both created and reasserts.  
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In this chapter I would like to elucidate philosophical anthropologies as they 
regard race and race-contacts that Locke was responding to with his theories on race and 
race-contacts. To this end, I focus not so much on the state of affairs for African 
Americans during the time that Locke was developing his theories, but on the philosophy 
that has, in many ways, produced and justified it. This is to say that I minimally elucidate 
the state of affairs for African Americans through the history of the concept of race as 
developed in anthropology, as it began to become more than merely exploratory, but a 
matter of scientific analysis. As one might imagine, the thinking about, and thus treatment 
of, African Americans (and in fact all non-white and certain white peoples) was quite 
bleak during Locke’s lifetime. Theories of race during this period recreated, justified, and 
reinforced non-white inferiority, and by large is a significant reason why respect could 
not be conferred to these groups in race-contracts. Thus, my reasoning behind devoting a 
chapter to certain historical figures' philosophical anthropologies regarding race is to set 
the stage for the issue, namely the racial superiority, that Locke introduced his theories of 
race and value to combat.  
Locke’s theory of race, upon which his value theory stands, is made in 
consideration of theories of race and race-contacts that either deny races as facts in the 
world and those that draw a necessary connection between races and culture-types and 
products, and then deny that certain races have cultures that are worthy of respect. Most 
of his work that seeks to reject the second conjunct takes aim at Arthur de Gobineau.  1
Specifically, Locke attempts to respond to two claims that are fundamental in Gobineau's 
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work, namely that races are products of God and that there is a necessary connection 
between race and culture such that races must produce certain culture-products which can 
be objectively judged to have greater or lesser value than the culture-products of other 
races.  And as such, certain races are inherently better than others insofar as they are able 2
to produce culture-products that other races cannot because of natural limitations placed 
on them by God. Thus, Locke takes aim at the idea of natural superiority and inferiority 
(and in-fact the very concepts of superiority and inferiority as they relate to humanity) 
that is averred by Gobineau. 
Now, with very few exceptions, Gobineau's ideas are not original. The idea that 
races are natural and that certain races are superior to others because culture-productive 
capacity is fixed is an idea that can be found earlier in philosophical anthropology––in 
both Immanuel Kant and Johann Friedrich Blumenbach. Kant’s philosophical 
anthropological statements were made to show that all humans had the same origin and 
were of the same species. This argument was made against those who thought that racial 
distinctions signified differences in origin.  Thus, Kant cannot be taken to exclude certain 3
races from the human community, and thus claiming that certain races were unworthy of 
any respect. However, as we have seen, it may very well be the case that Kant became 
aware that his anthropology as it relates to racial divisions had major problems for his 
moral and cosmopolitan considerations.  
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Kant and the Scientific Division of Man: 
Kant begins a rather lengthy list of persons who attempted to make racial 
divisions, and thus philosophical anthropology as it regards a division of races, a matter 
of science. Until Kant, European racial distinctions were made by travelogues and 
Christian missionaries who provided information about different peoples’ appearances 
and customs. This produced pressure to develop a more academic/scientific notion of 
race.  Insofar as Locke responds to what he takes to be scientific misconceptions of race, 4
I would like to begin looking at Locke's response to racial superiority by examining how 
it is elucidated and defended by Kant. 
Now, though Kant conceptualized members of all races as members of the same 
human race, Kant's goal was to account for the differences in human beings that he 
thought licensed him to categorize people as members of different races; he thought that 
he must account for the subcategories into which human beings should be placed. And 
Kant accomplishes this with the concepts “germs” and “predispositions.” Kant claims 
that: “The grounds of a determinate unfolding which are lying in the nature of an organic 
body (plant or animal) are called germs, if this unfolding concerns particular parts; if 
however, it concerns only the size or relation of the parts to one another, then I call them 
natural predispositions.”  Germs and predispositions account for differences in human 5
 Robert Bernasconi, “Who Invented the Concept of Race?: Kant’s Role in the 4
Enlightenment Construction of Race,” in Race, ed. Robert Bernasconi (Malden: 
Blackwell Publishing, 2001) 13.
 Immanuel Kant, “Of the Different Races of Human Beings,” in Anthropology, History, 5
and Education, ed. Günter Zöller and Robert B. Louden, Trans. Mary Gregor, Paul 
Guyer, Robert B. Louden, Holly Wilson, Allen W. Wood, Günter Zöller, and Arnulf 
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beings insofar as environmental conditions have affected or influenced them for some 
time at the beginning stages of the human species’ development. Kant thought that human 
beings, in the beginning of history, were destined for all climates, insofar as humans had 
germs and predispositions that would allow them to adjust to, or survive in, all climates.   6
Though human beings were destined for all climates, settlement in a particular 
climate for a lengthy period of time (at or towards the beginnings of human history) 
allowed particular germs and predispositions within the human organism to flourish, 
while suppressing other germs and predispositions because of a lack of use or need. Once 
particular germs and predispositions flourished or were suppressed, these developments 
were reproduced in humans’ offspring unfailingly. In other words, suppressed germs and 
predispositions will continue to be latent in humans’ offspring, irrespective of changes to 
the offspring’s environment. In fact, Kant seems to think that radical changes in the 
condition of the offspring, once the humans’ offspring has become accustomed to 
particular environmental conditions, can retard the posterity of the offspring.   7
For Kant, the theory of unfolding germs and predispositions accounts for what he 
thought to be large differences between human subcategories while at the same time 
allowing Kant to claim a sameness in all human origin. Human beings have the same 
origin, and this original group possessed equivalent germs and predispositions. Yet, as 
human beings were affected by their respective environments, some germs and 
 As an aside, Kant thought that the human species being destined in this way was 6
evidence that humans were on a path towards the establishment of a cosmopolitan 
community. Kant reasoned that humans were destined to spread across the earth 
because nature intended humans to seek peace.
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predispositions were able to flourish and others were suppressed in different racial 
groups. The differences in the suppression and flourishing of germs and predispositions 
are what accounts for racial difference. 
So, from changes in germs and predispositions, which stem from the influence of 
environmental conditions, namely air and sun (but also diet, bathing, etc.), we get 
difference in human beings. For Kant, only those differences that occur unfailingly in the 
human organism can allow one to be classified as a member of a race. Kant thinks that 
varieties, strains, and sorts within groups of people can change without marking a 
difference in racial classification. For instance, there can be black haired or blond haired 
strains within a particular racial category.  However, insofar as hair types are not 8
reproduced unfailingly, they do not demarcate differences in races. And with regard to 
races, Kant will argue that there are four main types: White; Negro; Hunnish (Mongolian 
or Kalmuckian; and Hindu). All other races have derived from these. 
Now, Kant would have us to believe that only physical properties account for 
differences in races. Kant tells us that: “What comes into question for establishing a 
division of the species into classes [of races] are the physical characters through which 
human beings…differ from one another, more precisely, only those physical characters 
which are hereditary. Now these classes are to be called races only if those characters are 
unfailingly hereditary….”  This passage makes it quite clear that what is supposed to 9
 Immanuel Kant, “Of the Different Races of Human Beings,” 87.8
 Immanuel Kant, “Determination of the Concept of a Human Race,” in Anthropology, 9
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determine classification into races are physical properties, not psychological or moral 
ones. However, when speaking about different races, Kant seems to leave this thinking 
behind, smuggling in psychological traits with clear implications for the culture that is to 
derive from these races, and thus the values that will characterize the races. Certain races 
are more worthy of respect because they possess certain psychological traits (as they are 
defined using value-terms).  
In his works, Kant tells us that laziness and immorality are inherently found in 
Negroes, along with weakness and lack of intelligence being inherent in Indians. And 
these, Kant thinks, are a part of the natural predispositions of these two races.  They are 10
clear value-terms that will play out in the respective cultures, and will be fundamental to 
the value-systems of the Negroes and Indians.  
And as opposed to these races, Kant locates the highest type of human beings 
(which can only be understood in physical, intellectual, moral, and aesthetic terms)—
those who have been most fortunate due to environmental conditions in the development 
of germs and predispositions—in Germany. In fact, Kant thinks that it is fair to assume 
that the pheletic species (the original human race) is from Germany because of the 
superiority of features inherent in this group.  Here, one is able to see a clear hierarchy 11
for the races, and even a bit of an intra-racial hierarchy, a hierarchy in which becomes 
clearer when one looks at Kant’s Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the 
 Immanuel Kant, “On the Use of Teleological Principles in Philosophy,” 209, and “Of 10
the Different Races of Human Beings,” 93.
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Sublime, where he rank-orders races, intra-racial groups, and even men and women 
according to natural predispositions in temperaments toward beauty or sublimity.  12
Now, Kant’s thinking on the division of human beings into races will have a very 
devastating effect for non-white people. Here, one is able to see a rank-ordering of human 
beings that accords to psychical properties from which culture and values will derive. 
Further, Kant thinks that races have degenerated from one higher race, which will come 
to be thought of as a master race, and which he claims has greater physical and psychical 
properties. And though Kant seems to think that all persons deserve respect insofar as 
they are persons (irrespective of the divergent levels of intellect or cultural capability), 
and thus that a cosmopolitan community might be possible because basic respect, and 
therefore moral obligations that include the obligation to be hospitable, is conferred to all 
human beings as persons, one should wonder about the possibility of establishing such a 
community because of the social instability that this will create and the lack of equality in 
rights that this implies (a fact that Kant himself, if we accept Kleingeld's suggestions, 
became aware of). If someone is by nature inferior to another, ought he/she to enjoy 
equivalent rights before the law, even if he/she can legitimately make certain moral 
demands that are equivalent to a superior man or woman. What of the social instability 
that is caused by a person receiving particular jobs and other social goods when that 
 Immanuel Kant, Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime, in 12
Anthropology, History, and Education, ed. Günter Zöller and Robert B. Louden, Trans. 
Mary Gregor, Paul Guyer, Robert B. Louden, Holly Wilson, Allen W. Wood, Günter 
Zöller, and Arnulf Zweig, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007) 53-62. Also 
see, Alix A. Cohen, “Kant on Epigenesis, Monogenesis and Human Nature: The 
Biological Premises of Anthropology,” Science Direct, 37 (2006). In this article, Cohen 
argues that for Kant, temperament is a part of natural predispositions in both races and 
genders.
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person is deemed inferior to another vying for the job or social goods. We will come back 
to this discussion. For now, it is enough to show that Kant’s philosophical anthropology 
shaped thinking on race that would allow the value-hierarchies implied by racial 
superiority, which are the hierarchies that Locke’s theory of value is constructed to 
combat. I would like to push forward in showing the anthropological background that 
influenced Locke’s anthropology through Gobineau. This discussion continues with an 
examination of Blumenbach’s philosophical anthropology. 
Blumenbach and the Degeneration of Man: 
Blumenbach’s philosophical anthropology diverges from Kant’s in many ways. 
However, like Kant's, it has been influential insofar as it has had a great affect on the way 
that people are rank-ordered. Essentially, the ways in which persons are rank-ordered, 
and thus valued as members worthy of respect are equivalent in both Kant and 
Blumenbach. Thus, like Kan’s anthropology, Blumenbach’s philosophical anthropology 
presents challenges to the possibility of establishing a cosmopolitan community because 
of its use in establishing and justifying the lack of respect conferred to non-white peoples.  
Blumenbach sets up his study by proposing a stark contrast between humanity and 
animals. This distinction is essentially grounded in the faculty that makes humans both 
superior to, and worthy of dominion over, animals. Blumenbach writes that the “gifts in 
which man so far surpasses the rest of the animals, of whatever disposition and nature 
they may be, we call reason.”  For Blumenbach, this gift was implanted into humanity 13
 Johann Friedrich Blumenbach, On the Natural Variety of Mankind, 3rd edition, in The 13
Anthropological Treatises of Johann Friedrich Blumenbach (Boston: Milford House, 
1973) 183.
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by God so as to allow them to accommodate the environments into which humans were 
to dominate. “Hence, even from the most ancient times, by the wisest nations, the chief 
power of man, that is, the genius of invention, has been celebrated with divine honors.”  14
Reason's divine superiority is confirmed, for Blumenbach, in its having been glorified 
throughout human history. What is evident here is that Blumenbach does not want to 
establish humanity's natural superiority in physical properties, but psychical ones. And 
this should be understood when engaging Blumenbach, insofar as the implication of 
ranking reason as the highest or “most divine” mark of a being is that arguments for this 
feature being unevenly distributed among human groups by God (or nature) produces the 
result that certain groups are superior to others, and that this superiority is designed by 
God (or nature). We will see this shortly. 
However, it is important to see how Blumenbach sets up the derivation of human 
beings into races. Blumenbach gives us two ways to think about human origins: “whether 
the origin can be traced to degeneration, or whether it is not so great as to compel us 
rather to conclude that there is more than one original species of man.”  As such, 15
Blumenbach suggests, as did Kant, that we must begin by engaging the debate between 
monogenesis, where all human beings have a common origin, and polygenesis, where 
humans have different origins. Apparently, Blumenbach thinks that if monogenesis is 
true, then degeneration is also true––that all races degenerate from an original race.  This 16
 Ibid.14
 Ibid, 188.15
 Justin E.H. Smith, Nature, Human Nature, & Human Difference: Race in Early 16
Modern Philosophy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015) 253.
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initial assumption, much like that found in Kant, will lead Blumenbach to set up the 
problem of human origins such that part of the goal of anthropology is to make inferences 
as to what the original race was or looked like, and to attempt to match it with a current 
race on earth, averring that one race is most like the original race (if not the original race), 
while all others are further degenerations from this original race. In both Blumenbach's 
and Kant's construction, the race that most matches the original race will be that race that 
is superior to the further degenerated races. And this is an idea that Gobineau will pick up 
on. 
Now Blumenbach further sets up the problem by laying out what a species and a 
variety are. Afterwards, Blumenbach attempts to justify a position on the potential origin 
of human races by specifying whether they are of a different species or variety. With 
regard to a species, Blumenbach writes that: “We say that animals belong to one and the 
same species, if they agree so well in form and constitution, that those things in which 
they do differ may have arisen from degeneration.” Blumenbach seems to think that 
species-inclusion relies on exactness in the essential nature or construction of the animal, 
perhaps with regard to shape and function, that cannot be explained by adaptations or 
external conditioning. Blumenbach continues: “We say that those, on the other hand, are 
of different species, whose essential difference is such as cannot be explained by known 
sources of degeneration, if I may be allowed to use such a word.”  Here, Blumenbach 17
rejects a very significant supposition in the Kantian claim of species-differences leading 
to the demarcation of races, namely Buffon’s rule “that animals which produce fertile 
 Johann Friedrich Blumenbach, On the Natural Variety of Mankind, 188.17
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young with one another (whatever difference in shape there may be) still belong to one 
and the same physical species….”  For Blumenbach, there is nothing that licenses this 18
inference because we cannot observe all animals in nature, which Blumenbach takes to be 
required if we are to prove the rule true; one would need to observe animals that are not 
(and in fact cannot be) in contact with each other in order to prove this rule true. 
Blumenbach uses the example of the orang-utan and the chimpanzee as evidence. We 
cannot know whether these are of the same species because they do not share a natural 
habitat and therefore are not naturally in contact with each other. Bringing them together 
would disqualify a principle presupposition of the rule, namely the need for nature to be 
the instrument producing fertile offspring from these two animals.  For Blumenbach, 19
“the principle sought to be deduced from copulation is not sufficient to define the idea of 
species and its difference from variety, so neither are the other things which are adduced 
with this object, for example, the constancy of any character.”  In separating different 20
varieties of the same species of elephant, Blumenbach avers that: “I see, for example, that 
the molar teeth of the African elephant differ most wonderfully in their conformation 
from those of the Asiatic. I do not know whether these elephants, which from such 
different parts of the world have ever copulated together; nor do I know any more how 
constant this conformation of the teeth may be in each.” Here, copulation is not the 
deciding factor in determining whether two animals are of the same species. “But since, 
so far in all the specimens which I have seen, I have observed the same difference; and 
 Immanuel Kant, “On the Different Races of Human Beings,” 84.18
 Johann Friedrich Blumenbach, On the Natural Variety of Mankind, 189.19
 Ibid, 189-190.20
!62
since I have never known any example of molar teeth so changed by mere degeneration, I 
conjecture from analogy that those elephants are not to be considered as mere varieties, 
but must be held to be different species.”  As such, a variety seems to regard animals 21
that possess equivalent essential features, diverging only in what is not essential to how 
an animal functions or is constituted.  
Blumenbach’s understanding of species and variety may appear to be 
scientifically suspect. What allows animals to be determined as varieties of the same 
species or of a different species altogether seems to be the perception and judgment of the 
anthropologist, with no evidence being required externally. In other words, there does not 
seem to be a need to justify the perception and judgment of the anthropologist with 
phenomena in the natural world. Further, an anthropologist's demarcation of what counts 
as essential seems arbitrary. One might wonder what criteria Blumenbach's uses in 
determining which features or properties of an animal are essential to its constitution or 
function. For Blumenbach, anthropological classification is an explicitly subjective and 
arbitrary art. This seems to be in stark opposition to Kant’s more scientific method of 
observing the offspring of two animals. Kant’s understanding takes classification outside 
of the classifying subject, and places it within a process of nature that is in some sense 
independent of the subject, namely copulation. Observation is confirmed by a separate 
process of phenomena in the world. 
However subjective Blumenbach’s classificatory scheme for animals might be, he 
argues that it should extend to humans, insofar as “the same causes should be assigned to 
 Ibid, 190.21
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account for natural effects of the same kind.”  Blumenbach’s statement here is 22
ambiguous. Blumenbach's adherence to a rule attributed to Newton can be interpreted in 
two potential ways. First, Blumenbach could be claiming that if we have determined a 
way to classify animal-species and separate them into varieties, then we should use this 
classificatory scheme to understand humans. Second, Blumenbach could be claiming that 
every kind of classification for deriving the differences in varieties of animals should 
apply to differences in humankind, such that we can know if/how to categorize varieties 
of humans. This interpretation seems plausible given the next two sentences: "We must 
therefore assign the same causes for the bodily diversity of the races of mankind to which 
we assign a similar diversity of body in the other domestic animals which are widely 
scattered over the world."  Here, Blumenbach states that if we claim that animals 23
diverge in variety, where they are members of the same species, then we should expect to 
be able to find varieties of humankind, who are members of the same species. 
Thus, Blumenbach appears to mean the latter, namely that every kind of 
classification for deriving the differences in varieties of animals should apply to 
differences in humankind, even though his use of the term “kind” is left undefined if he 
does mean the latter. The reason why Blumenbach seems to mean the latter is because he 
seems to account for the first when he writes his second rule for answering the question 
of the application of the animal-species/variety issue to humankind, namely “that we 




phenomena.”  Therefore, Blumenbach reasons, if degeneration, and by implication 24
monogenesis, is sufficient to explain differences in human groups, then we need not 
complicate or multiply explanations by averring polygenesis. Further, what Blumenbach 
seems to think is that monogenesis is a simpler explanation than polygenesis. 
In applying the classificatory scheme to humankind, Blumenbach lists several 
animal-traits as those that are altered when degeneration occurs. These are the color, hair 
texture, stature, figure/proportion of parts, and most importantly skull size of the 
animal.  And the causes of these features of degeneration, namely changes in climate 25
(primarily exposure to air), diet, and mode of life, will set the stage for value-hierarchies 
as implications of racial superiority.  
Blumenbach gives a theory of degeneration by first constructing a theory of 
generation, whereby he proposes that generation is the result of the interplay between 
physical and the immaterially God-infused substances. Of the causes of degeneration, 
Blumenbach tells us that when certain external stimuli has a constant effect on the 
formative force of an animal over several generations, changes in the animal occur.  26
Now for Blumenbach, the formative force is that which exists within the sperm cell of a 
male that has the essential form, force of development, and (teleological) future of the 
animal within it. Blumenbach tells us: “That the genital liquid is only the shapeless 
material of organic bodies, composed of the innate matter of the inorganic kingdom, but 





under certain circumstances of maturation, mixture, place, &c. to put on the form 
destined and determined by them.…”  Sperm cells are infused by God with a form that 27
develops and performs certain functions. And Blumenbach distinguishes this formative 
force as an invisible and perhaps unintelligible or indescribable force that is “excited by 
the stimuli which belong to it, that is, by the kindling of heat in the eggs during the 
process of incubation. But as other vital forces, as contractility, irritability, &c. put 
themselves out only by the mode of motion, this, on the other hand, of which we are 
talking, manifests itself by increase, and by giving a determinate form to matter.”  For 28
Blumenbach, this allows each animal to replicate itself through propagation. 
“Now the way in which the formative force may sometimes turn aside from its 
determined direction and plan is principally in three forms.”  Blumenbach tells us that 29
these are either genetic mutations that we might think of as deformations, cross-
fertilization/breeding, and degenerations into varieties. As stated, degenerations occur 
when formative forces begin to alter to accommodate changes in climate or diet, or 
differences in modes of life (cultivation, education, habit, etc.).   
Thus, with regard to the varieties of the human race, changes in climate, diet, and/
or modes of life have caused the singular human race to degenerate from an original 




 Blumenbach originally provides four varieties of human beings in the earlier 1775 30
publication of On the Natural Variety of Mankind. However, by the 1795 edition, he 
claims that there are five principal varieties of human beings, insofar as he adds the 
American (Natives) to the variety of natural races.
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variety has its own unique skin-color (white (Europeans), yellow/olive-tinge (Mongolian 
nations), copper (Americans), tawny (Malay race and those of the Souther Archipelago), 
tawny-black (Ethiopian nations)), which are the results, primarily, of exposure of the skin 
to the air and sun. Blumenbach writes that “the approximate cause of the adust or tawny 
colour of the external integuments of the skin, is to be looked for in the abundance of the 
carton in the human body, which, when it is excreted with the hydrogen through the 
corium, and precipitated by the contact of the atmospheric oxygen, becomes imbedded in 
the Malpighian mucus.”   31
Now, while it may be questionable as a justification for the claim that there are in 
fact varieties of human beings, Blumenbach’s assertion that differences in human skin 
that have been caused by exposure to air and sun is innocent enough when considering 
our connection between philosophical anthropology and the respect that cannot be 
conferred to non-white people. However, Blumenbach makes assertions about skin-color 
that clearly contributes to racial superiority, and shows themselves to be linked to value-
hierarchies, which present a problem for cosmopolitanism. Though one might think that 
there is no greater beauty or value to be attributed to skin color because skin color is 
merely the result of exposure to air and sun, Blumenbach clearly rank-orders humans 
because of it. Blumenbach rank-orders human beings in a problematic way for 
cosmopolitanism in three principal ways. First, Blumenbach places whites at the top of a 
rank-ordered hierarchy in terms of aesthetic valuation. Second, Blumenbach  places 
whites at the top of a rank-ordered hierarchy in terms of social values. Finally, 
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Blumenbach places whites at the top of a rank-ordered hierarchy in terms of intellectual 
properties. The result of this is that non-whites appear less deserving of equal respect in a 
way that makes establishing a cosmopolitan community problematic insofar as the 
images of non-whites are perceived as less respectable.   
One is able to observe the aesthetic value-hierarchies that Blumenbach provides 
with his claim that white skin is brilliant, particularly when he makes the claim in 
comparison to the jaundiced skin of every other race.  For Blumenbach, warmer climates 32
have had an affect on non-whites’ skin and liver, causing both the jaundiced skin and 
white region of the eyes. And this is, in-turn, caused by the “abnormal” amounts of 
carbon buildup in the blood that must be purified.  As such, for Blumenbach non-whites’ 33
liver and skin (which are the two principal organs of blood-purification) work too hard. 
What we have here is Blumenbach asserting that non-white skin-color is abnormal.  And 34
thus, Blumenbach appears to have greater justification in claiming that white skin-color is 
more aesthetically valuable than non-whites.  
Blumenbach provides more evidence for his aesthetic overvaluation of whites 
over non-whites with his assertion that he prefers to name whites the caucasian variety: “I 
have taken the name of this variety from Mount Caucasus, both because of its 
neighborhood, and especially its southern slope, produces the most beautiful race of 
 Ibid.32
 Ibid.33
 More than this, one can infer that Blumenbach thinks that non-white people are 34
abnormal, insofar as the manner in which non-white bodies function is to some extent 
unnatural and contrary to its proper function. This inference is licensed by 
Blumenbach's likening the occurrences of non-white's skin-behavior with a pathology.
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men.”  Here, Blumebach is clear that whites have more aesthetic worth than every other 35
race. And this claim is supported both by the more perfect symmetry attributed to the 
white face, which makes it the most handsome and becoming, and the belief that the 
white color is “the primitive colour of mankind, since...it is very easy for that to 
degenerate into brown, but very much more difficult for dark to become white, when the 
secretion and precipitation of this carbonaceous pigment has once deeply  struck root.”  36
Finally with regard to aesthetic value-hierarchies, one can observed that the 
description of every non-white racial variety makes them aesthetically inferior to the 
white variety.  Blumenbach is careful in choosing his adjectives and adverbs when 37
describing the varieties of humans. White cheeks are rosy, chins are full and rounded, 
faces are handsome, skulls are beautiful. Non-white hair is stiff, foreheads knotty and 
uneven, noses are apish. Blumenbach is careful to load his descriptions of other varieties 
with aesthetic value-laden terms, such that readers will come away with a devalued view 
of non-whites. 
Blumenbach makes further claims that contribute to the over-valuation of whites 
over non-whites with claims about the social values of whites verses non-whites, which 
derive from his arguments about skin-color. Blumenbach argues that whites value 
healthier dietary lifestyles and leisure more than non-whites, and this contributes to the 
jaundiced skin-color that non-whites have.  Thus, the social lives of non-whites can be 38
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deemed less valuable, and as a result, less worthy of respect in relation to white social 
lives. In short, whites’ cultural values are more conducive with “the good,” and thus more 
respectable than non-whites’ cultural values. 
Moreover, Blumenbach makes statements about the intellectual properties of the 
races that have direct bearing on the worthiness of respect for non-white persons. 
Blumenbach argues that “the temperament of most inhabitants of tropical countries is 
choleric and prone to anger” as a result of their being influenced by climate. What 
Blumenbach tells us is that the effect of climate on non-white people, the same effect that 
produces the effects on non-white skin and liver and produces the jaundice and color-
variations that are irreparably permanent, produces psychological effects that make 
certain varieties of humankind more irascible, and thus more prone to violence than other 
varieties. Now, Blumenbach admits that the darker the color, the more effect that climate 
has had on the skin and liver. And if this is the case, then one is licensed to infer that 
whites are least irascible, while blacks are most irascible. In fact, one has a clear 
hierarchy of proclivities towards violent behavior that regards the varieties of humankind. 
And this hierarchy is both grounded in nature and permanent insofar as it is natural that 
climate has this affect on varieties and these affects do not admit to change.  
Now, to be fair to Blumenbach, he seems to waver on the permanent inferiority of 
non-whites’ intellectual capacities, though does so in a way that maintains a racial 
hierarchy relating to intelligence. In his later writings, Blumenbach argues that non-white 
races are capable of cultivating intellectual gifts if they are exposed to white culture. 
Thus, Blumenbach seems to diverge from those who argue of the inability of non-white 
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races becoming intellectually gifted; Blumenbach seems to dismiss the view that non-
whites are irrevocably inferior in intellectual capacity because of a natural lack in 
intellectual properties. In Contributions to Natural History, Blumenbach concedes that 
blacks have intellectual gifts, and possess the ability to rival whites in areas that require 
advanced levels of abstraction or reasoning skills. He cites Anton Amo and Phillis 
Wheatley, and claims to possess works by Jac. Elisa Joh. Capitein. He states clearly that 
he refutes the idea that “the negroes are specifically different in their bodily structure 
from other men, and must also be placed considerably in the rear, from the condition of 
their mental capacities.”  However, Blumenbach does not seem to think that blacks can 39
maximize their intellectual capacities without contact with whites. Thus, while blacks 
might have intellectual capacities that are not completely stunted or non-existent by 
nature, Blumenbach still seems to think that blacks are intellectually inferior to whites, or 
that there is a hierarchy at play that whites are at the top of, while blacks––being 
dependent on contact with whites for intellectual development––are somewhere 
underneath whites (presumably at the bottom of the hierarchy ). Consider Blumenbach, 40
who tells us that:  
 Johann Friedrich Blumenbach, Contributions to Natural History, in The 39
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 My reason for inferring that Blumenbach ranks blacks’ intellectual capacity at the 40
bottom of the hierarchy is due to his argument that blacks and Mongolians are the most 
degenerated varieties of human beings, while whites are the least degenerated and his 
further claim that whites are “better” than other races because they are the least 
degenerated. If being least degenerated makes a variety better than another, and a 
different variety is most degenerated, then it is hard to see why the most degenerated 
variety’s intellectual capacity can be anywhere but at the bottom of the hierarchy, 
particularly considering Blumenbach's prioritizing of reason as the most estimable trait  
among living beings in the world. 
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I am of opinion that after these numerous instances I have brought together of 
negroes of capacity, it would not be difficult to mention entire well-known 
provinces of Europe, from out of which you would not easily expect to obtain off-
hand such good authors, poets, philosophers, and correspondents of the Paris 
Academy; and on the other hand, there is no so-called savage nation known under 
the sun which has so much distinguished itself by such examples of perfectibility 
and original capacity for scientific culture, and thereby attached itself so closely 
to the most civilized nations of the earth, as the Negro.  41
Here, while admitting the capacity for intellectual acuity in blacks, Blumenbach seems to 
both suggest that this capacity is more observable in Europe and that blacks need to be in 
contact with “civilized” nations (which is a code-word for European nations) for their 
intellectual acuity to develop well. Thus, Blumenbach denies the natural superiority of 
white intellectual capacity that Kant admits (namely that it is permanent), while affirming 
the equivalent racial superiority that Kant ends with. And this non-natural version of 
racial superiority is equally problematic in establishing a cosmopolitan community 
because it elevates certain people (namely, their values) and makes other groups less 
worthy of respect. In fact, Blumenbach's non-natural version of racial superiority would 
seem to aver that blacks must acknowledge the superiority of European values in making 
strides to cultivate develop their intellectual acuity. Thus, if it could lead to the 
establishment of a cosmopolitan community, adopting Blumenbach's version would lead 
to a uniformitarian method of establishing a cosmopolitan community, one where strict 
and intolerant adherence to one set of values is the basis of a lasting peace. For many 
reasons, this uniformitarian method is one that Locke vehemently rejects. 
Gobineau and the Divine Superiority of Whites: 
 Johann Friedrich Blumenbach, Contributions to Natural History, 312.41
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Insofar as the views of Kant and Blumenbach have been elucidated, we now have 
some grounding for understanding Gobineau’s philosophical anthropology (which is that 
body of work that Locke’s philosophical anthropology attempts to challenge most). My 
argument is that both Kant and Blumenbach provide key anthropological ideas that 
Gobineau constructs his philosophical anthropology around. Kant gives Gobineau the 
idea of monogenesis and non-white inferiority, along with the concept of race as a 
concept “whose scientific status could at least be debated.”  Blumenbach gives 42
Gobineau degeneration theory, which is the theory that differences in races can be 
explained by the degeneration of humans in accordance with external changes.  
Gobineau’s philosophical anthropology, which incorporates ideas from Kant and 
Blumenbach, emerges out of his attempt to satisfy two inquiries. First, Gobineau inquires 
into the nature of a state's failure. Gobineau’s philosophical anthropology emerges out of 
an attempt to “know not merely the immediate causes of the plagues that are supposed to 
chasten us, but also to trace the more remote reasons for those social evils which the most 
meagre knowledge of history will show to have prevailed, inexactly the same form, 
among all nations that ever lived, as well as those which survive to-day, evils that in all 
likelihood will exist among nations yet unborn.”  Gobineau’s philosophical 43
anthropology emerges out of a very noble goal, which is to account for those necessary 
and sufficient––and thus universal and consistent––factors that cause states to fail. 
Gobineau’s answer to the question is “that the inequality of the races from whose fusion a 
 Robert Bernasconi, “Who Invented the Concept of Race?: Kant’s Role in the 42
Enlightenment Construction of Race,” 11.
 Arthur de Gobineau, The Inequality of Human Races, trans. Adrian Collins (New York: 43
Howard Fertig, 1999) ix-x.
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people is formed is enough to explain the whole course of history.”  Thus, Gobineau’s 44
philosophical anthropology is an attempt to satisfy a second inquiry: “Are there serious 
and ultimate differences of value between the human races; and can these differences be 
estimated?”  As we will see, for Gobineau, naturally unequal groups of people 45
conjoining together, and more to the point, groups of people coming together in such a 
way that equality is conferred to unequals, is the plague that causes nations to fail.  
Gobineau’s thinking on the failure of states has implications for establishing a 
cosmopolitan community. What this explanation for the failure of states will amount to is 
that establishing cosmopolitan community is the worst thing for the world, insofar as 
cosmopolitanism brings people together in a way that naturally leads to the mixing of 
blood by conferring equal rights, and therefore equal respect, to all persons––persons 
who are unequal by nature. And thus, while Gobineau will concede that principles of 
cosmopolitanism are noble, they are unnatural. Taking this into account, it is no wonder 
why Locke targets Gobineau’s philosophical anthropology specifically. I begin with this 
idea (as Gobineau himself does), namely that mixing blood leads to the decay of states 
and that cosmopolitanism is unnatural. Afterwards, I illustrate Gobineau's theory of race 
and the problematic nature that it creates for the establishment of a cosmopolitan 
community. 
Now, in determining the consistent and universal laws governing the decline and 




Gobineau, God’s hand guides history. Considering this principal for understanding 
history from the ancients, Gobineau writes that: “The wisdom of the ancients yields little 
that throws light on the subject, except one fundamental axiom, the recognition of the 
finger of God in the conduct of this world; to this firm and ultimate principal we must 
adhere.”  This principal is important because it shows that for Gobineau, the laws by 46
which states fail are (in essence) divinely inspired. God has set into place certain 
universal laws in God’s movement through the history of the world. Gobineau also 
adheres to a second principal, namely that “all societies perish because they are sinful.”  47
This principal is important because it shows that any human ideas, commitments, values, 
or principals causing states to fail derive from human sin, and as sinful must be 
understood to be contrary to God’s commands. What we are licensed to infer from these 
two laws is as follows: if any human ideas, commitments, values, or principals that cause 
states to fail derive from human sin, then they must be understood to be contrary to God’s 
command. Thus, since human ideas about, commitments to, or values or principals of 
cosmopolitanism are those that cause the failures of states, then those relating to 
cosmopolitanism are sinful and are contrary to the command of God. Further, if we add to 
this that the finger of God is in the conduct of this world, then we may infer that God is 
behind the failure of states that embrace cosmopolitanism, precisely because they 




because it is sinful––is divinely unjust (though, again, Gobineau will acknowledge that 
principals fundamental to cosmopolitanism are noble).  
In arguing that mixing blood leads to the decay of states, and that principals that 
promote it––principals that confer equality to natural unequals in a way that can perhaps 
be understood as overvaluing lesser valuable items on a divinely-set chain of natural 
beings––are unjust, Gobineau first lists conditions that are not both necessary and 
sufficient causes of a state's decay. These conditions are fanaticism, luxury, moral 
corruption, and irreligion. Using the Aztecs and other New World (but non-European) 
peoples as examples, Gobineau seems to use the term fanaticism to convey the idea of a 
deplorable or heinous religion, perhaps religion that is either too rigid or extreme in its 
beliefs or practices. For Gobineau, fanaticism cannot be the cause of decay in states 
because there have been European nations that have decayed without practicing 
fanaticism. Additionally, there have also been New World nations that have possessed 
power and wealth at the height of embracing fanatic views or practices. “Thus fanaticism 
does not cause the fall of States.”  Further for Gobineau, luxury is neither a necessary 48
nor sufficient condition for the decay of a state because he claims to observe such in 
England and Russia, two states that for him are at the height of vitality.  
Very interestingly, Gobineau claims that moral corruption is neither a necessary 
nor sufficient condition for the decay of a state. Gobineau's reasoning is that: “From the 
beginning of history, there has been no human society, however small, that has not 
 Ibid, 8. 48
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contained the germ of every vice.”  While not claiming that moral corruption goes hand-49
in-hand with the formation of the state, Gobineau seems to think that states have not 
functioned without every imaginable vice. Moreover, Gobineau claims that there need not 
be an imbalance between moral and immoral agents in a state for the state to decay, 
where moral agents are outnumbered by immoral agents. To the contrary, Gobineau 
claims that “men of strong character, men of talent and energy, so far from being 
unknown to human societies in the time of their decadence and old age, are actually 
found in greater abundance than in the days when an empire is young.”  Gobineau does 50
not mean to suggest that there are more moral agents in a totalitarian, dictatorial, or 
tyrannical state. What Gobineau thinks is that the state’s social and political temperament 
is more moral in its decay. Gobineau tells us that “the ordinary level of morality is higher 
in the later period than in the earlier.” Gobineau’s claim is that in decline, a state becomes 
more moral, both as an entity possessing a greater quantity of moral agents as well as an 
entity possessing more moral laws and values. “Far from admitting the superior moral 
character of early societies, I have no doubt that nations, as they grow older and draw 
nearer their fall, present a far more satisfactory appearance from the censor’s point of 







The reason why Gobineau's thinking on the lack of a necessary connection 
between moral corruption and a state's decay is interesting is because Gobineau seem to 
draw a distinction between morality/moral corruption and divine justice/sin (contrarity to 
God’s commands). Both moral laws/values and an increase in moral men seem to be 
operating contrary to God’s commands in a decaying state, such that a state’s increasing 
moral commitments lead to a state’s increasing sin because the state’s moral laws/values 
confer equality to natural unequals. What one can see here is the strength of the idea of a 
hierarchy in nature whose respect is mandated by God. One can think of this by appeal to 
the idea of a great chain of being.  From it one can infer the power of the belief in, and 53
commitment to, non-white inferiority. Treating non-white lesser beings equally will be 
sinful, and will be sinful even if we assume the morality of the principals aimed at 
conferring equality to non-white beings.  
Likewise it is interesting that Gobineau argues that irreligion, which he describes 
as merely the loss of the faith of the “fathers” of the state, is neither a necessary nor 
sufficient factor that causes the decay of a state. Gobineau's reasoning is that he sees no 
discontinuity or breaks in the religious views of (European) nations, particularly before 
Christianity.  This is interesting because one would expect Gobineau to argue that states 54
have failed insofar as they have not been Christian states, and that a Christian state that 
 See Arthur O. Lovejoy’s The Great Chain of Being: A Study in the History of an Idea. 53
In this text, Lovejoy tells us that: “No history of the biological sciences in the 
eighteenth century can be adequate which fails to keep in view the fact that, for most 
men of science throughout that period, the theorems simplicity in the conception of the 
Chain of Being continued to constitute essential presuppositions in the framing of 
scientific hypotheses.” Though Lovejoy is speaking primarily about biology, I would 
argue that anthropology appeals to the same idea. 
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looses its commitment to Christianity would fail. However, Gobineau seems to think that 
even Christian states could fail, and their failure could have nothing to do with a loss of 
Christianity. Thus, Gobineau thinks that he has “shown that fanaticism, luxury, and the 
corruption of morals have not necessarily any power of destruction, and that irreligion 
has no political reality at all….”  55
So, Gobineau gives his impressions about what factors are neither necessary nor 
sufficiently for causing a state to decay. Gobineau, giving us the necessary and sufficient 
factor that causes a state to decay, claims that when a state decays, “it is because it has no 
longer the same vigor as it had of old in battling with the dangers of life; in a word, 
because it is degenerate.”  Gobineau claims that the necessary and sufficient factor 56
causing a state to decay is a state’s degeneration, where what declines is the vigor that 
once defined such a state’s glorious vitality. In a very important passage defining 
degeneration, Gobineau writes the following: 
The word degenerate, when applied to a people, means (as it ought to mean) that 
the people has no longer the same intrinsic value as it had before, because it has 
no longer the same blood in its veins, continual adulterations having gradually 
affected the quality of that blood. In other words, though the nation bears the 
name given by its founders, the name no longer connotes the same race; in fact, 
the man of a decadent time, the degenerate man properly so called, is a different 
being, from the racial point of view, from the heroes of the great ages.  57
Here, Gobineau’s philosophical anthropology begins to come into play when answering 





with a God-given level or type of vigor that gives it a particular value.  The level or type 58
of vigor that characterizes the blood of different races is neither qualitatively nor 
quantitatively equal. As such, one can see immediately that all human beings have not 
been created equally. Some people are qualitatively better, or more valuable, than others. 
This God-given vitality within the blood of races accounts for certain groups’ ability to 
successfully produce better cultural gifts and civilizations. However, when blood mixture 
occurs between greater and lesser (superior and inferior) groups, the vitality of the 
superior blood diminishes. Thus, the cultural gifts and civilizations of superior people 
lessen and decay. Now, if the blood of particular people is divinely infused with certain 
talents for greatness, then these groups must have some kind of teleological end for 
which the blood was given.  Given this idea, one can see why Gobineau thinks that 59
blood admixture with inferior groups would be sinful, insofar as diminishing the vigor in 
the blood would cause the superior group to fail to produce the end for which its blood 
was given by God. 
Now, in proving that the decay of states is caused by degeneration, Gobineau 
gives us a way to conceptualize a people’s formation into a state that leads up to 
civilization. This way is broken into three stages of civilization at which races can be 
observed. About the first a stage, Gobineau tells us that: “I take a people, or better, a 
 There reason why race is in quotations here is because earlier on in the text, Gobineau 58
seems to use the term race to describe a nation. 
 This idea of a teleological end for which the blood of a race was given is also inferable 59
from page 39 of The Inequality of Human Races, where Gobineau tells us that “if on the 
one hand human societies are called equal, and on the other we find some of them 
frivolous, others serious…it stands to reason that these differing nations must have 
destinies which are also absolutely different, and, in a word, unequal.”
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tribe, at the moment when, yielding to a definite vital instinct, it provides itself with laws 
and begins to play a part in the world. By the mere fact of its wants and powers 
increasing, it inevitably finds itself in contact with other similar associations, and by war 
and peaceful measures succeeds in incorporating them with itself.”  This step, for 60
Gobineau, marks the first step in a race becoming a nation (call it the embryo society), 
and thus is the lowest rung on the ladder of civilization. Gobineau reserves this step for 
the Polynesian negroes, Samoyedes, and the majority of African races.  Gobineau thinks 61
that these races are absolutely incapable of civilization. 
Those who have reached the second stage in a race becoming a nation 
“understand that if they wish to increase their power and prosperity, they are absolutely 
compelled, either by war or peaceful measures, to draw their neighbors within their 
sphere of influence.”  For Gobineau, communities at this stage have some of the 62
characteristics of a highly developed civilization such as class distinctions and an 
industrial system. Still, Gobineau tells us that those stuck at this stage are stagnant. 
Finally, “there are others, more imaginative and energetic, whose ideas soar 
beyond mere brigandage. They manage to conquer great territory, and assume rights of 
ownership not only over the inhabitants, but also over their land.”  For Gobineau, these 63
are the highest or qualitatively better races. And thus, if the great chain of being organizes 
beings in distinct ways, and tells us how much respect to accord to each type on the 





chain, then within the chain there is a chain of human races, telling us how much respect 
we must accord to humans that regards the stage of a races’ civilization that derives from 
the vigor in the blood that God has infused the races with. 
We are able to see the different stages of civilization that accords to different races 
and how certain races are qualitatively better than others because of the vigor or energy 
given by God. However, one might question what this has to do with cosmopolitanism. 
While Gobineau does not use the word “cosmopolitanism,” he clearly has it in mind 
when considering decay in the state. Gobineau thinks that every state, at its beginning, 
both recognizes and respects a fundamental principal that it loses sight of as it matures, 
namely that human races are unequal. Gobineau tells us that: “Every people, great or 
small, has begun by making inequality its chief political motto. This is the origin of all 
systems of caste, of nobility, and of aristocracy, in so far as the last is founded on the 
right of birth.”  Gobineau seems to think that respect for this divinely-mandated and 64
therefore natural principal makes nations great, insofar as “[t]he stronger will play the 
parts of kings and rulers in the tragedy of the world. The weaker will be content with a 
more humble position.”  What we see here is that the idea of natural inequality informs 65
how agents within the state are to relate to each other, and is in a way that unevenly 
distributes goods and gives certain members more rights than others. This creates castes, 
classes, etc., on which the social markers that higher civilization stages are predicated. 




However, problems arise when, as states mature, the stronger and lesser races 
within the state begin to behave more favorably towards each other, and because of the 
mixing of blood, reject this principal of natural inequality in favor of the idea of human 
equality, thereby lessening the necessity of keeping the blood of the better races pure. 
Gobineau writes that “when the majority of citizens have mixed blood flowing in their 
veins, they erect into a universal and absolute truth what is only true of themselves, and 
feel it their duty to assert that all men are equal.”  Gobineau continues: “They are also 66
moved by praiseworthy dislike of oppression, a legitimate hatred towards the abuse of 
power; to all thinking men these cast an ugly shadow on the memory of races which have 
once been dominant, and which have never failed…to justify to some extent many of the 
charges that have been brought against them.”  Thinking in this way causes citizens 67
(both the greater and weaker race-members who compose a state) to reject the laws of the 
ancestors that respected the principal of inequality among humans, which is the 
presupposed and divine law upon which high civilization was built. As a result, laws and 
customs are changed.  And this movement away from the laws and customs of the 68
ancestors of the state causes the decay of the state. 
Several things can be inferred from Gobineau’s thinking. First, it is clear that 
Gobineau does not think that this movement is immoral. Gobineau thinks that the “dislike 
of oppression” is praiseworthy. He refers to the morality of humans in the late stages of a 





cosmopolitan ideas of human brotherhood. Still, Gobineau thinks that this idea of human 
brotherhood is both contrary to fact and nature: “The curious point is that the theory of 
equality, which is held by the majority of men and so has permeated our customs and 
institutions, has not been powerful enough to overthrow the evidence against it; and those 
who are most convinced of its truth pay homage every day to its opposite.”  And if 69
human brotherhood is contrary to both fact and nature, then cosmopolitanism (which 
relies on the idea of human brotherhood in claiming that all humans are citizens of the 
world) is both contrary to fact and nature. 
Secondly, it would appear that Gobineau rejects cosmopolitanism for the reason 
that cosmopolitanism ultimately relies on respect for all humans, which he views as being 
inconsistent with the factual, natural, and divinely-mandated principal of racial 
superiority (as an inequality of gifts distributed to human races where Europeans possess 
greater intellectual, aesthetic, and bodily gifts), which implies value hierarchies. For 
Gobineau, it is certainly true that the mixing of blood causes the decay of a state, and as 
such is sin. But beyond this, Gobineau seems to be committed to the view that the 
equality of rights, and thus the respect accorded to inferior races, is just as sinful.  
For Gobineau there is a natural order to the universe that ought be regarded, and 
regard for this natural order requires inferior races understanding their inferiority, and 
thus accepting the humble positions in the state that are proper to them. Superior races 
must understand their superiority and rule over inferior races. And Gobineau does not 
think that superior races should rule without “oppression.” It is unclear what oppression 
 Ibid, 38.69
!84
is for Gobineau, outside of the idea that superior races rule. Beyond this, when defining 
the “bad” institution, Gobineau asserts that “bad institutions are those which, however 
well they look on paper, are not in harmony with the national qualities or caprices, and so 
do not suit a particular State, though they might be very successful in the neighboring 
country.”  Notice that Gobineau does not define the bad state as that state that abuses 70
power, but as a state that does not remain true to the spirit of the ancestors that cause it to 
flourish in accordance with its divine end.  
Likewise, Gobineau seems to claim that a good state can be oppressive, so long as 
those who ought to rule do in fact rule and do so in a manner that is consistent with its 
ancestors. Gobineau writes that: “On the contrary, other institutions are good for the 
opposite reason, though they might be condemned, from a particular point of view or 
even absolutely, by the political philosopher or the moralist.”  What this shows is that, 71
unlike Locke, Gobineau does not think that healthy social and political relations imply 
respect, but that inequality in rights, and therefore inequality in respect, is the basis of 
healthy social and political relations. Cosmopolitanism, and the equality in respect that it 
requires, destabilizes the state. And this is expressly the pattern of argument that Locke 
wants to reject, insofar as Locke is attempting to argue that the establishment of a 
cosmopolitan community is possible only if the value hierarchies of racial superiority are 
false and rejected. Locke's argument, much like Kant’s, is that the possibility of a 




This respect is inconsistent with racial superiority because of the value hierarchies that 
are implied by racial superiority.  
Now, the racial superiority that implies value-hierarchies is cashed out in terms of 
Gobineau's commitment to white Europeans’ intellectual, aesthetic, and bodily 
superiority. In giving us his racial hierarchy, Gobineau gives us three human types: black; 
yellow; and white. For Gobineau: “The negroid (black) is the lowest, and stands at the 
foot of the latter, the animal character, that appears in the shape of the pelvis, is stamped 
on the negro from birth, and foreshadows his destiny. His intellect will always move 
within a very narrow circle.”  And though Gobineau argues that the intensities of black 72
people’s desires, passions, and will––in a word, sensations––are strong, he tells us that: 
“The very strength of his sensations is the most striking proof of his inferiority.”  Blacks’ 73
sensations lead them to violently pursue objects of desire, and thus render blacks 
immoral.   74
The yellow type is the exact opposite. He lacks ambition and physical energy, is 
apathetic, and has feeble desires.  This lack of ambition causes mediocrity and the feeble 75
desires cause comfort with life that could never create beauty or technology. Still, 
Gobineau argues that Asians are superior to blacks, insofar as they are neither violent nor 
antisocial. Asians can at least temper their wills so as to create and live within society. 






Whites have a higher intellectual capacity than both Asians and blacks. They are 
ambitious, setting them above Asians in their capacity for innovations, and yet not too  
ambitious, setting them above blacks in their ability to temper their wills.  With regard to  76
morality, Gobineau tells us that: “When they are cruel, they are conscious of their 
cruelty…” , which seems to suggest that whites are at least conscious of moral 77
obligations, and therefore have the capacity for moral principles. Unlike both the yellow 
and black races, whites have honor, which gives them “reasons why they should 
surrender this busy life of theirs, that is so precious to them.”   78
As such, there will exist value-hierarchies in both the humans and the culture-
products that are produced by them. And for Gobineau, these hierarchies, particularly as 
relating to blacks, are immune to influences such as Christianity and educational 
training.  Christianity and educational training can only affect those who have the 79
capacity to be civilized. As such, the hierarchies are permanent and unchangeable.  80
The Racial Superiority that Became: 
What we see in each of these thinkers is a commitment to the idea that white 
peoples are inherently superior to non-white peoples. We see that the commitment to 
racial-superiority is grounded in inherent and permanent differences in aesthetic, 







from each people.  These culture-differences are reducible to value-differences, and 81
allow us to rank-order each people. On this point, Locke tells us that “the denial of 
[cultural] equality, through the hard discipline it inflicts, has just this tendency to spur on 
and build up a moral and spiritual superiority.”  Bound up with the commitment to the 82
idea that whites are inherently superior to non-whites is the idea that non-whites are less 
worthy of respect. Natural inequalities in traits lead to suggested inequalities in rights that 
result in inequalities in treatment. This inequality in treatment can be understood as the 
result of prejudice (defined as race antipathy),  which Locke describes in the following 83
way: 
[P]rejudice[,] as far as we have traced it in this lecture[,] is simply an abnormal 
social sense, a [perversion] of a normal social instinct, which falsely attributes to 
certain arbitrary ethnological and biological factors, sociological and social 
standards which do not pertain to them at all, and which therefore operate to bring 
about the discrepancies which we confront when we see people who are on the 
way to conforming to the civilization type, denied participation and recognition in 
society, as if nothing mattered but their color or their kind.  84
 Though all three thinkers commit to the permanency of aesthetic, physical, and 81
intellectual differences separating the races, Kant claims that talk of race is merely talk 
of physical distinctions (though he includes value-terms in describing racial 
differences), Blumenbach’s later work contradicts his earlier work on the permanency 
of intellectual differences, and Gobineau does not seem to be licensed to infer 
permanent intellectual differences separating the races that he wants to, inasmuch as 
there is degeneration of the vigor of superior races––which can only translate to the 
lessening ––when they mix blood with inferior races.
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For Locke, humans have a natural sociability that causes them to want to commune and 
share with others (as stated in chapter one), though they may feel a stronger level of 
confraternity with members who share their value-systems (as will be discussed in 
chapter three). This desire to commune and share with others can become perverted by 
beliefs about the inherent nature of a group’s value-systems, perhaps because of beliefs 
about the groups’ intellectual, aesthetic, and physical traits that produce the value-
systems. These systems become indicative of races' color or particular phenotypical traits 
that are inherent and come to define the group. And the group is denied participation and 
recognition, in a word––respect, because of the phenotypes that signal value-differences.  
All three of the thinkers who are the subjects of this chapter are committed to this 
thinking, and Locke thinks that this thinking is quite pervasive. The pervasive nature of 
this thinking, for Locke, is a serious challenge to establishing a cosmopolitan community: 
Even in circles that are so representative and stable that they should have no 
hysteria on the subject of race amalgamation, “no social equality,”— in short, 
“White Supremacy,”— is held to be the one reservation every typical White man 
is supposed to make and every typical Negro is expected to concede. Cultural 
recognition, on the other hand, means the removal of wholesale social 
proscription and, therefore, the conscious scrapping of the mood and creed of 
“White Supremacy.” It means an open society instead of a closed ethnic shop. For 
what? For making possible free and unbiased contacts between the races on the 
selective basis of common interests and mutual consent, in contrast with what 
prevails at present,— dictated relations of inequality based on caste psychology 
and class exploitation.  85
 Alain Locke, “Should the Negro be Encouraged to Cultural Equality?,” 288.85
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Here, one can see that Locke thinks that racial superiority is an ideology that whites 
expect other whites to embrace, while every black (and non-white) person concedes. In a 
word, Locke thinks that whites expect to govern the world.   86
Locke tells us that cultural recognition leads to the removal of racial superiority. 
These two seem to go hand in hand, and thus cultural recognition and what follows from 
it cannot both be consistently affirmed if racial superiority is affirmed. What unfolds from 
the removal of racial superiority is nothing other than our movement towards 
cosmopolitanism, namely the opening up of society in a way that promotes the free and 
unbiased contacts that serves common interests, along with mutual consent. As such, 
what is required if we are to move towards cosmopolitanism is a displacement of racial 
superiority, which relies on differences in the worth of races, and which are grounded in 
differences in value-systems that can be rank-ordered. Locke seeks to displace racial 
superiority with in two ways. First, Locke attempts to rethink the concept of race in the 
study of humanity, which is to say that Locke develops a philosophical anthropology 
relating to race that is distinct from those who are the subject of the present chapter. This 
shows that racial differences are not products of nature or God. Second, Locke attempts 
to displace the value-hierarchy that undergirds racial superiority directly, arguing against 
the view that certain values are “better” than others. I now turn to Locke’s philosophical 
anthropology that relates to race, saving Locke’s second attempt for chapter four.  
 Locke makes a similar argument relating to white superiority and its function in the 86
world in Race Contacts, pg. 29.
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Chapter 3  
Alain Locke on Science and Race, and the Science of Race: 
“Reason, feeling, and imagination, united in the most beautiful dance, are the Graces of 
life…. Oh, how has anybody dared to accuse nature of denying this beautiful harmony of 
predispositions to nine-tenths of our brothers! For the point of unification of all nations 
lies in the core of their essence….” 
––Georg Forster, “On Local and General Bildung” 
Introduction: 
In the previous chapter, we saw three philosophical anthropological positions that 
create a necessary link between race and culture such as to rank-order certain racial 
groups. Certain cultures, defined by their values, are inherently and irrevocably better 
than others. This makes the people who compose certain groups better or more valuable 
than others. This cashes out to those people being more worthy of respect. And what this 
ultimately does is that it challenges the possibility of establishing the cosmopolitan 
community that was the subject of the first chapter. In this chapter, I would like to 
elucidate Locke’s understanding of race and culture/cultural differences as one half of 
Locke’s attempt to challenge the racial superiority that ultimately makes the 
establishment of a cosmopolitan community impossible. Locke had a rather peculiar view 
of race and culture (particularly for his time) that, in addition to an avalanche of racial 
theories and prejudiced treatment, needs to be understood so that one may have a proper 
framework for understanding Locke’s thinking on value. In fact, one might aver that the 
pluralism of Locke’s value theory emerges out of his anthropological arguments on race 
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and culture such that there is an ontology that produces his axiology. And as such, in 
understanding his axiology, we must begin by understanding the anthropology lying 
underneath it.  
Now, it is my argument that Locke wants to prove value-hierarchies false so as to 
be able to assert the possibility of establishing a cosmopolitan community. However, 
Locke does not merely attack the falsity of racial superiority with his value theory, but 
attacks the theories of race that imply value-hierarchies, namely that there are divinely-
mandated or natural differences between racial groups that confer certain groups a 
capacity for certain types of culture that are better or more advanced than others. And 
Locke does this in a number of ways.  
Firstly, Locke attacks the anthropological (biological/physiological) method of 
investigating races, and argues that we need a correct starting-point for understanding 
race. For Locke, a correct starting-point for understanding races is of such significance 
for three principal reasons. First, Locke thinks that the concept of race is both wedded to 
American society, and though it can shift or take different meanings, it will not be 
eliminated. Second, Locke thinks that the concept of race is a useful concept for both 
understanding cultural development as well as for an oppressed people. For Locke, the 
concept of race has pragmatic value. Third, Locke thinks that understanding race is the 
first step towards solving race-conflict. For Locke, understanding race gives us an 
understanding of society. Locke conceptualizes race and race contacts as a much older, 
much more pervasive, form of contact that provides insights into other complex social 
relations.  
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Secondly, Locke attacks anthropological theories that support value-hierarchies 
insofar as he attacks the objectivity of analysis as it regards anthropological notions of 
humanity. For Locke, one cannot understand humanity divorced of bias. One never 
merely interpreting physiological movements. When one investigates humanity, one 
attempts to understand motivations. Understanding human motivations requires 
interpretation, which implies the influence of biases. In attacking objectivity, Locke 
seems to be attacking scientific notions of race, though, perhaps paradoxically, Locke 
will argue that a (sociological, as opposed to a biological) science of race is necessary. In 
evaluating Locke, I seek to show that Locke is correct in his thinking, insofar as he aims 
to give us a critique of anthropologists’ claim to be presenting unbiased or objective 
understandings of race; anthropologists claim to present a view of humanity uninfluenced 
by human motives. Thus, the anthropologists claim to study humans like biologists study 
fish or geologists study rocks.  
In addition to clearing up the starting-point for inquiry into the study of races, as 
well as attacking the method and fundamental assumptions in anthropological 
investigations, Locke attacks the connection between culture and race. For Locke, we 
should think of races as being the products of culture, not culture being the determined 
product of races. Thus, while preserving the connection between race and culture, Locke 
both severs the necessary correlation between the two, and gives race a socio-historical 
origin.  
What Locke does by forcing us to rethink the connection between race and culture 
is to redefine race, moving it away from biology and placing it in sociology. However, as 
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one can already see, this is not enough to combat white racism, insofar as Locke’s more 
sociolo-historical understanding can still leave value-hierarchies intact, merely locating 
them in history as opposed to making them timeless by either nature or divinity. Thus, 
Locke will need to attack value-hierarchies implied by racial superiority. And this, in part, 
is the reason for Locke’s theory of value, which will be the subject of the next chapter.  
Locke on the Significance of, and Starting-point for, Understanding Race: 
Locke gives us his understanding of the significance of studying race throughout 
his life, beginning with his text, Race Contacts. Locke begins the text with the statement 
that “so complicated the idea and conception of race that there are a great many people 
who fancy that the best thing that can be done, if possible at all, is to throw race out of 
the categories of human thinking.”  Here, Locke does not appeal to the concept’s 1
potential or actual harm in societies or their histories. And this is significant because later 
in the text Locke will state that race is a much older concept than people think, and 
further will seemingly imply that racial thinking or categorization is natural for humans. 
(Locke seems to think that race and race-thinking in some sense is permanent both 
because of the kind of beings that humans are and given the manner in which it manifests 
itself America.) Locke’s response to this eliminativist perspective on race is that “even if 
it were possible to eliminate the concept that has been the center of so much social 
thinking, let us not presume, at least at the outset of a study professing a critical basis, 
 Alain Locke, Race Contacts and Interracial Relations, ed. Jeffrey C. Stewart 1
(Washington, D.C.: Howard University Press, 1992) 1.
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that it would be desirable.”  This one statement tells us two significant things about 2
Locke’s thinking. 
First, Locke gives an indication that he does not believe the concept of race to be 
eliminable. For Locke, attempts to eliminate race and race-thinking are rather useless. 
And this is in part because race has become a way to categorize humans, which Locke 
considers to be a natural phenomenon; categorization is a natural human phenomenon, 
and race has come to serve as a way to categorize other humans rather easily. In 
introducing the second lecture of the text, Locke tells us that: “The sense of race really 
almost antedates anything in its name, in the etymology of it, because just as you have 
groups of people knit together by a kinship feeling and [who] reali[z]e that different 
practices [operate in] their society from those which [operate in other societies and 
therefore] determine their treatment of other groups, [then] you really have what is the 
germ [of] the race sense.”  Locke thinks that race-distinctions are grounded in the age-old 3
way of recognizing that there are other human groups in the world who neither perceive 
nor act in the world in the same manner that we do. This leads to a “kinship feeling” with 
other members of our group, along with an understanding of how others are to be treated. 
In other words, one recognizes that others navigate the world differently from him/her, 
and this recognition creates in him/her a greater appreciation of the manner in which he/
she navigates the world. Consequently a bond with those who navigate the world as he/




difference, confraternity with those who are considered similar to me, and considerations 
of how to treat others. And as stated, this appears to be natural to world-discriminating 
beings.  
Now, so that it will not appear that Locke is inconsistent, this idea that humans 
naturally make discriminations with regard to how people perceive and act in the world 
does not contradict the conception of cosmopolitanism established as the end of society 
that was elucidated in the first chapter of this dissertation. Locke does not conceptualize 
recognizing difference as either synonymous with, or necessarily leading to, alterity. By 
alterity I have in mind a sense of “othering” people, where it is particular differences in 
culture-products, values, religious commitments, etc., that makes “others” inferior or 
unworthy of respect. Locke asserts that: “The race sense, as you see, is something which 
is not vicious in itself, but which may become so if invidious social practices are based 
upon it.”  Locke argues that value-hierarchies are not the necessary result of the natural 4
phenomenon of differential discrimination. Thus, that whites (or blacks, asians, etc.) 
conceptualize differences in groups (and do so in terms of broad, perhaps inaccurate 
ways), and further that they have some sense of confraternity with other members of their 
group because of it, treating others in a particular way because they are considered 
different, does not imply that they must devalue or inferiorize others insofar as it does not 
imply that they can only distinguish themselves from others on the basis of overvaluing 
what makes them similar to other members of their group. In fact, not only will Locke 
argue that cultural progression both is and ought to be composite, and thus is grounded in 
 Ibid.4
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reciprocity between cultural groups (which implies racial groups), and that 
cosmopolitanism, which relies on reciprocity and pluralism, actually needs differences in 
groups and values that justifies his idea that the highest type of art is that which is both 
universal (in its ability to reach members of any culture in the world) and particular (as an 
expression of the will, aspirations, and temperament of a specific group),  but Locke will 5
also argue that what is fundamental to cosmopolitanism is understanding what makes 
every cultural group similar, namely the cultural constants that must be at play in order 
for a community (as an assemblage of persons) to be a community at all. Certain constant 
values are necessary preconditions for a group of individuals becoming a community. 
These constants are what allows social cohesion. All communities will have these, and to 
a lesser or greater degree, all communities must remain faithful to them. Recall from 
chapter one that what makes establishing a cosmopolitan community possible is that 
these cultural constants seem to be best fulfilled by the establishment of a cosmopolitan 
community.  
So, from this we may gauge that with regard to the significance of studying race, 
along with the study’s necessary starting-points, Locke seems to suggest that a necessary 
starting-point is the idea that race is grounded in a very human phenomenon of 
recognizing difference and confraternity with members of an in-group. This is important 
because it would appear that beginning with this starting-point would not allow someone 
to be judged negatively for noticing that others around them are different. Merely 
 Alain Locke, “The Negro Spirituals,” in The Works of Alain Locke, ed. Charles 5
Molesworth (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012) 105 & Alain Locke, “The 
Poetry of Negro Life,” in The Works of Alain Locke, ed. Charles Molesworth (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2012) 58.
!97
noticing racial, cultural, or religious differences does not make a “bad” person, and thus 
does not license us to negatively judge the person. Locke (and I think rightly) fears that 
seeking to either eliminate all distinctions or failing to see distinctions between 
individuals can be just as harmful as othering people, insofar as attempts to fail to see 
distinctions could become a weapon for ignoring harmful biases, while seeking to 
eliminate differences has the aim and end of the uniformitarianism, which aims at making 
everyone the “same.” This cashes out to failing to be tolerant and forcing the dominant 
culture’s values and products on everyone.   6
Further, this starting-point seems to cast doubt on notions of color-blindness, 
wherein individuals makes statements such as “I do not notice race.”  It is true that one 7
does not need to notice differences in the same way as race-distinctions have been carved 
up in the West, such that one who claims to be color-blind is not, of necessity, lying. One 
who makes the claim that they do not see race could be distinguishing people in different 
ways, thereby observing what is a natural human phenomenon without doing so in 
accordance with Western notions. Locke’s argument is, in fact, that race is a kind of way 
 Alain Locke, “Democracy Faces a World Order,” in The Works of Alain Locke, ed. 6
Charles Molesworth (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012) 545.
 Casting doubt on the notion of color-blindness could have an affect on the idea of color-7
blind politics, though it would appear that Locke supports such politics, or at least 
would seemingly reject the notion of Affirmative-Action. For more on Locke’s view of 
affirmative-action-type , see “The Negro Vote in 1936,” where Locke tells us that “it is 
more important to him [the Negro] in the long run to have common justice to the 
common man than special favor to himself as a handicapped minority or special 
protection as an oppressed group. It is safer and sounder to arrive at the fulfillment of 
the Negro’s hope and just due through general social justice, through federally initiated 
and subsidized social welfare than by any special legislation or particular pampering or 
coddling.” Here, Locke voices support idea of generalized help for Americans in the 
New Deal as the correct method of helping blacks, and seemingly tells us that this is 
better than programs created specifically for blacks.
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that humans can be categorized, and not that it is the only way of categorizing humans. 
Still, if one takes Locke’s claim that race-distinctions are grounded in the natural 
phenomenon of distinguishing humans, and further takes into account the history of this 
way of distinguishing humans into which Westerners are born, then one might become 
suspicious of the claim that people (particularly Westerners) do not see race. Making 
distinctions between in-group and out-group members is natural, and the West has given 
us a very easy way to do it (problematic as it might be). Still, starting with the idea of it 
being grounded in a natural phenomenon makes it easier for us to be sensitive to it, while 
not judging others too harshly for their doing it.  
Now, there is another reason why studying race is of such importance. For Locke, 
studying race and contacts between races gives us insight into the inter-workings of larger 
social relationships, and can thus tell us about how society is and ought to be. Thus, 
studying race is important for both understanding and shaping society. In the third lecture 
of Race Contacts, Locke attempts to investigate the phenomena and laws of race and race 
contacts. Locke asserts that: "We want to try to record those forces that are invariable 
phenomena of racial contacts and we want also to see if in investigating these 
phenomena[,] we [can] catch their drift or tendency."  Locke does not think that 8
“catching their drift or tendency” will (or should) lead to any claims of universal natural 
laws about race or race contacts. Still, Locke’s goal is to engage race and race contacts 
impartially and dispassionately.  Locke tells us that: “Our effort isn't to find a [natural] 9
 Alain Locke, Race Contacts and Interracial Relations, 41.8
 Ibid, 42.9
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law, [that is] to arrive by very hasty generalization at anything which might be construed 
as law, but simply to observe as calmly and dispassionately as we can, the phenomena 
attendant upon race contacts.”  The criterion for establishing such phenomena as law-10
like will depend on generalities. And as stated, studying the phenomena is important 
insofar as we can make descriptive and prescriptive claims regarding society.   
Later in the lecture Locke argues that studying race “is an important phase of 
social study and for us important far beyond any consideration of race relationships, 
because the same tendencies which separate class groups (and groups other than class 
groups) in society, will be identical with those that affect the racial groups.”  Locke 11
thinks that class- and general societal-conflicts follow the same trends as race-conflicts.  12
And Locke seems to have proper grounds for this, having argued that race follows a 
particular type of relationship that precedes the term “race.” In essence, what Locke is 
suggesting is that social-relations follow the same trends as race-relations in being 
grounded in recognizing difference and ways of perceiving that produce confraternity 
between members of in-groups that separate them from out-groups. Thus, “a systematic 
 Ibid. One need take note of Locke’s use of the terms “calmly” and “dispassionately.” 10
Here, Locke seems to suggest that answers to scientific questions are generally better 
the less they are influenced by emotion. This statement, and statements like this one, 
will become a problem for Locke in the next chapter, where Locke will argue for the 
necessity of the emotions to thought, decision-making, and investigation. Perhaps 
Locke would rely on the terms “as we can,” and argue that the emotions are integral to 
thought, decision-making, and investigation but that there is a requirement to limit them 
severely in some settings (particularly where they can easily affect the reasoning-
process).
 Alain Locke, Race Contacts and Interracial Relations, 4211
 Interestingly, Locke remains silent on the issue gender- and sexual-conflicts. In 12
Locke’s corpus, there seems to be no essay and, more surprisingly, no part of an essay 
dedicated to these issues. As himself a homosexual, one might expect Locke to have 
something to say about homophobia. Still, Locke fails to incorporate the study of these 
issues into his thinking on society, democracy, or cosmopolitanism.
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study of race contacts will teach us a great deal concerning the actual nature of human 
society.”  On the issue of race- and class-feelings, relations, and conflict, Locke tells us 13
that “race feelings (group sense that moves on racial lines) is only different in degree and 
not different in kind from class sense and class groupings.”  Now, Locke does not 14
explain in what way he is using “degree.” However, he seems to think that there is more 
confraternity and intensity that occurs with race-feelings, and thus the potential for more 
animosity or hatred that occurs with in-group/out-group racial contacts, than with class-
feelings. However, Locke thinks that class-feelings can be just as “tense” as race-feelings, 
which can produce conflicts that are just as violent and arouse emotions that are just as 
instinctive and passionate as race-feelings. And in the case of the caste system of India, 
Locke thinks that class divisions have actually created racial distinctions.  
Fundamentally, Locke thinks that both the significance in, and starting-point for, 
studying race is bound up in its being derived from a very natural phenomena. For Locke, 
when this idea is coupled with American history and its practice of distinguishing people 
along racial lines, we should conclude that race is something that we should not expect to 
disappear. Thus, studying it becomes imperative, insofar as making racial distinctions 
appears to be a permanent American (and perhaps worldly) phenomenon. Additionally, 
Locke thinks that the significance of studying race is bound up in its telling us something 
more broadly about social relationships and their conflicts, which can ultimately give us 
insight into how to better the society. With this understanding of the significance of 
 Alain Locke, Race Contacts and Interracial Relations, 42-43.13
 Ibid, 44.14
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studying race, along with a proper starting-point, Locke critiques particular assumptions 
relating to anthropological investigations into race.  
Locke's Critique of Anthropological Assumptions:  
Beyond telling us why studying race contacts is important and what a proper 
starting-point for such a study is, Locke critiques two assumptions of foundational (early) 
anthropology as they apply to race. This critique allows Locke the intellectual space to 
craft his own understanding of race and racial development, though one that will need a 
specific understanding of values to combat racial superiority. Locke criticizes early (late 
seventeenth- and eighteenth-century) anthropologists for their thinking that they can 
derive universal and static anthropological laws about races without history and an 
understanding of how society shapes humans. Additionally, Locke criticizes 
anthropologists for their not having a pragmatic end for anthropological investigations. 
Locke reasons that if early anthropologists understood the role of history and society in 
racial formation and development, along with the implications that history and society 
have on investigating race, then they would be less tentative about having a pragmatic 
end guide their investigations into race. By criticizing these two assumptions, Locke 
criticizes a method that depends on a rejection of human import into investigations. And 
these criticisms allow Locke to see certain conditions that allow race-differences to 
emerge. 
Locke criticizes foundational anthropologists’ assumption that there can be certain 
universal and unchanging laws discovered about the being, development, and interactions 
of human beings as they relate to races without engaging history and theories of society. 
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What this suggests is that anthropologists attempt to study human races with the method 
of a “pure” science.  And one can see this commitment with an examination of the 15
philosophical anthropologies of Kant, Blumenbach, and Gobineau that were the focus of 
the last chapter. For each theorist, static natural laws were assumed and races developed 
from them while these races developed society from these static natural laws. The 
development of specific societies were inevitable and unchangeable after the races were 
either affected by nature (Kant) or directed by God (Blumenbach and Gobineau). 
Particular cultures necessarily followed from certain races. Societal factors could do little 
or nothing to change these races, and thus an examination of them with regard to social 
theory was unnecessary. Thus, all three of these thinkers, and Locke would claim most of 
the foundational anthropologists, had little or no regard for cultural exchange and found 
little wrong with either colonization or imperialism. Thus, Locke claims that both 
colonization and imperialism follow from the static laws of race-development that are 
assumed in philosophical anthropologies.  
In assuming that society had no affect on races and race-development, and that 
static laws can be found out about races, foundational anthropologists study laws of 
human development and contact like geographers study the development of rocks. 
Humans are studied as if they were static objects (in this case, objects without agency) 
 Locke considers anthropology, history, psychology, and the newly born sociology to be 15
sciences. However, he does not consider them to be pure sciences. Pure sciences are 
those sciences that do not rely on social structures, human motivations, and historical 
biases for its answers (though all sciences rely on these for its use and value). These 
sciences will be mathematics, geography, geology, biology (Locke seems to have 
thought that living organisms generally, excluding humans, could be studied without 
appeal to history and society), etc. So, one can say that Locke separates sciences into 
two categories, pure and impure (though all sciences are valuable inasmuch as they 
have practical use).
!103
much like types of rocks or soil. For Locke, this approach was fundamentally flawed 
insofar as it assumes that humans do not have motivations, and that the very concepts of 
“races” and “humanity” are not concepts affected by society. And this flawed position 
leads anthropologists to conclude that human histories and societies develop from static 
natural capacities in human beings. For Locke, humans cannot be studied like inanimate 
objects or animate beings who cannot value, and thus we need not think that humans can 
be studied like pure sciences. Beyond this, society and history can be thought to 
participate in the production of humans insofar as humans continue to change in light of 
society and history.  
Locke poses the following set of questions aimed at a critique of foundational 
anthropology: “what of a pure science of race? Is it necessary? Is it desirable? Is it 
possible if it were desirable and necessary? I fancy in the present state of the sciences of 
[man,] it must be admitted impossible.”  For Locke, a science of race cannot be pure 16
insofar as “race theory is essentially committed to the historical”, which entails that “like 
history itself, [race] must incorporate the factor of human belief, because history is not 
merely a record of facts, but as well, a record of beliefs, and an historical opinion (be it 
an individual opinion or a group opinion) [which] is as important a factor of history as the 
objective fact itself.”  Here Locke gives us two reasons for why we are licensed to doubt 17
the purity of any science of race. First, Locke thinks that investigations into human races 
necessarily presuppose the agency of the subjects studied. We will need to make 
 Alain Locke, Race Contacts and Interracial Relations, 7.16
 Ibid.17
!104
inferences about agents' motivations, which we cannot be certain about. Second, race 
science, like history, can only be conducted with interpretations/inferences, which 
presupposes that we interject ourselves into the science. In short, like history, when we 
study human races we study agents, which we ourselves must interpret.  
Beyond doubting the ability to study races purely, Locke questions whether a pure 
science is desirable even if we assume it to be possible. For Locke, a pure science of race 
is not desirable because of its lack of a practical end. Thus, Locke is critical of 
anthropologists’ lack of a practical end for their scientific endeavors. Locke tells us that 
modern thinkers on race, a camp into which Locke partially places himself, "believe that 
a really pure science of race is, after all, undesirable, not so much because it is 
impossible, but because even though it were realized, it would be impracticable, 
particularly as contrasted with whatever current practical theories of race are prevailing in 
society.”  Pure scientific theories of race must, in some way, service society. However: 18
"It could never successfully hope to compete with what men really believe human society 
to be."  Pure scientific theories of race could never be useful to society because pure 19
scientific theories of race could not map onto what people believe about society. 
Now it is a question as to what Locke wants to say regarding people’s beliefs 
about human society, and thus how beliefs about society apply to theories of race. One 
might think that Locke is suggesting that anthropologists need to end with a notion of 




does not have this in mind. He is not conceding the “wisdom” of common beliefs about 
races. Rather, Locke seems to think that we need a notion of race that allows us to live up 
to the values that we hold in our society. In other words, if we profess to value liberty, 
democracy, equality, freedoms of conscience/expression/association, and the like, we 
need a notion of race that pushes our thinking and social actions toward those values. 
Theories of race should coincide with larger social values, serving as a corrective of 
social ills. Locke writes that: “It is the idea [,] then[,] that instead of a perfectly objective 
science of human society, that we should have a corrective or a normative conception of 
society which should aim to improve upon and better those predominant notions and 
ideals which are prevalent.”   20
This thinking, that theories of race should confirm larger social values (that they 
be pragmatic), may seem problematic. What is the point of having a science if it is 
skewed in this way? Locke's answer to the question is that the question itself assumes that 
there is a way to conduct scientific studies of race that are free from history and societal 
import. A science of race cannot but be skewed, and as such should be skewed in a 
particular direction, namely one that serves society by moving us closer to our overall 
social and political values.  
Further, Locke has oppressed minorities in view when he makes the assertion that 
conceptions of race are desirable and should serve a pragmatic purpose. Here, Locke 
likens to W.E.B. Du Bois, writes that: "As American Negroes, we believe in unity of 
racial effort, so far as this is necessary for self-defense and self-expression, leading 
 Ibid.20
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ultimately to the goal of a united humanity and the abolition of all racial distinctions."  21
Like Du Bois, race is an important tool for an oppressed group. Locke sees that racial 
distinction, even in being a natural phenomenon, is both a method for oppressed groups 
to unify around, find protection in, and even “discover” themselves through. In his 
seminal essay on the New Negro, Locke tells us that: “American Negroes have been a 
race more in name than in fact, or to be exact, more in sentiment than in experience. The 
chief bond between them has been that of a common condition rather than a common 
consciousness; a problem in common rather than a life in common.”  Here, Locke seems 22
to lament the bonds that have brought African Americans together. They have not unified 
in the manner that Locke thinks races (as groups engaged in the natural phenomenon of 
recognizing value-differences that causes greater confraternity) have, and on the basis 
that Du Bois writes about. However, Locke argues that: “In Harlem, Negro life is seizing 
upon its first chances for group expression and self-determination. It is––or promises at 
least to be––a race capital.”  When Locke wrote these words in 1925 he saw an 23
oppressed group of people progressing in artistic expression, becoming more motivated 
towards social mobility, and developing a deeper sense of understanding because of 
confraternity with each other that occurs through the use of a racial term. In fact, Locke 
thought that art and culture increases because of the kind of particularization that occurs 
with racial divisions, so long as the division does not “other” different groups.  
 W.E.B. Du Bois, Dusk of Dawn: An Essay Toward an Autobiography of a Race 21
Concept (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2002) 320.
 Alain Locke, “The New Negro,” in The New Negro: Voices of the Harlem Renaissance, 22
ed. Alain Locke (New York: Touchstone, 1992) 7.
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So, one can see from this that Locke, as a pragmatist in much of his thinking, 
wants to argue that science should serve a pragmatic purpose. Here, rather than criticize 
anthropologists on the grounds that their determinations are made to serve racial 
superiority (which has been claimed by African American theorists from Martin Delany 
to Charles Mills), Locke argues that anthropologists have attempted to remain too neutral, 
stressing the importance of purity and rejecting pragmatic ends for the science.  For 24
Locke, these anthropologists fail to see how race does and can operate in the real world, 
and how science should serve to ameliorate social conditions. They wrongly assume the 
possibility of purity and universality with regard to the science of race, so much so that 
they reject practical occurrences and a pragmatic end for the science that could both help 
the science and make it useful to society.  
So, in short, Locke critiques two assumptions that have led anthropologists to 
make claims that have both reshaped and justified racial superiority. Locke critiques 
anthropology’s fundamental assumption that it can get universal laws of human beings 
and human contacts as they regard races, and can do so without looking at human 
motivations and social influences. Racial groups produce certain cultures and have 
certain values because of the kinds of beings that either nature or God has made them to 
 Now, Locke does attack foundational anthropologists’ work on the grounds that they 24
have socially unproductive, and thus un-pragmatic ends, insofar as they serve to 
inferiorize non-white people seemingly in the service of supporting a white-supremacist 
ideology and agenda. In the notes to Race Contacts, Locke writes: “Race theory of 
recent development (de Gobineau, 1854)––scientific data and method, pseudoscientific 
in postulates and conclusions––invariably the philosophy of the dominant groups––
propagandist in the interests of the prevailing civilization types….” See, “Race 
Contacts and Inter-Racial Relations: A Study in the Theory and Practice of Race,” in 
The Works of Alain Locke, ed. Charles Molesworth (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2012) 253.
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be. For foundational anthropologists, exploitation, colonialism, etc., in a word, racial 
inequalities in social interaction, are effects of racial differences. And the way that 
investigating race in this way plays out in society is that racial inequalities are able to be 
justified by racial differences. For Locke: "Racial differences parallel what we know in 
human society as racial inequalities."  However, they do not have a cause/effect 25
relationship. Locke thinks that instead of explaining inequality with appeals to 
anthropological or ethnological factors, which would translate to race-differences, we 
should explain race inequality by historical, social, and economic factors. We should 
explain anthropological and ethnological factors in another way, which leads us to an 
explanation of the parallel between racial differences and racial inequalities in divergent 
way.  Locke, with a critique of a second assumption, namely the denial of a necessary 26
practical end for anthropology, gives us a clear way to get past racial inequalities. If racial 
inequalities emerge out of historical, economic, and societal conditions that produce 
inequality, then the practical end of anthropology is to eradicate these inequalities by 
investigating race-differences. 
To conclude this section, from a critique of anthropological assumptions, Locke 
will divide the science of anthropology into two views. The first, Locke describes as the 
older (foundational) view. This view relies on an assumption of human races as static 
products of either nature or God's design. As static products races necessarily produce 
certain levels of culture that can be ranked-ordered, and whose value can be objectively 
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determined. Locke distinguishes this view from a modern view. Locke’s acceptance of 
many of the themes of the modern view led him to incorporate socio-history and 
pragmatic ends into his thinking on the divisions of human races. As such, we can say 
with Clevis Headley that Locke's inclusion of history and social/cultural elements into the 
conversation of race allows him to observe "the extent to which race functions, not as 
shapely defined concept embedded in a natural scientific theory, but as a conceptual 
artifact readily malleable to cultural exploitation."  Conceptions of race will then have 27
the pragmatic end of challenging this exploitation by providing, in addition to racial 
divisions, reasons for the divisions that make the divisions more understandable and 
appreciable. It is to Locke’s notion of race that I now turn. 
Locke's Philosophical Anthropology: On Race and Culture: 
In an essay entitled “The Concept of Race as Applied to Social Culture,” “Locke's 
interest in the idea of race stems primarily from an attempt to combat notions of national, 
racial, and cultural superiority.”  My argument is that Locke’s theory of race has the end 28
of participating, as one half of an argument, in combating racial superiority that has the 
aim of establishing a cosmopolitan community. In partially combating ideologies of 
superiority (in my case, racial superiority), Locke attempts to answer a longstanding 
impasse regarding the relationship between races and cultures. Robert Bernasconi writes 
that “for most of their history the terms race and culture were not easily separated. The 
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term race was, from its first definition in the late eighteenth century, used to talk about 
specific peoples who were as readily identifiable by their behavior as by their physical 
appearance.”  Bernasconi asserts that early theorists of racial divisions did not think in 29
terms of matchings between physical traits and moral/cultural attributes. They merely 
observed differences. As seen in chapter two, Bernasconi thinks that Kant’s philosophical 
anthropology creates more of an intimate relationship between physical types and moral/
cultural value. Bernasconi tells us that: “Early in the nineteenth century the term race was 
beginning to take hold to describe broad groupings of such peoples and this led to 
questions about their origin, their number, their destiny, and the effect of race mixing 
between such groups.”  Bernasconi later continues: “Most thinkers in the nineteenth 30
century saw the racial as manifesting itself in both physical aspects and ‘moral’ or 
cultural aspects. In other words, for them, race was as visible in behavior and in 
dispositions or talents as it was in physical appearance.”  We saw this in chapter two.  31
So, on one side of the debate, anthropologists took culture to depend on race, such 
that races, of necessity, produce particular cultural gifts. These gifts, at least at the time 
during which Locke wrote, derived from biological traits that owe their existence to 
either nature or God. As stated in the prior chapter, one can view the idea of a necessary 
correlation between race and culture in Kant’s, Blumenbach's, and Gobineau’s 
philosophical anthropologies. For Kant, psychological qualities become permanent when 
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germs within races ferment due to climate. Thus, a racial group’s cultural gifts, which 
must emanate from these psychological qualities, are fixed, even though diet and other 
culture-products can have minimal effects on the race, and therefore further cultural gifts 
produced by the race. Therefore, Kant must think there to be a necessary connection 
between culture and race, and one that is permanent. Likewise Blumenbach's teleology, 
one in which God mandates certain differences in human capacities through blood, 
necessitates a connection between race and culture. And finally for Gobineau, because 
God creates races with certain purposes that regard culture, cultural gifts necessarily 
derive from human races.  
Bernasconi (as well as Locke) tells us that the work of Robert Lowie marks a 
change in thinking on race and culture. “Lowie explained that, if culture is defined in 
terms of social acquisition, then racial characteristics, precisely as innate, could not by 
definition determine culture.”  Lowie saw the transformative nature of race and culture, 32
and thus thought that he was licensed to infer a lack of a correlation between the two 
terms.  
As such, on the other side of the debate anthropologists argue that there is no 
correlation between race and culture. On this view, the culture-products of certain groups 
are more or less arbitrary and capricious. Racial groups have a proclivity to create or 
embrace any culture-product, and no race’s culture, or capacity for producing a particular 
type of culture, is permanent. On this view, either there are no racial groups in the world 
to produce cultures from necessity or there are racial groups in the world, though the 
 Ibid, 129.32
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cultural productions of these groups are arbitrary. Locke sought a middle-ground between 
the two competing views. And it is out of this debate that Locke carved out a definition of 
race. 
Locke’s goal in the article, and in a number of his essays on race throughout his 
life, was to explain why we should not think culture to be determined by race. Instead, 
Locke thought that we should think that races are social phenomena that derive from 
culture (which derives from environmental conditions that present to us different avenues 
of response). Thus, Locke denied that any race's behavior and cultural products is either 
natural or divine, and fixed (placing him in opposition to the three thinkers who were the 
subjects of the last chapter). Still, Locke “identified a defect in Lowie’s position: the fact 
that Lowie presented no account of why many ‘culture traits’ are so persistent to the point 
where they come to be thought of as ethnically characteristic.”  Locke realized a certain 33
stability in races’ cultural characteristics. Locke attempted to explain why some cultural 
traits have marked certain racial groups. Thus, Locke neither wanted to deny that certain 
cultural productions are trackable in certain groups nor that race (and race-talk), as it 
applies to culture, is meaningless.  
As stated, Locke attempted to loosen (without breaking) the connection between 
race and culture. In the extreme case, those who connect race to culture think that race, as 
a natural set of physical and psychical attributes and capacities, are responsible for 
cultural productions and the degree of cultural achievements because of the internal or 
intrinsic abilities of particular races. Locke’s position, in 
 Ibid, 130.33
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differing from that of the school of interpretation which denies all significant 
connection between racial and cultural factors, does not deny that race stands for 
significant social characters and culture-traits or represents in given historical 
contexts characteristic differentiations of culture-type. However, it does insist 
against the assumption of any such constancy, historical or intrinsic, as would 
make it possible to posit an organic connection between them and to argue on 
such grounds the determination of one by the other.  34
Race and culture have something to do with each other, as Locke defines race in terms of 
the culture-traits that are preserved by a group of people (“race stands for significant 
social characters and culture-traits”).  Locke wants to deny that there is a one-to-one 35
correlation between race and culture, such that productions do/must derive from specific 
people due to their innate ability, as was supposed by social evolutionists who thought 
that there were stages of cultural progression that corresponded to racial evolution.  For 36
Locke, though race is culture-heredity, there is nothing static in the continuance of 
culture-types in groups, and no necessity of groups having or passing on specific cultures. 
Locke’s denial of the social evolutionists’ claim is grounded in two facts. First, 
primitivism and advancement in culture can be found in a number of different people at a 
number of different times, which suggests that there is no cultural evolution occurring 
among peoples.  Cultural progress waxes and wanes when one looks at history. One 37
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need only consider the advances of the Moors, and certain cultural backwardnesses 
occurring after them (and perhaps amongst the same group of people) to see this fact.  
Second, Locke thinks that if one takes an earnest look at cultural development in 
civilizations, one is more likely to find that these developments are composite in nature.  38
Cultures most often develop because of a mixture or blending of different cultures by 
interactions between culture-groups. One need notice here that cultural evolution and 
progression are dependent upon tolerant intergroup contact, reciprocity, openness to 
learning from others that implies equality in ability to voice concerns and opinions 
(democracy), and pluralism. As we have seen, these ideas are the ground for Locke’s 
conception of cosmopolitanism.  
Likewise, these are principals fundamental to the formation of human societies 
and social interactions such that they undergird the formation of all states. They will be 
probably cultural constants (with the exception of democracy, which is a cultural 
constant), both illustrating that human beings and states are more alike than different, and 
that cosmopolitanism (in which these concepts find completion in the world) is a natural 
development from human beings forming states. One can immediately see how this 
thinking seems to challenge the philosophical anthropologies that we have discussed, 
particularly Gobineau’s teleological view. God cannot be said to implant a specific 
quantity and quality of vigor into the blood of superior and inferior races that must 




Still for Locke, we can think of culture-products as representations of distinctive 
race-types. And this thinking challenges the notion that there is no connection between 
culture and race. Against theorists like Lowie, whose positions cannot explain the 
undeniable relative consistency of particular races producing particular cultural-traits, 
Locke claims that “there are certain traits the peculiarly stable and stock character of 
which must be interpreted as ethnically characteristic.”  It would appear that Locke 39
thinks that we can both notice and predict culture-traits and types in particular racial 
groups. Thus, “we do not need to deny the existence of these characteristic racial molds 
in denying that they are rooted in ‘inherent hereditary traits either of a biological or a 
psychological nature.’”  While it is true that there is nothing inherent in the blood of 40
certain races that allows/forces them to produce certain culture-traits, the correlation 
between them is significant, and therefore capable of scientific inquiry and explanation. 
Locke's goal, subsequent to dismissing both claims of a necessary relationship 
between race and culture and claims that there is no connection between the two, is to 
understand why certain cultures are distinct representations of particular race-types given 
that there is no necessary correlation between racial groups and cultural types, 
particularly given the composite nature of cultures. And it is here that Locke gives us his 
definition of race as something socio-historical. 
In order to understand Locke’s position on the correlation between race and 




natural phenomena but social constructions that relate to culture in a particular way. And 
when we talk about culture as something hereditary, we should not refer to biology. 
Culture is inherited through social relationships such that when we talk about heredity as 
applied to culture, we ought to mean social heredity. Locke tells us that:  
The best consensus of opinion then seems to be that race is a fact in the social or 
ethnic sense, that it has been erroneously associated with race in the physical 
sense and is therefore not scientifically commensurate with factors or conditions 
which explain or have produced physical race characters and differentiation, that 
it has a vital and significant relation to social culture, and that it must be explained 
in terms of social and historical causes such as have caused similar 
differentiations of culture-type as pertain in lesser degree between nations, 
classes, and even family strains.  41
Here, Locke tells us that races begin, much like nations and classes, as historically and 
socially contingent. Social and historical conditions section off people in certain sorts of 
ways that tend to produce a varying degree of proclivities that make it easier for people to 
endorse and reject certain values because of the proclivities having informed their ways 
of seeing the world, modes of expression, etc.  These values, ways of seeing the world, 42
modes of expression, etc., make up specific culture-traits. For Locke, what binds these 
groups together is the conditions that produce a likeness in culture-types, which we may 
understand as a set of culture-traits. Race, then, becomes the concept (a sort of name 
under which the group understands itself) that better binds the group.  Locke writes that 
race lies in “that particular selective preference for certain culture-traits and resistance to 
 Ibid, 272.41
 Here, we see that Locke wants to say that values derive, and in a sense characterize a 42
race, thereby distinguishing races. On this point, Locke concedes a point that Kant, 
Blumenbach, and Gobineau all make. However, Locke diverges from these insofar as 
there is nothing static in the relationship, these values are neither natural nor divine, and 
though there may be value-differences there is no value-hierarchy. 
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certain others which is characteristic of all types and levels of social organization.”  43
Thus, race (or a racial name) becomes a value in itself, one in which further unifies 
culture-types by its causing a robust sense of solidarity amongst those who understand 
themselves as a unified group with specific culture-traits.  And though Locke tells us 44
that this solidarity occurs with a “resistance” to other values, he does not think that it 
must lead to lack of appreciation or devaluation of other values. As a result, race is to be 
understood as culture-heredity, and “[i]nstead therefore of regarding culture as expressive 
of race, race by this interpretation is regarded as itself a culture product.”  Race as 45
culture-heredity is socio-historical, and not biological. 
So, what Locke tells us is that race is socio-historical, insofar as it is the result of 
conditions that produce proclivities to endorse or reject certain values because of the 
ways in which conditions inform perceptions of the world, expressive techniques, etc. It 
is the concept under which similarities in how a group defines itself are unified. And 
further, it is a value in itself  “since it determines the stressed values which become the 
conscious symbols and tradition of the culture.”  What Locke has in mind is that a group 46
faces certain conditions that produce certain ways of engaging those conditions, whether 
consciously or unconsciously.  These responses, ways of understanding the conditions, 47
abstracted ways of understanding the world in light of these conditions, etc. become 




 On pg. 274, Locke tells us that: "The type itself may have been established by accident 47
or fortuitous combinations of historical circumstances...."
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“canonized” as the group’s more or less “official” manner of dealing with these 
conditions by being placed under a name. What this implies is that the group will begin to 
see these traits as theirs, or as markers of group-identification; these traits become a large 
part of how the group-members identify with themselves––it strengthens the “we” in 
group self-concepts. It seems to be a way of suggesting that this way is ours/yours/theirs 
(though Locke argues that this is contrary to reality, insofar as there is a composite nature 
to all cultures). Over time, a technique, way of expression, etc., will be emphasized 
greater, become more developed or expanded, and will be so because of its having been 
included into this group’s cannon.  
To grasp this, one may think of why cultures are created. Locke writes that:  
[T]hough there is lacking for the present any demonstrable explanation, there are 
certain ethnic traits the peculiarly stable and stock character of which must be 
interpreted as ethnically characteristic. They are in no sense absolutely permanent, 
the best psychological evidence as yet gives us no reason for construing them as 
inherent, yet they are factors not without an integral relationship one to the other 
not satisfactorily explained as mere historical combinations.  48
Locke then considers why certain traits are “stable and stock.” For Locke, it would 
appear that certain culture-traits are “stable and stock” in relation to certain people 
because certain people experience an environment where certain responses become 
necessary to attain a sense of being/belonging or realize certain values such as a 
validation or affirmation of a people’s humanity, strides towards benefits that people are 
rejected from, privileges that certain people’s have, etc. Certain environments possess 
materials and create conditions where certain responses are called for or more naturally 
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developed. Ralph Ellison, when describing this in relation to the “blues,” puts the point in 
the following way:  
The blues is an impulse to keep the painful details and episodes of a brutal 
experience alive in one's aching consciousness, to finger its jagged grain, and to 
transcend it, not by the consolation of philosophy, but by squeezing from it a near-
tragic, near-comic lyricism. As a form, the blues is an autobiographical chronicle 
of personal catastrophe expressed lyrically…. Let us close with one final word 
about the blues: Their attraction lies in this, that they at once express both the 
agony of life and the possibility of conquering it through sheer toughness of spirit. 
They fall short of tragedy only in that they provide no solution, offer no scapegoat 
but the self.  49
The “blues” are a survival tool that a group has created and embraces wherein a people 
realizes that they cannot escape the pain of life, but must face it, and further that facing it 
requires smiling or sharing a laugh. Now, Ellison does not attempt to racialize blues-
culture (unlike Houston Baker, Jr. and Amiri Baraka). Still, his implicit point is that the 
“blues” is a culture-product that derives from, and is embraced in, a particular set of 
conditions that a group deals with.  
From this, one might suggest that culture is a group-response to better deal with 
what environments, whether physical or social, impose upon them. The “blues,” in being 
a response to certain conditions that a group has to deal with, gets included into the 
identity of the group with the concept of a racial name. This culture-trait gets emphasized 
in locations where this group’s members meet and when the group engages other groups. 
The culture-trait is developed and expanded to create new traits, jazz, gospel, rhythm and 
blues, hip-hop. A race-term is the name that canonizes or organizes traits like the “blues.” 
What this suggests is that the correlation between the two (the race-term and the “blues”) 
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maintains a “stable and stock” character without being biological. There is a correlation 
between race and culture such that races produce certain culture-traits (and culture-types 
as the set of those traits) rather stably because they are responding to certain conditions 
and have canonized their responses in a particular way, valuing them through continued 
emphasis, development, and expansion. Thus, “these determine what is the dominant 
pattern in any given culture, and it is toward these dominant so as social norms that social 
conformation converges and according to which it eventually establishes the type.”  50
Again, none of this is to suggest that Locke thinks that culture-traits and -types 
have been or must remain separately developed or appreciated. Locke does not think that 
certain races must make exclusive claims on culture-traits, or that those traits are a result 
of that race’s production solely. They have become characteristic, meaning they have 
been adopted and canonized by the group. However, Locke thinks that when we look at 
the actual occurrence of these traits, we cannot earnestly say that they are exclusive 
products of any one group:  
Indeed, the evidence shows most cultures to be highly composite. Sometimes 
there seems to be a race relatively purely physically with a considerably mixed 
culture, sometimes, perhaps more frequently, a highly mixed race with a relatively 
fussed culture. But in the large majority of cases the culture is only to be 
explained as the resultant of the meeting and reciprocal influence of several 
culture strains, several ethnic contributions.   51
Reciprocation is one of the means by which culture is produced and developed. And 
reciprocation and the composite nature of these traits and types are, in part, reasons why 
races can come together to establish a cosmopolitan community. Thus, they are, in some 
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sense, the basis for how we should interact with each other insofar as establishing such a 
community is our aim.  
As a result of being committed to the ideas of reciprocation and the composite 
nature of culture, Locke must think that races themselves, not merely the culture-traits or 
-types, can change without a necessary change in biological features. Locke cannot be 
committed to the idea that phenotypical traits play a part in racial distinctions, as 
evidenced by his critique of Ronald Dixon’s text The Racial History of Man.  Locke 52
denies that there is a static nature to races once racial names have been applied to culture-
types. Locke tells us that: “Race operates as tradition, as preferred traits and values, and 
when these things change culturally speaking ethic remoulding is taking place.”  Now, 53
one must take care to notice that Locke tells us that “ethic” changes occur as a result of 
changing culture-traits and values. Thus, it would appear that Locke seems to think that 
races can change without biological changes, particularly if Bernasconi is correct to say 
that Locke has a conception of “ethic race.”  As such, if Locke thinks this to be the case, 54
he is committed to the view that contact with other groups is affective.  
What we see here is a commitment that Locke makes to the idea that reciprocation 
and the composite nature of culture leads to “remoulding,” which seems to imply the 
possibility of a cosmopolitan community.  
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Still, Locke is quite clear that race contact does not occur without friction. For 
Locke, social friction is the result of the same principle that unifies the various peoples of 
society, and that living in a society ultimately generates social conflict.  As such, Locke 55
thinks that races (at least unconsciously) have initial difficulty committing to the 
reciprocity necessary for cultures to both shape and be reshaped (and would thus have 
difficulty committing to principals that lead to establishing a cosmopolitain community). 
Locke tells us that race “intensifies therefore with contacts and increases with the 
increasing complexity of the culture elements in any particular area. A diversity of 
cultural types temporarily at least accentuates the racial stresses involved, so that even 
when a fusion eventuates it takes place under the conditions determined by the resistance 
developed and the relative strength of the several cultural components.”  As peoples 56
meet racial stresses, and therefore conflict between the meeting races, increases. Locke 
seems to think that there is, in the nature of group-contact, a proclivity that groups have 
to both cling to, and further to rather harshly emphasize those values, ways of seeing the 
world, etc.––in a word, culture-types––that make them races. And this thinking diverges 
slightly from Gobineau, who argues that races have a natural repulsion of other races.  If 57
Gobineau’s argument holds, then human beings would be incapable of coming together, 
or reciprocating culture, which one might think is necessary for the establishment of a 
cosmopolitan community. Instead, Locke holds that their is an initial resistance to other 
cultures, which is not an innate repulsion, and therefore not one that has no possibility of 
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being overcome. Further, there can be no claims made that morally requiring groups to 
abandon this resistance is contrary to nature or God’s divine will/mandate. 
Now, insofar as Locke thinks that there is an initial resistance to other groups’ 
culture-types, he is committed to the view that groups cling harder to the racial names 
under which these culture-types are referred. It is perhaps the case, though he does not 
explicitly state this, that Locke thinks that groups cling to these culture-types, and thus 
racial names, harder in times of contact with other groups because of a perceived threat of 
values, ways of seeing the world, etc., that are not understood to be their own; out-group 
cultures are perceived to threaten to supplant in-group cultures. And this, for Locke, 
seems to be a very natural phenomena, much like the phenomenon of distinguishing 
between those who embrace values that are like ours and those who do not. Thus, Locke 
seems to understand that progressive inter-race contact naturally begins in inter-race 
conflict. Perhaps this is why Locke tells us that: “Civilization very often produces 
counter-currents. Civilization is something which in itself seems to involve very often 
these rough places, these antagonisms, these struggles, these actions and reactions, 
because the reactions are, after all, just as inevitabl[y] part of the process, it seems, as the 
positive actions themselves.”  Here it sounds as though Locke is suggesting that social 58
conflict is a part of civilization. And when one adds Locke’s view of progression towards 
cosmopolitanism to this idea, one can either infer that Locke thinks that social conflict is 
inherent to the progress towards cosmopolitanism, or that Locke thinks that 
cosmopolitanism does not exclude (at leas the possibility of) social conflict, such that 
 Alain Locke, Race Contacts and Interracial Relations, 45.58
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Locke does not think that a cosmopolitan community is an actual community where 
everyone loves everyone, but that there is respect between humans.  
In any case, one can see here that Locke has neither a quixotic view of race-
relations nor contempt for white people grounded in some abominable way of being. For 
Locke, race-antipathy (or perhaps less harshly, race-antagonism) is a natural occurrence 
given the natural phenomena of “that peculiar selective preference for certain culture-
traits and resistance to certain others” that is the ground of group-identity and the feeling 
that it must be protected when there is a possibility of its being attacked by the imposition 
of others’ values, ways of seeing the world, etc. However, Locke seems to think that this 
conflict can be mitigated and perhaps even eliminated when engaged by an earnest 
attempt to understand other groups’ culture-types, which must begin in with a rejection of 
the assumption that our own culture-types, even in their difference from others’, is by no 
means better.  
Thus, we may summarize Locke’s philosophical anthropology as an attempt to 
carve out a particular notion of race. Locke also wants to produce an understanding for 
why studying race is necessary along with an understanding of the proper starting-points 
for such a study. For Locke, these understandings show us certain assumptions in 
foundational anthropological arguments regarding race, and lead us to reject these 
assumptions and the theories based upon them. For Locke, with an understanding of the 
proper starting-points for the science of race, we can have a correct understanding of 
race, which should lead us to think of races as socio-historical, and not biological, 
products. Further, studying races with a proper starting-point gives us a correct 
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understanding of humanity. For Locke, a proper understanding of humanity is pertinent in 
attempting to establish a world in which is defined by peace. What I mean to claim here 
is that for Locke, cosmopolitanism depends on a correct understanding of humanity and 
human culture because it depends on an understanding of the possibility of humans 
coming together through an understanding of how humans conceptualize and act on 
perceived similarities/differences in other humans. What this amounts to is that 
cosmopolitan theory must begin in anthropology. Thus, Locke thought it necessary to 
answer anthropological questions that are pertinent to the possibility of establishing a 
cosmopolitan community. For Locke, if things were truly as philosophers, 
anthropologists, and biologists, particularly those mentioned in the last chapter, said that 
they were, then cosmopolitanism would be impossible. Perhaps like the late Kant, Locke 
realizes that cosmopolitanism relies on races having particular potentialities, dispositions, 
and qualities if cosmopolitanism is to be a community that can possibility be established. 
To conclude this understanding of Locke's philosophical anthropology, as it 
regards questions of race, I would like to leave the reader with two significant inferences. 
First, Locke’s commitment to what I have called a middle-ground on the correlation 
between race and culture is derived from his view that history and social conditions, the 
instruments responsible for shaping people, have an affect on people in ways that produce 
certain responses. As Ernest Mason tells us, Locke thinks that “we should make an honest 
attempt to understand the social and historical factors that determine races'” values and 
culture.  What this seems to do is to allow for an appreciative, or at least a sympathetic, 59
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understanding of particular peoples whose culture-traits or types we may not find 
interesting. Locke seems to understand that not everyone will find all others' culture-
products attractive. Still, Locke thinks that understanding them from a historical 
perspective allows us to appreciate them more than seeing them as natural or divine and 
fixed. It is not God who gave these people a culture that I do not find interesting, but 
historical circumstances. And because historical circumstances have allowed a people to 
develop in this way, we can, by understanding them in their historical circumstances, 
appreciate the way that these people have responded. We can, in a sense, place ourselves 
into their shoes, saying to ourselves something like: “if we found ourselves in these 
circumstances, we would have done similar.”  
As such, Locke thinks that there is a greater capacity, and thus more ability, to 
respect others when there is some respect for others’ culture-traits/types. This respect, 
namely the respect of others’ culture-traits/types, is more likely when there is an 
appreciation for how these traits/types have developed throughout history and within 
particular social settings. Thus, if we learn to appreciate the social and historical settings 
that surround races and their cultures, then we will be more likely to respect the peoples 
that make up these races, and value these cultures. Thusly, we need a theory of race that 
takes this into account, particularly when cultures have something to do with races. And 
one can see the proper practical aim of anthropology deriving from this. However, one 
can also see limitations in Locke’s anthropological argument as the sole method for 
combating racial superiority, which allows for the possibility of establishing a 
cosmopolitan community.  
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As shown through the philosophical anthropologies of Kant, Blumenbach, and 
Gobineau, racial superiority does not merely rely on the superiority of whites over non-
whites in the abstract, but asserts differences in races as necessarily connected to 
differences in culture, which reduces to differences in values. Racial differences imply 
value-differences because culture-difference is perceived as value-difference. To claim 
that one race is better an another is to perceive that its culture is better, which is to say 
that the race’s culture has better values than the other's. There is no way to talk of a race 
that is superior to another, yet one that lacks a superior culture to the other. However, talk 
of culture implies talk of value and values. Thus, to claim that a race is better than 
another is to talk about a race’s value and values as better than the other's. As a result, 
Locke, in wanting to show that races are not superior to others, needs to show that values 
are not better in those supposedly superior races. A philosophical anthropology that 
denies the inherent correlation between race and culture, and one that demonstrates that 
neither nature nor God makes races possessors of particular cultures, but a philosophical 
anthropology that shows races to be socio-historical, does not (in itself) combat racial 
superiority, therewith showing the possibility of establishing a cosmopolitan community. 
A race that claims supremacy over other races can still claim superior values as products 
of socio-history, as opposed to nature or divinity. As a result, Locke’s philosophical 
anthropology would need to be supplemented with a theory of values that shows the 
equivalences of values and value-systems.  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Chapter 4  
Alain Locke on the Facts about Value: 
“Enough has been said to show that the view generally held of the relation between race 
and culture may well be reversed. According to the prevailing view, man is many and 
civilization one, meaning by this that the races differ significantly in potential ability and 
that only one, the white race, could have and has achieved civilization. The reverse view, 
forced upon the ethnologist and the historian by a more critical and open-minded survey 
of the facts, reads thus: man is one, civilizations are many, meaning by this that the races 
do not differ significantly in psychological endowment, that the variety of possible 
civilizations is great and of actual ones, considerable, and that many civilizations other 
than ours have achieved things of genuine and unique worth.” 
––Alexander Guldenweiser, Early Civilization: An Introduction to Anthropology 
Introduction: 
In the last chapter we saw Locke denying that race-talk involves talk about 
inherent differences in physical and psychical traits, particularly where those traits are 
natural or divinely-mandated. Locke wants to deny races in this way because Locke 
wants to combat racial superiority, and in so doing wants to give a proper ground for 
establishing a cosmopolitan community. For Locke, race is a more fluid socio-historical 
concept from which inherent superiority with regard to races cannot be inferred. This 
argument, Locke thinks, goes a long way in uprooting the theoretical commitments of 
racial superiority. However, racial superiority does not merely rely on the superiority of 
one race over another––in Locke’s case whites over non-whites––in the abstract, or as 
products of nature or God. Racial superiority asserts differences in races as necessarily 
connected to differences in culture, which reduces to differences in values. Racial 
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differences imply value-differences because culture-differences, as necessary productions 
of race, are perceived as value-differences. To claim that a race is superior to another is to 
perceive that race’s culture as superior to the other’s, which is to say that such race’s 
culture has values that are superior to the other’s. Thus, in addition to denying racial 
origins and differences like the ones produced by the thinkers illustrated in chapter two, 
Locke needs to displace the value-hierarchies that undergird these anthropologies that 
regard race.  Locke needs to produce a theory of value if he is to successfully assert 1
grounds for the establishment of a cosmopolitan community. 
Chief among Locke’s interests in value theory is the problem of whether certain 
objects or states of affairs have objective value, or whether the value of all objects and 
states of affairs are neither correct nor incorrect, but dependent solely on the individual 
valuer. Here, I define value objectivity as the belief that our aesthetic and ethical 
evaluations, whether  judgments, beliefs, or feelings, are either correct or incorrect 
independently of our individual valuations, and can be known to be such.   2
 Locke’s understanding of race, as a socio-historical product that relies on culture (and 1
thus on values), does not, by itself, displace the idea that certain races are superior to 
others. One can merely concede Locke’s argument that there is neither anything 
inherent nor natural/divine about race and still assert that the superiority of some races 
over others, and can do so relying on Locke’s socio-historical understanding of race. 
One can argue that a race’s superiority derives from socio-historical circumstances that 
give the superior race the right to deny inferior races the respect necessary for the 
establishment of a cosmopolitan community. In order to combat white-supremacist 
ideology that denies respect for non-white peoples, Locke needs more than merely the 
philosophical anthropology regarding race that he developed. Now, Locke can simply 
deny race, or a correlation between race and culture. However, Locke (as a pragmatist) 
cannot commit to the former (that there are no things as races, insofar as Locke wants 
to preserve race-talk on pragmatist grounds), and in rejecting the former (in affirming 
race) Locke sees an undeniable correlation between the two latter concepts (race and 
culture). 
  R.M. Chisholm, Brentano and Intrinsic Value (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2
1986) 3-4.
!130
Additionally, Locke was interested in related value problems such as value 
realism and the intrinsic nature of value. By value realism, I have in mind the idea that 
there are properties within a particular object (either physical or intellectual) or state of 
affairs that give the object or state of affairs its value. By intrinsic value, I mean merely 
that what gives these objects or states of affairs their value regards the objects or states of 
affairs themselves, as opposed to objects’ value being dependent solely on other objects 
or states of affairs for their value.  So, for any object or state of affairs that is intrinsically 3
valuable, whatever it must be that makes the object or state of affairs valuable must be 
found in, or apply only to, the object or state of affairs itself/themselves, rather than 
depending solely on something outside of it for its value. 
In responding to these problems (particularly the overarching problem of value 
objectivity), my claim is that Locke’s aim was to produce a sort of in-between position 
wherein we think of values as neither ontologically objective, a position that Locke 
thought led easily to austere demands placed on agents to accept them, nor radically 
subjective, a position that Locke considered to have a tendency to produce anarchism and 
pessimism as related to imperatives.  My argument is that though Locke denied that value 4
was either correct or incorrect in the way that objectivists tend to, he also denied that the 
value conferred upon all objects was dependent on the valuations of individual agents in 
 Francesco Orsi, Value Theory (New York: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2015) 31.3
 One can very easily see Locke’s problem with value objectivity. If it is the case that 4
values are objective, and some group of white peoples (say Kant’s Germans) had better 
values than all other peoples, then this group of whites (Kant’s Germans) seem licensed 
to colonized other peoples. Likewise, if Locke accepts radical subjectivism, then it 
would seem that we are never licensed to argue against people(s) who deny respect to 
other people(s).
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the way that subjectivist positions tend to. A sketch of the argument is as follows. Let us 
take objectivity, as it relates to value, to express the following: values are either correct or 
incorrect, and they cannot be said to depend on agents’ value judgments about objects 
([C∨¬C]∧¬I).  Let us take subjectivity, as it relates to value, to express the following: 5
values are neither correct nor incorrect, and must be thought to depend on individual 
agents’ value judgments (¬[C∨¬C]∧[I]). My argument is that Locke's in-between position 
expresses the following: values are neither correct nor incorrect (ontologically), but 
cannot be said to depend on individual agents’ value judgments, which confers a kind of 
objectivity or objective reality to them (¬[C∨¬C]∧[¬I]). Locke seems to think that this 
position allows him to avoid the implications of both extremes, and further allows him to 
justify what some may consider to be a tension in his thinking, namely how he is 
committed to cultural constants and more permanent values such as toleration, 
reciprocity, and democracy which are necessary for the creation of a cosmopolitain 
community on the one hand, and how he argues for a constant process of reflective 
reconsideration of all values that he terms a transvaluation of values on the other hand. 
On an Appropriate Starting-point for Value Theory: 
Now, insofar as Locke wanted to produce this in-between position because of a 
tendency towards draconian results from either extreme, we are able to aver that Locke is 
concerned with the practical/political world. We may aver this because of Locke’s deep 
concern for how these results play out in human interactions with each other. Further, we 
may aver that Locke considers the practical/political world as an appropriate starting-
 C = Correct, I = Dependent on Individual Agent’s Value Judgments.5
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point for an analysis of value. In saying that Locke is concerned with the practical/
political world, what I am claiming is that Locke is concerned with the world wherein 
humans interact, and understands value theory to be a discipline that must consider how 
its theories are able to affect the world, and not merely describe or intellectualize it. This 
concern deeply affects Locke's arguments regarding the objectivity/subjectivity debate 
about values.  
Further, this concern is what led Locke to commit to a functional approach to 
value theory whereby there is no uncoupling “the theoretical from such practical aspects 
of the value problem, and [which] may eventually find its best leads and most satisfactory 
solutions coming by way of an insistence on such correlation.”  For Locke, theoretical 6
questions include, and in fact are guided by, value-conflicts and the more political 
problems of values in our world. This concern with the practical/political world is what 
separates Locke from more positivistic and purely scientific thinkers on value, and what 
aligns Locke with pragmatists such as William James and John Dewey, who take into 
account how theoretical disquisitions must be applicable to the political world and are in 
fact justified by their engagement with people’s lives.  So as to give a clearer view of 7
Locke’s thinking on value theory as a discipline that must be applicable to the practical/
 Alain Locke, “A Functional Theory of Value Ultimates,” in The Works of Alain Locke, 6
ed. Charles Molesworth (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012) 478. Recall also 
that we saw this thinking in Locke’s arguments regarding anthropology, whereby 
anthropology should look to justify the values that we hold dearest. 
 It is perhaps this concern that forces most Locke-scholars to, I believe wrongly, speak 7
about him merely in relation to pragmatism. As I show below, Locke was much more 
concerned with phenomenological approaches to value than is credited.
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political world, I would like to focus on key aspects of James’ pragmatism, a system that 
Locke both appreciates and partially critiques. 
James’ concern with the practical/political world is illustrated in both his 
conceptions of truth and value. With regard to truth, James rejects the correspondence 
theory of truth whereby a statement is true just in case it matches the world wherein the 
statement is made. For James, “intellectualists,” or those who accept a correspondence 
theory of truth, ground truth in the agreement between a statement and the world.  8
However, agreement along these terms is merely epistemological. It merely regards the 
understanding of the world by the agent, and does not regard the application of, or 
possibility for, an idea or statement in the world. So, to say that “a book exists at a 
location at a particular time” is true just in case there is actually a book that exists at a 
location at a particular time. The truth of this statement does not regard how the idea of 
the book affects the world, or any possibilities for the book. 
James claims that this epistemological understanding of truth is deficient insofar 
as intellectualists are not able to ground truth in agreement with reality in the manner that 
they would like to. James asks us to take some object such as a clock. Of course a 
statement such as “Clock(x) is in Location(y)” is true just in case there is actually a clock 
in a particular location that matches the idea reflected in the statement. One can produce 
an idea of a clock that is a copy of the clock in the world, such that the statement 
“Clock(x) is in Location(y)” is true. However, “your idea of its ‘works’ (unless you are a 
clock-maker) is much less of a copy, yet it passes muster, for it in no way clashes with the 
 Falsity will, of course, be disagreement between a statement and the world.8
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reality.” James continues: “Even though it should shrink to the mere word ‘works,’ that 
word still serves you truly; and when you speak of the ‘time-keeping function’ of the 
clock, or of its spring’s ‘elasticity,’ it is hard to see exactly what your ideas can copy.”  9
James’ point in appealing to the clock is that if it is the case that truth is an agreement 
between our statements and the world, we have no grounds to believe that many, if any, 
of our statements actually agree with the world, and therefore it would appear that we can 
possess little to nothing in the way of truth. In fact, James seems to be suggesting that the 
term “agreement” is rather ambiguous in this correspondence notion of truth: “Where our 
ideas cannot copy definitely their object, what does agreement with the object mean?”  10
The term “agreement” would then become superfluous when there is little to no 
possibility of connecting our ideas/statements with the world.  
What James seems to think is that the intellectualists miss something critical in 
their understanding of truth, namely that there is a practical or functional aspect to truth. 
Intellectualists define truth in such a way that would make possessing it unable to change. 
James argues that “the great assumption of the intellectualists is that truth means 
essentially an inert static relation. When you’ve got your true idea of anything, there’s an 
end of the matter. You're in possession; you know; you have fulfilled your thinking 
destiny.”   11
 William James, Pragmatism, in William James: Writings, 1902-1910 (New York: The 9




In responding to intellectualists James asserts that pragmatists are also committed 
to grounding truth in agreement with reality. However, pragmatists and intellectualists 
“begin to quarrel only after the question is raised as to what may precisely be meant by 
the term ‘agreement,’ and what by the term ‘reality,’ when reality is taken as something 
for our ideas to agree with.”  It is not the case that intellectualists and pragmatists have 12
completely distinct notions of truth, insofar as pragmatists would deny that the agreement 
between idea/statement and reality serves as the criterion for truth. However, in thinking 
through the criteria for truth, pragmatists ask “‘what concrete difference will its [the 
idea’s] being true make in any one’s actual life’” given that the idea is true?  James’ 13
thinking adds a functional aspect to the epistemological assertions of the intellectuals, 
and thus brings truth into the practical world. For James, truth regards considering the 
relevancy of an idea taken to be true in the world.  Thus, truth is not merely about 
agreement between claims and the world, but an engagement with the world that claims 
agree with. And as such, an idea’s being/becoming true depends on whether they can be 
assimilated, validated, corroborated, or verified in the world.  James tells us that: “The 14
truth of an idea is not a stagnant property inherent in it. Truth happens to an idea. It 
becomes true, is made true by events. Its verity is in fact an event, a process: the process 
namely of its verifying itself, its veri-fication. Its validity is the process of its valid-






way of belief’, it must be good for ‘definite, assignable reasons.’”  What is true is 16
intimately connected to what is of value, which is determined by the manner in which 
society is progressed. This is an idea that Locke accepts and will be committed to when 
developing a philosophical anthropology, which we have already seen, as well as a theory 
of value.  
Now, if it is the case that what is true is intimately connected to what is of value, 
then what is of value––that is, what progresses society in a particular way, which for 
James becomes what is of greatest value––becomes truth. That value, as what progresses 
society in a particular way, becomes truth implies that James rejects ontological realism 
as applied to value.  Like Locke, James “found little room for sui generis ethical facts in 17
his ontology, and since neither moral relations nor the moral law could ‘swing in vacuo’, 
he took the ‘only habitat’ for goodness, badness, and obligation to be ‘the mind which 
feels them.’”  James asserts that: “Surely there is no status for good and evil to exist in, 18
in a purely insentient world. How can one physical fact, considered simply as a physical 
fact, be ‘better’ than another?”  Good and evil, unlike elemental properties such as 19
helium or oxygen, require valuers. Thus for James, “any facts about values have to be 
understood in terms of facts about the practice of valuing, and this might seem to make 
 Henry Jackman, “William James,” in The Oxford Handbook of American Philosophy, 16
ed. Cheryl Misak (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008) 77. 
 Ibid, 74.17
 Ibid. 18
 William James, “The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life,” in William James: 19
Writings, 1902-1910 (New York: The Library of America, 1987) 599.
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goodness, like the valuations that it depends upon, a purely ‘subjective’ phenomenon.”  20
James takes values to be grounded in the subjective experience of valuing objects and 
dependent on agential valuations, which implies that they are not found in nature. James 
claims that “nothing can be good or right except so far as some consiousness feels it to be 
good or thinks it to be right….”  This might seem to make values subjective, or more 21
plainly might seem to make James a subjectivist about value. However, “James still 
wants our values to be ‘objective’, since while values are constructed out of our 
valuations, we intend them to be more than simply expressions of our preferences.”  22
Values, thus can be thought to be truth-apt.  
James locates the objectivity of value in the equilibrium of claims for objects in 
the world in which agents desire, and in judgments about value that produces the best 
results (in terms of producing the most benefits without harm from a societal 
standpoint).  James begins by imagining a solitary agent, whose agency is a necessary 23
condition for the possibility of value to emerge. A solitary agent can produce objective 
values by reaching an equilibrium or consistency among his/her desires and his/her 
demands. “If now we introduce a second thinker with his likes and dislikes into the 
universe, the ethical situation becomes much more complex, and several possibilities are 
immediately seen to obtain.”  We can seem much of this thinking in Locke’s work. 24
 Henry Jackman, “William James,” 75.20
 William James, “The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life,” 601.21
 Henry Jackman, “William James,” 75.22
 William James, “The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life,” 600-601 & 607.23
 Ibid, 600.24
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Locke justifies a pragmatic approach to truth and value in perhaps his most cited 
work entitled “Values and Imperatives.” Locke opens by telling us that all philosophies 
refer to given times and locations, and do not refer to objective realities.  Philosophical 25
discourses are conditioned by the needs and perspectives of the communities within 
which they are developed, and are judged to be sound insofar as they accurately reflect 
the needs of the community. They begin with the concepts and contexts provided by the 
community. Locke, as we have seen with his philosophical anthropology as it regards 
race, and will see with his value theory, thinks that they must refer back to the 
community.  26
Immediately we can see that Locke rejects a correspondence theory of truth as it 
applies to philosophical inquiry. If philosophical inquiry can capture truth, and Locke 
seems to think that it can, then Locke must think that the truth that it captures need not 
correspond to the world as it is “objectively.” Locke submits the tenability of 
philosophical discourse to the practical needs (along with the dispositional attitudes) of 
those about whom the discourse was constructed, which places Locke squarely in line 
with James’ rejection of the correspondence theory of truth on practical grounds. And this 
is in part what justifies the practical world’s being a starting-point for Locke. Philosophy 
need not be concerned with reporting objective facts about the world, and thus statements 
about the world need not correspond to the factual world in order for those statements to 
 Alain Locke, “Values and Imperatives,” in The Works of Alain Locke, ed. Charles 25
Molesworth (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012) 452.
 Recall Locke’s commitment to this Jamesian idea in chapter three, where Locke, in 26
critiquing an assumption of foundational anthropologists, argues that anthropology 
should be useful for society.
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be true. For Locke, there is nothing wrong with a philosophical system grounded in the 
usefulness that it has to a community. Thus Locke, like James, thinks that something like 
the belief in God as a true idea is not grounded in God’s corresponding to some Being in/
beyond the world, but the manner in which the statement or idea affects the people of the 
world. And so, for Locke, there is nothing "ugly" about judging a philosophical system as 
either valuable or lacking value because of its ability or inability to solve practical 
problems. Thus, Locke, in being committed to a rejection of the correspondence theory of 
truth, seems able to commit to a practical theory of value. 
Now, as Ernest Mason tells us, Locke does not think that value theory (or any 
philosophical discourse) should be tailored to support any particular argument or system. 
Mason writes that Locke’s “psychological approach to values was never intended to be an 
end in itself. Rather, he was interested in the psychological nature of valuating 
consciousness in an effort to better understand the nature of our agreements and conflicts 
over values.”  What this means is that Locke is deeply committed to solving practical 27
problems when constructing his value theory, and constructs it to that end; his value 
theory is not merely abstract or an intellectual endeavor. “This does not mean that 
axiology should have the task of formulating and expressing a specific ethical system, but 
that it should serve as a methodology for the investigation of ethical and moral 
phenomena in an effort to offer us a more accurate approach to the problem of normative 
judgments.”  Axiology, and Locke would suggest any theory about phenomena, should 28
 Ernest Mason, “Alain Locke’s Philosophy of Value: An Introduction” (Unpublished 27
Emory University Doctoral Thesis, 1975) 87.
 Ibid.28
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not be constructed to support a system or world view, but must begin with the world, and 
have the aim of relating back to the world in its goal of progressing the world. And this 
idea about axiology places Locke squarely in-line with pragmatist thinking. Still, Locke 
is not completely satisfied with pragmatism as an appropriate starting-point for value 
theory.  
Locke tells us that “pragmatism has only transposed the question from the 
traditional one of how what ends should govern life to the more provocative one of how 
and why activity created them.”  For Locke, pragmatism merely wants to replace 29
dogmatic principles of value with understanding the principles’ genesis and why we rely 
on them. Pragmatism, on Locke’s account, does not do anything to challenge value 
dogmatism. Pragmatism asks questions about the genesis of beliefs about value without 
giving us new methods of determining values and solving conflicts about them. So Locke 
would say that James, in tracing the genesis of values in processes of valuating, leaves 
dogmatism unchallenged.  
Further for Locke, “pragmatism and instrumentalism has set up at the center of its 
philosophy a doctrine of truth as itself a functional value.”  What Locke means here is 30
that pragmatism and instrumentalism have set up an ends-means relationship whereby 
means become justifiable because of the ends that are desired. For Locke, this leads to 
value anarchism while avoiding the problem of absolutism that it was constructed to 





“oppressive” values, or assert something like the inequality of human beings whereby 
respect for certain humans is denied because of some good for some larger number of 
people. What Locke is worried about is that people will get lost in pragmatism’s 
functional theory of value. And further, Locke sees that rejecting the normativity of 
values does not license the inference that they no longer govern our lives. Locke asserts 
that “by wavering the question of the validity of value ultimates as ‘absolutes,’ we do not 
escape the problem of their functional categorical character as imperatives of action and 
as norms of preference and choice.”  Thus, the problem that Locke engages is how to 32
ground a theory that preserves the necessity of respect accorded to humans qua humans 
without supporting the idea that certain values, and thus certain people, are inferior 
because of their value-systems given that people will choose from these systems. Locke’s 
approach is through engaging questions of objectivity, realism, and the intrinsic nature of 
value in objects, ultimately leading to both a rejection of ontological objectivity and 
radical subjectivity. 
Realism, Objectivity, and the Intrinsic Nature of Value:  
That Locke accepts many of the pragmatists’ claims on the issue of the practical 
importance to truth and value inquiry has now been asserted. I would now like to begin a 
proper inquiry into Locke’s theory of value. For Locke, like most thinkers on the question 
of value, the first and perhaps most significant theoretical problem in value theory is the 
problem of the status of value as it relates to objects and states of affairs. Unlike many 
inquirers into value, Locke thinks that engaging this problem is significant for a solution 
 Ibid, 453.32
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to value-conflicts that get in the way of cosmopolitanism, particularly those conflicts that 
are grounded in a group considering itself to be superior to others. Thus, we must begin 
to understand Locke’s value theory by looking at Locke’s statements that regard realism, 
objectivity, and the intrinsic nature of value in objects and states of affairs.  
Recall that Locke thinks that philosophical discourses are both time- and location-
conditioned. If we relate the idea that philosophical discourses are both time- and 
location-conditioned to the issue of the objectivity of values, we may infer that either 
Locke thinks that we cannot know about, or more plainly that we have no direct access to 
knowledge regarding, the ontological objectivity of value in our philosophical discourses, 
though we have grounds to believe in the ontological objectivity of value, or that our 
philosophical discourses can be complete (that is to say accurate within finite limits) on 
the question of value, and still be time- and location-conditioned. If the latter is the case, 
then one may infer that value itself, about which we discourse, is not an ontologically 
objective reality. If value was ontologically objective and our knowledge about them can 
be complete, then there would be no reason to say that all philosophical discourses are 
time- and location-tempered. Now, insofar as Locke thinks that he can correctly talk 
about value philosophically, he must think that value itself is not ontologically objective.  
 Non-inferential evidence that Locke is not committed to the objectivity of values 
can be provided from an article written some years after “Values and Imperatives.” In this 
article, Locke rejects ontologically real, objective, and intrinsic values. Afterwards, 
Locke provides us with a process through which objects become both objectively and 
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intrinsically valuable in a quasi-real sense that is not dependent on their having an 
ontologically real status.   33
In the article, Locke gives us an implicit rejection of what I have been calling 
value-realism by telling us that: “If value is conferred upon an object by a personal 
attitude towards it, it is clear that all objects can be valued by being included in a 
valuation-process.”  Locke’s view that all objects are capability of being valued (though 34
some can perhaps be valued more easily than others) seems to be a rejection of a 
particular type of argument used to support value-realism, one that asserts that there is a 
natural attraction/repulsion towards/away from certain objects because of certain 
objectively or intrinsically valuable qualities within the objects, or that one's emotions, 
intuition, and/or reasoning faculty/faculties pick(s) out particular natural or nonnatural 
value-qualities in objects that make them worthy of a certain sort of esteem.  Locke 35
seems to reason that if all objects possess the ability to be valued, then attitudes pick out 
nothing in them. For Locke, the value conferred onto objects derives from our attitudes.  
One might still think that Locke can be committed to the view that all objects 
possess the ability to be valued even if there are properties in the objects that make them 
worthy of a certain sort of esteem. One might argue that nothing that I have stated denies 
 In this article, Locke seems to mean something slightly different from what I have 33
defined the term to mean. Locke seems to mean universal, or universally accepted or 
acknowledged and not necessarily either true or false and independent of the judgments 
of the valuer.
 Alain Locke, "Value,"  in The Works of Alain Locke, ed. Charles Molesworth (New 34
York: Oxford University Press, 2012) 474.
 One can see this type of argument in Franz Brentano's The Origin of our Knowledge of 35
Right and Wrong, trans. Roderick M. Chisholm and Elizabeth h. Schneewind, ed. Oskar 
Kraus English (New York: Routledge, 2009).
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this if Locke thinks that an agent can merely be mistaken about the appropriate value-
properties within objects. Though there are properties in objects that make them 
objectively valuable, Locke might still think that an agent’s sensing faculties must be 
trained in a certain way so as to pick out the value-properties within objects 
appropriately. Thus, Locke might think that there are properties within objects that make 
them valuable even if it is possible that all objects are capable of being valued.  
However, Locke seems to be committed to the view that a rejection of objectivity 
in an ontological sense implies a rejection of value-realism.  If there is no ontological 36
objectivity with regard to the value of objects, then there cannot be real value-properties 
within objects. Further, as Locke tells us very early in the article, “value differs in kind 
from consciousness of fact. It is posterior to the latter, and represents a reaction upon 
fact…. [V]alues are something superadded upon the other qualities of objects by the 
mind, in order to express their relation to its purpose and acts, and do not inhere in 
objects per se.”  Value, for Locke, is something added to the factual object by the mind, 37
or more precisely for Locke, by the personality of the valuing agent.  38
Moreover, Locke thinks that value-realism fails to account for either value-change 
or value-transposition. Locke understands there to be changes in value content, or the 
goodness/badness conferred onto objects. Locke challenges value-realists to explain these 
 Alain Locke, "Value," 474.36
 Ibid, 465.37
 Here, we need not think that the separation between fact and value is too sharp. I show 38
below that for Locke, we do not perceive facts separately from value, or without value, 
and in many cases the fact becomes what it is because of value. Thus, distinguishing 
them is not as simple as it might appear.
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radical shifts in the value of objects, particularly if it is the case that value-properties are 
implied by the existence of the object, or more plainly if it is the case that there are 
properties within objects that make them valuable. Locke writes that “what is revealed or 
developed in experience as better becomes the new good, shifting the position of 
normative acceptance or agency formerly occupied by the older value content.”  Here 39
Locke is claiming that an object that we judge to be better than another object, but not 
necessarily a good object, becomes a good object because of its being reevaluated in 
certain contexts.  It’s goodness is contextual, and dependent on circumstances in which 40
contexts become important, which can only be connected to the experiences (that is the 
socio-historical contexts) of agents. These experiences will shape and be interpreted by 
the personalities of agents. Locke thinks that this could not be the case if there were 
properties within certain objects that made them qualitatively better than other objects, 
though not necessarily good.  
From changes in value content, Locke argues that we get changes in the 
normative force that the value of the object produces; whether we ought or ought not 
pursue an object shifts with the shifts of the goodness/badness of the object as negotiated 
in changing contexts. However, these shifts are difficult to explain if it is the case that 
value resides within objects. Consider Locke's claim that: “The process continuity of the 
normative character of values is demonstrated not merely by the substitution of new 
 Alain Locke, “A Functional View of Value Ultimates,” in The Works of Alain Locke, ed. 39
Charles Molesworth (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012) 479.
 Thus, one may infer that a qualitatively "bad" object can become an unqualifiedly 40
"good" object, which Locke is claiming would be impossible if a certain value-
properties were implied by the existence of the object.
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value content for the old, but even more clearly by the displacement and retroactive 
devaluing of the old, a procedure which transforms yesterday’s good into a relatively [sic] 
bad.”  This shift in the value content is doubtful if value realism is true. 41
For Locke, our imperatives are derived from either how we feel or judge an object 
as either good or bad, or as either better or worse than another object. “When explicit 
judgment ensues, it is revamped in evaluative thought accordingly.”  For Locke, this 42
evaluation both should and usually does occur in accordance with the functional character 
of the object or abstract value (democracy, love, freedom of speech, etc.).  Locke argues 43
that “it seems to be the progressively corrective character of the value norm more than 
the stability of specific value content which endows our abstract values with normative 
ultimacy.”  Thus, Locke is making both a historical and normative claim about the 44
functional character of value, and he takes this as evidence in exposing weaknesses in 
arguments that favor value-realism. 
After rejecting value-realism, Locke targets the ontological status of objective and 
intrinsic values, and attempts to answer why it appears that there are objective and 
intrinsic values in an ontological sense. In other words, Locke’s concern is whether there 
is objective and intrinsic value in an ontological sense and why people tend to think of 
 Alain Locke, “A Functional View of Value Ultimates,” 479.41
 Ibid.42
 Locke tells us that there are certain cases, such as states or communities where 43
inhibitions and dogmatisms exist, where the process of corrective revision is blocked. 
However, these exceptions (meaning rarities) are unjust insofar as they are 
counterproductive. The question here is whether progression, which seems to lay 
behind this functional approach to value theory, is a dogmatic value.
 Alain Locke, "A Functional View of Value Ultimates," in The Works of Alain Locke, ed. 44
Charles Molesworth (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012) 480.
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particular objects as containing both an inner worth and one that can be recognized as 
either true or false if there is not a recognizable inner worth attributable to objects. Locke 
tells us that:  
If value is conferred upon an object by a personal attitude towards it, it is clear 
that all objects can be valued by being included in a valuation-process. Many 
objects, however, are so variously valued according to circumstances, or are so 
really important enough to be valued at all, that they are conceived as neutral or 
indifferent per se. So it is only if an object is constantly valued in a particular way 
that its value adheres to it and it comes to seem intrinsically valuable. Value 
acquires objectivity in other ways also.   45
For Locke, what separates the appearance of objects as possessing extrinsic and 
subjective value from those that appear to have intrinsic and objective value is not 
internal to the object, or a kind of fittingness of the objects that can be discriminated by 
any valuer, but rather their being valued in a certain sort of way in society, along with the 
longevity of their being valued in this way.  Thus, one is able to see Locke stripping 46
away both the ontological status of objectivity and the intrinsic nature of value in objects. 
Value in objects merely appears to be objective and intrinsic in an ontological sense. And 
as such, one is not licensed to subject others to his/her values, or to deny the legitimacy 
of others’ values without grounding. Insofar as values are superadded onto objects, and 
are not ontologically objective, we cannot assume the superiority of particular values. 
Now, if value is socio-historically dependent, then we would, for Locke, need to 
 Alain Locke, "Value," 474. (Locke never actually articulates how value acquires 45
objectivity in ways other than the way in which he states. One is left to wonder whether 
there are manifold valuation-processes, or whether there are manifold ways in which 
the one valuation-process can be said to flower out. However, it is significant to note 
that Locke states that value acquires objectivity, which seems to be a tacit rejection of 
subjectivism.)
 Still, one is left to wonder why there is such a variance in why people are more likely 46
to value some things in a similar way and why others are valued so variedly.
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understand a community’s socio-historical circumstances before making judgments about 
their values or the value that they place on certain objects. 
Though Locke denies ontological objectivity, he does not want to support a 
radical subjectivist view of values wherein values are dependent on individual agents. Of 
particular interest for Locke is this view’s tendency to promote the abdication of talk 
about values. Though Locke finds value to be dependent on socio-historical context, he 
does not want to commit to the view that judgments made about communities’ value-
systems are never licensed. This would, in arguing that we be more open to others’ value-
systems, lead to an inability to critique racial superiority. 
Further for Locke, we live by our imperatives, and values ground these 
imperatives. This is what produces a responsibility for philosophical discourse about 
values. In “Values and Imperatives,” Locke tells us that: "In de-throning our absolutes, 
we must take care not to exile our imperatives, for afterall, we live by them. We must 
realize more fully that values create these imperatives as well as the more formally super-
imposed absolutes, that norms govern our behavior as well as guide our reasoning."  47
Locke grounds an argument for the importance of the study of values in human 
experience––a practical responsibility that a certain sort of radical subjectivist thinking 
would abandon. What Locke wants to say is that the study of value is valuable, and is so 
because of the way that human beings are constructed. Humans are value-having and 
value-operating beings. Radical subjectivism abandons discussion of values. However, 
abdicating talk about value does not solve the problem that austere imperatives derived 
 Alain Locke, “Values and Imperatives,” 452.47
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from objective theories of value pose, and in abdicating talk about value, "we do not 
escape the problem of their functional categorical character as imperatives of action and 
as norms of preference and choice."   48
Locke’s goal then, is to avoid objectivity’s rigidity and wrongheadedness, and 
subjectivism’s amorphousness and dangerousness. Locke thinks that he can show this 
through a genetic exposition of our experiences in valuing objects, both personally and as 
a human race, and in so doing grounds a type of objectivity of value in communality and 
its affects on the process through which objects and states of affairs become valuable. As 
such, I would like to elucidate Locke’s conception of the valuation-process, connecting it 
to an understanding of the human being in community, which Locke uses to ground his 
thinking on the objectivity of value.  
At the beginning of the valuation-process, perhaps very early in agents’ lives, the 
value conferred onto certain objects is strictly subjective. Locke thinks that each 
individual begins their value experiences by considering him/herself to be the measure of 
all things. Because each individual considers him/herself to be the measure of all things, 
all personal reaction to objects carry a “formal claim to universality” for valuing agents.  49
What this means is that at the beginning of the valuation-process, agents engage certain 
objects with an immediate disposition towards them, and the value of objects concurs 
with the disposition. If the agent has a favorable disposition towards the object, then the 
object has positive value. If the reverse, then the object has negative value. Agents then 
 Ibid, 453.48
 Alain Locke, “Value,” 474.49
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infer that all other agents do/should value these objects in the equivalent manner. (As we 
will see, this amounts to is an assumption by Locke that agents begin life by viewing 
particular objects in a non-communal manner, and then later in life come to view objects 
under communal classificatory constraints of language and usage that have caused new 
perceptions of objects.)  
Here, we can see that at the beginning of agential value experiences, there is a 
one-to-one correlation between the disposition of the agent and value attributed to 
objects. As the agent engages his/her community, communal interaction has an impact on 
the experiences of objects to which value is attributed. Locke tells us that the one-to-one 
correlation between the disposition of the valuer and objects begins to break down when 
the value conferred onto objects comes into question in community. In this way the 
valuing agent’s value-judgments are rejected and referred to as “merely subjective” or are 
affirmed and “may thereby acquire every degree of 'objectivity.'”  For Locke, “objects 50
which have obtained social recognition as valuable come to rank as objective values.”  51
Thus, the seeming objectivity regarding the value of some object is accounted for by the 
consistency of communal opinion, and is not something over and above the judgments of 
the collective. As such, objectively valuable objects possess no ontologically “real” value. 
From the object’s being valued on an individual basis, the object “emancipates itself from 




existing value.”   This value is, in a sense, communal or negotiated by the collective, and 52
cannot be reduced to individual valuations.   
Let us return to Locke’s use of the term “emancipates” in the last quotation above. 
This use is interesting, particularly when considered with Locke’s words “look like a 
mere recognition of an already existing value.” By “emancipates” Locke could mean 
either that there is something of a failed recognition that the object's value is subjective––
that valuers merely fail to appreciate the subjective nature of valued objects when they 
“recognize” them as “already existing values,” or that there is an actual elevation of the 
value of the object beyond its merely ontologically subjective status––that in a certain 
sense, the object quite literally becomes objectively valuable. I would like to explore this 
second possibility when returning to the grounds of agreement regarding objects’ value 
that was discussed in the prior paragraph.  
Now for Locke, objectively valuable objects are not considered objectively 
valuable merely because they have a certain sort of communal status that is recognized by 
many valuing agents. It is indeed the case that an object that is judged to be objectively 
valuable must have been recognized in a certain sort of way in community in order for it 
to be considered objectively valuable. However, after the object has been recognized in 
this way, Locke wants to say that it need not continue to be esteemed in the way in which 
it was when judged objectively valuable. Locke writes that: “A value that has risen to be 
objective may then maintain itself without continuing to be valued, and even though, 
under the circumstances, its value may have been converted into the opposite. Thus, once 
 Ibid.52
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a literary work is ranked as a ‘classic,’ its value remains uncontested, even though few 
care for it or even read it….”  For Locke, community is merely responsible for setting 53
up the value of the object. However, the object need not be esteemed or desired whenever 
considered. Thus, one can see Locke distancing himself from desire-theories of value, 
whereby value regards our desires for some object. If I no longer desire an object, but 
recognize it as objectively and intrinsically valuable, then its objective and intrinsic value 
(and in fact, its value simpliciter) is not a product of my desiring it.  Further for Locke: 54
“It cannot always be assumed therefore that, because a value is current and is recognized, 
it is fully functional, any more than it is right.”  Thus, unlike one might expect from a 55
pragmatists, value is not a function of the object, or is not conferred onto an object (and 
further is not continually conferred onto an object) because the object has or maintains a 
certain use for a community of agents. We might still think marriage to be valuable even 
if there is not a practical use for it, or if it were no longer desired. 
 Alain Locke, “Value,” 474.53
 Now, in fairness to the range of potential interpretations of Locke’s view, one could 54
plausibly interpret Locke as thinking the following: even though one’s valuing some X 
does not necessarily mean that one desires X, or more plainly that value does not equate 
to desire, we might still think that to value X implicates a desire that one has for X, or 
more plainly that a desire that one has for X signals that one values X. When one desires 
X, we are licensed to infer that one values X, even if desiring X does not equate to 
valuing X. A potential interpretation of this kind can be grounded from statements that 
Locke makes about facts and value, where Locke tells us that one of the reasons why 
fact and value cannot be separated completely is that we seem to have a desire for 
(which implicates that we value) the possession of facts. This would allow Locke to 
hold that because we desire X (Facts), we are licensed to infer that we value X (Facts) 
even though to desire X (Facts) is not to value X (Facts).
 Alain Locke, “Value,” 474. Now, Locke's use of “right” here seems strange. Locke 55
seems to use this term in a moral sense, which would be absurd sense moral oughtness 
is a type of value, which would reside over values in order to justify our conferring 
them onto some object. Moreover, Locke seems not to want to commit to a 
transcendent sense of normativity. “Right" must then refer to a use-value in society, 
which would make his use of “right” reflexive for “functional.” 
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So, what we have learned is that it is through community that objects take on 
objective value. And we might think that communal recognition, or what we may refer to 
as a sort of consensus of the value of some object, is merely a necessary condition for 
some object's becoming objectively valuable. However in my view, Locke must not 
(cannot) think communal recognition to be a sufficient condition for an object’s 
becoming objectively valuable if his thinking is to be accurate. Note here that my 
argument is that, in a sense, subjectively valued objects become objectively valuable 
because of their status in community. Thus, being recognized by community in a certain 
sort of way is necessary for them to become objectively valuable. However, more is 
needed for an object to become objectively valuable, which is to say that communal 
recognition is not sufficient for an object’s value becoming objective. If it were both 
necessary and sufficient, then there would be nothing to distinguish Locke’s value theory 
from radically subjectivist ones. To see what else is needed we must understand just why/
how there is an immediate apprehension of a certain value conferred onto an object when 
the object is perceived.  
So, let us say that there is a merely subjective value-judgment that results from a 
disposition towards an object at the beginning of value-experiences that occur early in an 
agent’s life. Further, let us say that objects that have agreement as valuable in community 
become those objects that attain an objective value. However, none of this explains why 
objects appear immediately valuable after our personal value-judgments are subjected to 
communal scrutiny and are affirmed. What explains the immediate representation of an 
object as possessing a certain value (which, for Locke, cannot be properties within the 
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object) seems to be the training of our perceptive faculties to see objects in certain ways. 
It is this training of our perceptive faculties that seems to be reflected in confirmations 
about valuable objects such that there is agreement about certain objects’ value.  
So, Locke thinks that agreement on the value of certain objects and states of 
affairs confers a kind of objectivity to the value of the object. Communal experience 
trains humans to perceive objects as possessing a certain value. Locke’s thinking is 
grounded in a harmonic relationship between: 1) the value that is attributed to an object 
as an object of perception; 2) the way in which an object is classified in a given 
community; 3) the agent's natural classificatory categories as it relates to feeling-kinds. 
The first focuses on the relationship between value and perception. The second focuses 
on how objects are classified in accordance with language and usage. The third focuses 
on the psychological schemata of valuers. 
A Lockean Harmony: Value and Perception: 
Let us begin with facts about objects in the world and their relationships to value 
and perception, which is to say, let us start with the first component of what we may call 
a Lockean harmony. However, before looking specifically at the relationship between 
value and perception, let us look at the relationship between facts and values. Doing so 
will ground just how perceiving “factual” objects occurs. For Locke, perceiving existing 
objects does not occur without perceiving values. Thus, Locke conceptualizes a rather 
strong relationship between value and perception such that perception involves value 
through valuations.  
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Locke thinks that value is implied by our ability to recognize both the existence of 
objects and facts as they relate to objects (physical, abstract, and mental). Locke tells us 
that: "Facts, being the objects of truth, must all imply values, and it must be in vain to 
search for any existence which is wholly free from valuations."  Here, one is able to see 56
that Locke is making an epistemological claim. It is not the case that the existence of 
objects outside of human cognition implies value, but rather that our either affirming or 
disaffirming statements that relate to objects implies valuations. Thus, what Locke argues 
is that an object’s becoming an object for us––insofar as we affirm/disaffirm it (in 
recognizing it) and particular statements relating to it (in recognizing facts about it)––
implies value. When looking at some object, our perception of the object, insofar as we 
affirm the object’s existence, along with various statements we make about the existing 
object, implies value. Further, Locke seems willing to aver that to perceive some object is 
to perceive it as a particular kind of object, which implies classification; to classify 
objects implies value attributed to them because of their being the particular kinds of 
things that they are classified as. Under its classification as a particular kind of thing, 
there will be a particular understanding of how it is to be used, which is to say how it is to 
be engaged. This seems, for Locke, to give it a certain sort of value.  
Now, it is one thing for Locke to claim that knowledge of a thing or fact implies 
value, and quite another for him to justify his claim. Locke argues that the “truth” of his 
assertion that facts imply values can be demonstrated in four ways. First, Locke concedes 
the idealist point that the search for truth uninfluenced by the mind has been 
 Alain Locke, "Value," 470.56
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unproductive. “Only the moral to be drawn is not, as idealism supposes, that reality is the 
work of ‘pure thought.’ The thought which cannot be rooted out is a valuing thought, 
which is aiming at ends and selecting means, and accepting, rejecting, and variously 
manipulating the data represented to it in the whole process of ‘recognizing’ reality.”  57
What Locke is arguing is that philosophy’s inability to reach or settle on a method of 
arriving at abstracted reality shows that reality, or at least our knowledge of it––which is 
to say reality for us––requires the human mind’s additions, namely valuations. 
Second, Locke recognizes that the mere fact that we want truth proves that it is 
impossible to completely separate fact from value.  Here Locke understands that we (not 58
merely philosophers, but human beings generally) value the possession of truth over 
falsity. One need only recall Aristotle's declaration at the beginning of Metaphysics that 
all human beings by nature desire to be in a state of knowledge, to see Locke’s point.  59
Locke tells us that: “For the importance attributed to the discovery of fact, and the 
eulogistic sense in which ‘reality’ is opposed to ‘appearance' or ‘illusion’ are, in fact, 
values.”  What Locke tells us is simple. Our language demonstrates the value that we 60
place on the possession and discovery of facts, and this demonstrates something 
psychological, namely that valuations guide or drive us towards facts in a way that allows 
for a fact to be possessed or discovered. That humans place value on facts motivates the 
 Ibid.57
 The term that Locke uses in describing this is "desire." However, as stated earlier, 58
Locke does not seem to want to endorse a desire theory of value. Locke's use of desire 
must then be a slippage, or sloppiness on his part.
 Aristotle, Metaphysics, in Aristotle:Complete Works, vol. 2, trans. W.D. Ross, ed. 59
Jonathan Barnes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984) 3.
 Alain Locke, "Value," 471.60
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pursuance of facts. So, if a fact is valuable because it is a fact, and this motivates us to 
seek it out, then there can be, for Locke, no knowledge of facts without our attribution of 
value.   61
Further than this, one can see Locke making claims about the ontological status of 
knowledge and the existence of objects. If value is not ontologically objective, then our 
knowledge of facts (with reference to what kind of object that such is being classified 
as)––being inseparable from value––is not ontologically objective. And, as we will see, if 
it is the case that existence concerns facts, insofar as existence (for us) regards what we 
can know, then existence (for us) is not ontologically objective. What an object is, or how 
it is classified, lacks an ontologically objective status. 
Third, Locke argues that: “It is not psychologically possible to reach any ‘fact’ 
except by a process permeated throughout by values, viz, a purposive endeavor to attain 
an end (‘good’) by choice of the ‘right’ means, which implies selective attention, 
preferences for what seems valuable, and the influence of concomitant value-feelings and 
a variety of prejudices and forms of bias.”  Here Locke understands that the affirmation/62
disaffirmation-process is rooted in a teleological end that is thought to be valuable, and 
one in which is rooted in human preferences, which signals psychological modes and 
orientations not related to the subject of the fact. It would be absurd to say otherwise. No 
one who affirms or disaffirms aims at being incorrect. Further, people do not aim at being 
 This seems rather odd. Why think that a fact is inseparable from a value because a 61
fact’s being valuable motivates our seeking it out? Certainly one might think of a fact as 
something separable from a valuation even if the valuation motivates our search for the 
fact, so long as the valuation does not determine the content of the fact.
 Alain Locke, “Value," 471.62
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incorrect, and do not do so principally because people consider being incorrect to be 
unwelcome, which is to say that people are disinclined from being incorrect. What this 
amounts to is that people devalue being incorrect. So, this process is undergirded by 
value insofar as the end for which it has been employed is value-laden. Still further, it is 
not merely that reaching the end for which the process has been undertaken is valuable, 
but that the process itself seems to imply a discriminative nature that is value-laden 
insofar as one focuses one’s attention on a more valuable set of solutions to problems, 
evidence, etc. that one takes to lead to facts. This is why we regard “method” in 
philosophical, psychological, mathematical, anthropological, etc., studies as of such 
importance.  
Finally, Locke tells us that all facts contain latent values insofar as, in judging 
facts, we implicitly judge that it is better to know than to be ignorant. Just as it is the case 
that one is inclined towards what is correct and disinclined away from what is incorrect, 
we may say that one is inclined towards knowing a thing and disinclined away from 
ignorance of a thing. “Hence, the value-relation and attitude can never be eradicated from 
even the merest and most stubborn ‘fact.’”  We cannot be aware of any fact without the 63
imputation of value, which seems to root out objectivity in facts (as value is something 
superadded onto fact by the agent), and thus objectivity in our knowledge of existing 
things. 
Now for Locke, there is a reciprocal relationship between facts and values. So, 
while it is appropriate to say that one cannot be aware of a fact without the imputation of 
 Ibid.63
!159
value, it is equally appropriate to say that “[p]ure value exists as little as pure fact. It 
would be pure fancy or sheer postulation, and neither fancies nor postulations are 
elaborated without regards to facts. They are made to be realized, and when they are 
recognized as impossible their value is destroyed or impaired.”  What Locke tells us 64
here is that value requires reference to something; value requires an object (for us). One 
cannot say “this has no value” without there being a referential object that they are 
claiming has no positive value. Likewise, the statement “nothing has value” requires 
there to be factual objects that relate to claims about positive value. Thus, one might say 
that value requires facts because value is intentional.  To value is to direct one's attention 65
and motivation towards something that relates to emotion, which requires both the 
perceived existence of the “something” and the belief in factual claims about the 
“something” that is perceived. 
Consider Locke here:  
Reality in its fullness contains and exhibits values, and they are ejected from it 
only by an effort of abstraction, which is relative to certain restricted purposes, and 
is never quite successful. Values therefore are not to be regarded as gratuitous 
additions to reality, made out of the superfluity of human perversity, but as its 
highest qualities and the culminating points of its significance for us.  66
Again, as we have seen earlier in the examination of Locke's theory of value, Locke 
wants to close the distinction between value and fact, such that the two, in many ways, 
 Ibid.64
 Like Gerald Gaus in Value and Justification, Locke will argue that valuing is 65
intentional because discriminatory dispositional emotions, which allow valuations to 
occur, are intentional. As such, valuing is intentional because valuing regards 
dispositional emotions that are intentional in nature.
 Ibid.66
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rely on each other. Now, it would appear that Locke collapses the distinction, arguing that 
the two are merely different aspects of the same phenomena. Locke seems to want to say 
that we can separate them abstractly, much like he will say that we can do with emotion 
and will. Still, in experience, there is no way to parse them out. “Values are the highest 
qualities of facts.” They are, in a sense, the facts of facts.  
Further, Locke wants to say that values are not gratuitous in relation to reality 
merely because they are not ontologically objective. He holds on to relativism (though 
not subjectivism). The reason for their non-gratuitous, non-ontological nature as the facts 
of facts must be that Locke thinks facts are relative, and relative neither as phenomena 
that produces factual content nor what we take as a fact, but the perceived factual content. 
One must take care to notice the implications that Locke's inferences about the 
relationship between value and truth have on the relationship between emotion and 
reason. If value is emotion-laden, and truth does not occur without value, such that even 
logical connections require emotion because of their connection to value, then reasoning 
itself must require emotion. And this is precisely what Locke thinks. Locke states that 
“norms control our behavior and guide our reasoning.”  From this we may infer that 67
values, which undergird norms and are undergirded by feelings, undergird our behavior 
and guide our reasoning. As such, Locke thinks that feeling, in some capacity guides our 
reasoning. Now, Locke could follow David Hume in thinking that reason is a slave to the 
passions, such that we think in accordance with what we desire. However, I think that 
Locke considers the connection between emotion and reason to be a bit more intimate. 
 Alain Locke, “Values and Imperatives,” 452.67
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Hume, even in arguing that reason is a slave to the passions, separates reason and 
emotion in a very fundamental way. They are two separate processes that, while 
connected, are not intertwined. I think that Locke saw emotion as a fundamental part of 
our reasoning, such that emotions such as inquisitiveness are both necessary for, and 
intertwined throughout, logical or scientific investigation.  
Locke follows many traditions and thinkers including the Gestalt tradition in his 
agreement with those who think that “the fact/value dichotomy is weaker than it might 
appear at first sight.”  For Locke the relationship between fact and value is one of 68
dependency, such that facts cannot exist without value, and value requires facts. Further, 
Locke seems to think that existing objects, which is to say objects that exist for us 
(objects that we make statements about, use, classify, etc.), all require value.  
In addition to following the Gestalt tradition on the relationship between facts and 
values, Locke will take much of this thinking from Wilbur Urban’s claims in Valuation, 
where Urban has an aim of investigating the relationship between facts and values. Like 
Locke, Urban separates facts from values. Consider the following: “When I say that the 
object is good or beautiful or noble, I assert a direct relation of the object to my feeling 
and will, a harmony between the object and my subjective dispositions which is relatively 
independent of my judgment of [the] existence of the object or judgment of the truth of 
the idea I have of the object. Existence is perceived; truth is thought; value is felt.”  For 69
 Fiorenza Toccafondi, “Facts, Values, Emotions, and Perception,” in Values and 68
Ontology: Problems and Perspectives, ed. Arkadiusz Churdzimski and Wolfgang 
Huemer (New Brunswick: Ontos Verlag, 2009) 137.
 Wilbur Marshall Urban, Valuation: It’s Nature and Laws, (New York: Routledge, 2014) 69
21-22. 
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Urban, facts relate to objects of perception and the knowledge of facts (truth) will be 
determined both by reasoning about objects of perception and the relations between these 
objects and human subjectivity. Value relates to feelings about the objects of perception. 
Still Urban, like Locke, holds that “while the worth predicates (value-terms) are in 
the first place felt and not cognised, while they are at the third removed from pure 
objectivity, nevertheless, there is presupposed in every appreciation, in every judgment of 
value, a reference to reality and truth.”  What Urban tells us is that value is not in the 70
world like objects of perception; they are not qualities in objects. And further, they follow 
a different path than those of perceived objects and reasoned truth. Still, whether the 
immediate appreciation of a perceived object or the judgment regarding the value of 
appreciating a perceived object (that is to say, a possible perception and experience of an 
object), there needs to be perceived objects that are presupposed in valuation. “The 
feeling of value includes the feeling of reality. Appreciative meanings presuppose reality 
meanings.”  Further, Urban’s use of the term “feeling,” as it relates to reality, seems to 71
suggest that, like those who follow the Gestalt tradition (a tradition that Locke himself 
follows), feeling undergirds judgments about reality and truth. Though these three modes 
of human experience (feeling, truth, and perception) can be separated conceptually, they 
cannot be separated in actual experience. As such, there seems to be an intimate 




We can infer from what has been said that the perception of objects requires 
value, and that one perceives value when perceiving objects. Consequently this is what 
produces the immediacy of a certain sort of value conferred onto an object in community. 
In a word, for Locke, the immediate representation of objects as possessing particular 
values that derive from how communities both value objects and teache agents to see 
objects accounts for the objectivity and seeming intrinsic value of particular objects. 
Consider Locke's statement: 
There are then plenty of objective values, which any valuer encounters and has to 
recognize as given. But they may nevertheless all be conceived as products of 
valuation-processes, and as presupposing prior value-judgments. For when the 
valuation of an object has been repeated and has grown familiar, the conscious 
and reflective value-judgment becomes superfluous, and an immediate 
apprehension of value results, just as immediate perception supersedes judgment 
about familiar objects of cognition.   72
In this passage, Locke tells us that the objectivity, and perhaps the intrinsic nature of 
value (as the intrinsic nature of value in objects was Locke’s focus throughout the section 
of the article from which this quotation derives) is immediately recognized by agents 
with the presentation of the object, which is to say how the object is perceived by the 
valuer (the way that the object appears to the valuer). However, for Locke it is not the 
case that objective and intrinsic value applies to, or is ontologically within, the object, as 
has already been discussed. Rather, the seeming objectivity and intrinsic quality of value 
trace back to a valuation-process whereby certain value-judgments about the object have 
already been established. These judgments need not be repeated at each perception of the 
object, but rather the value can be thought to be attributed to the object at the time of 
 Ernest Mason, “Alain Locke’s Philosophy of Value,” 474.72
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perception if the valuer has repeatedly embraced the prior value-judgments about the 
object (or at the very least, refused to raise questions about the value attributed to the 
object).  
Now, from the passage above one might think that Locke understands the 
immediate attributions of value to some object upon its being perceived to occur on a 
more individual level such that one engages in a valuation-process whereby one makes 
individual value-judgments about objects, and then, because of repetition, need not 
continue to make judgments about perceived objects’ value when he/she perceives them. 
In short, an agent begins by evaluating the object, and after many repeated perceptions of, 
and value-judgments about, the object, the agent immediately perceives the value of the 
object upon perceiving it. However, on my reading of Locke, Locke seems to think that a 
certain value has been attributed to objects in community prior to the individual’s 
valuations of them, and that the individual need not make particular value-judgments 
about objects in order to attribute value to them in certain sorts of ways. One learns how 
to perceive objects––that is, in community, one learns how perceptive phenomena is to be 
classified, which necessarily includes certain valuations. 
So, in teaching agents how to perceive objects classified as certain socially 
relevant things, which allows agents to participate in communal engagements, 
communities teach agents to confer value to objects. This is why Locke tells us that an 
agent’s claim that an object’s value is objective “maintains itself only while it is not 
disputed,” (my emphasis) and that “objects which have obtained social recognition as 
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valuable come to rank as objective values.”  If Locke considered the valuation-process 73
to occur merely at the individual level, namely that value is perceived when we (as 
individuals) perceive objects because of our repetitiously perceiving them and judging 
them as having a certain sort of value, then Locke need not suggest that there are changes 
in the value of objects when there are disputes about them or that there is a social nature 
to objective values. What these statements (that there is a change in the value of objects 
when there are disputes about the value of objects and that there is a social nature to 
objective values) seem to suggest is that there is a change in the manner in which objects 
are perceived after disputes, and that the social nature of objective valuations is a product 
of the manner in which individuals are taught to see objects. 
The argument here is that the objectivity in value accords to individuals in a 
society coming to view some object in a particular way. Individuals may in fact have a 
certain inclination towards, or disinclination away from, some object very early in life. 
However with certain objects––in order for them to mean something in community––the 
agent must perceive them as particular sorts of objects, which means that objects must be 
classified in particular ways. When objects are classified in a particular sort of way, 
which implies perceiving them in particular ways that are not without certain values 
attributed to them, changes to individuals’ ways of perceiving (and thus valuing) occur. 
Individuals begin to see and value objects from within communal constraints.  
My argument on this point is thus two-fold. First, I hold that Locke thinks that 
value is perceived at the time that the object is perceived (this will be mediated through 
 Ibid.73
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feeling). Second, I hold that Locke thinks that there is a communality to perception, such 
that communities “teach” individuals how to perceive phenomena as objects, and this 
confers a type of non-ontological objective value onto objects.  
Locke provides further evidence for these arguments. In a critical passage to 
understanding Locke’s theory of the valuation-process, when speaking about the 
valuation-process whereby repetition disqualifies or cancels out the need for value-
judgments, Locke asserts the following: 
[T]his process does not occur in the history of the individual, but it can be traced 
in that of the race, whose achievements the individual inherits. An object may, for 
example, be apprehended as pleasant, beautiful, or right, without a judgment or 
process of valuation; but the immediacy of its value-claim is no bar to any inquiry 
into why it is valued, how it has come to be so, and whether it ought to be so, and 
really is as beautiful, right, or pleasant as it seems to be.  74
Now, Locke makes many claims in this passage. However, Locke’s basic point here is 
that the immediacy of the value represented to the agent upon perceiving the object is no 
indication of the appropriateness of the object's being valued in that way. We need not 
think that objects have a certain ontological value simply because individuals do not 
always engage in a valuation-process about the objects. Objects’ coming to have a certain 
value does not depend on individual valuers’ experiences in valuing certain objects. For 
Locke, the individual valuer inherits a world of valued objects––a world in which objects 
have obtained a certain sort of value due to a valuation-process. Locke can only think that 
communities have set up value-systems that they “teach” (culture, if you will) individuals 
to perceive when individuals perceive objects.  
 Ibid.74
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And as an aside, this is perhaps why Locke thinks that anthropologists must 
understand communities’ socio-historical contexts wherein values arise in rendering 
them. There seems to be an assertion here that perceiving (and valuing) objects reflects 
socio-historical conditions, and that one needs to learn to perceive as members of the 
communities that one studies in order to understand and make judgments about value-
systems.  
We have seen that Locke thinks that individuals inherit a world of valued objects 
from communities because communities teach individuals how to perceive objects, which 
involves perceiving them with a certain value. I argue that the way that this is done is 
through language and use. I will now turn to this argument, which makes up the second 
component of the Lockean harmony, namely the classificatory schemes by which 
communities give to individuals valued objects. 
A Lockean Harmony: Value, Language, and Use: 
With regard to Locke's value theory, classificatory schemes will refer to two 
different processes. The first scheme relates to the way in which objects are classed in 
community. The second scheme relates to the way in which socially classified objects 
affect the emotions of valuers insofar as they are placed under value-kinds in accordance 
with either a transgredient or an immanental reference-mode. These two modes are the 
basic ways of sensing and feeling values that are attached to the perception of objects. 
Locke explicitly tells us that community is responsible for the seeming objectivity of 
values insofar as it teaches us how to perceive objects with a certain sort of value. 
Further, Locke explicitly explains to us that value is an emotionally laden form of 
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experience. Perceived objects affect our emotions, and value derives from the interplay of 
perceived objects and emotions. What Locke does not state explicitly, but seems to need 
to state is precisely how his two explicit claims relate to each other, which is to say, why 
perceived objects are able to affect emotions of individual valuers in a way that would 
produce non-ontological objectivity with regard to values.  
Now, Locke gives us clues about the second scheme that relates to the way in 
which socially classified objects affect the emotions of valuers. For Locke, when objects 
are subsumed under classes that are in accord with communal constraints of language and 
use, they affect the feelings, emotions, and/or attitudes of valuers in a way that makes 
placement under a value-mode immediate.  The manner in which they affect the valuers’ 75
feelings, emotions, and/or attitudes are not thought to be arbitrary, and thus Locke must 
allow for a kind of objective criteria for the evaluation of imperatives. 
For Locke, there is a schema that is particular to humanity such that objects that 
get classified in a certain way fit into a set number of value-modes, which refers to “the 
qualitative character of a particular way of experiencing as mediated by a given emotion 
or attitude which Locke terms the feeling-quality.”  In this way, “values are immediately 76
recognized through an apprehension of their emotional quality; value-predicates are 
determined by the affective volitional influence of the feeling quality; and the imperatives 
 The manner in which “feelings, emotions, and/or attitudes” is understood by Locke is a 75
contentious aspect of Locke’s thinking and is the focus of the next chapter.
 Jacoby Carter, “Alain LeRoy Locke,” in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 76
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of a given value are given immediately once the primary feeling-quality has been 
established.”  This characterizes the second classificatory scheme.  77
Still, there must be a more fundamental way––besides the schema that places 
objects directly under value-modes––that humans relate to objects of value, one prior to 
the effects that objects have on value-modes wherein objects get classified. The argument 
is that in order for Locke to hold that equivalences in human value-modes license us to 
think of value as non-ontologically objective, Locke needs to think that perceived objects 
accord to similarities in language and use in order to affect value-modes in equivalent 
ways. As such, we will need to explore the classificatory scheme that relates to perceived 
objects. This classificatory scheme must be understood in light of Locke’s understanding 
of value generally.  
Locke tells us that even though value, in relating to our interests, must be 
understood by what is relative to our personalities: “This relativity [of interest], however, 
is not to be regarded as importing any objectionable subjectivity into values, just because 
it proves to be the source also of their objectivity. For it turns out that all objects are 
pervaded by values and constituted for man by valuations, and hence their avowed values 
may just as rightfully belong to them as the values latent in their other qualities.”  Now, 78
one can infer that if all objects did not possess the same criteria for valuations, insofar as 
they were seen as particular objects, possessing a general kind of usableness and under 
certain linguistic constraints as the kinds of objects that they were classified as, then they 
 Ibid.77
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would arbitrarily affect valuers’ feelings, emotions, and/or attitudes. Objects must be 
classed by the psyche of valuers in a similar way so as to be able to affect the particular 
emotions that evoke an immediate categorization of the value-mode under which the 
value of the object falls if there is to be agreement about them in community.  
Now, one might think that this type of classification is contrary to Locke’s own 
words. Locke seems to express this when, in describing the constancy of value-content, 
he writes that: “The further we investigate, the more we discover that there is no fixity of 
content to values, and the more we are bound, then, to infer that there identity as general 
as groups must rest on other elements.”  Values, on Locke’s account, have no inflexible 79
content. And Locke does not seem to suggest this on a mere communal level, such that 
the content for the value of a certain Objectx is inconstant across communities because of 
divergences in the perception of the object that accords to language or use. Locke tells us 
that an “awe-inspiring scene becomes, ‘holy,’ the logical proof, ‘beautiful,’ [or] creative 
expression, a ‘duty.’”  Locke relates this to the ordinary occurrence that: “We are aware 80
of instances, for example, where a sequence of logical reasoning will take on an aesthetic 
character as a ‘beautiful proof’ or a ‘pretty demonstration,’ or where a moral quality or 
disposition is appraised not as ‘good’ but as ‘noble,’ or again, where a religious ritual is a 
mystical ‘reality’ to the convinced believer but is only an aesthetic, symbolic show to the 
non-credal spectator.”  This seems to promote the idea that the predicates of valued 81
objects are inconstant irrespective of the community of valuers, such that two valuers in 




the same community can value some Objectx in very different ways, even given stability 
in the perception of the object. Thus, it might appear from reading this that Locke thinks 
that two valuers can perceive the same object, understanding it as having the same use- 
and linguistic-contexts, which is to say the same context in which the object is placed, 
and ascribe different value-predicates to the object. What this amounts to is the idea that 
the perception of the object as a particular kind of object (an object subsumed underneath 
the same scheme), one in which accords to similarities or exactnesses in language and 
usages, tells us nothing of the value that will be perceived in the object. On this reading, 
perception of objects in accordance with language and use means nothing to the value 
attributed to objects. Thus, Locke, on this reading, would not hold that the perception of 
objects as particular kinds of objects according to communal constraints can ground a 
kind of non-ontological objectivity in value. 
However, what I would like to maintain is that Locke must think that the 
perception of objects must be similar for valuing agents of the community. This must 
occur in order for there to be a sort of objectivity in value that is not reducible to the 
value conferred onto objects merely in accordance with individuals’ wills, and thus one 
that is non-ontological. Locke must think that the similarity in perception can be 
accounted for by language and use. 
Again, that similarities in perceiving value in objects is accounted for by language 
and use is not something that Locke explicitly states and defends. I take it that either 
Locke assumes it or needs it in order for his thinking on value to be adequate. The reason 
that Locke needs this component of a harmony between agent, value, and object is 
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because Locke argues that there is no ontologically real value in objects, and further that 
value-content is not objective. Locke also argues that communities confer a kind of 
value-objectivity onto objects that makes valuations more than merely a subjective 
experience. Given all of these arguments, Locke must think that communities “give” 
objects certain values insofar as they “teach” individuals to perceive objects as possessing 
particular values. This can only be through language, which gives meaning and shapes 
how we relate to objects. Language provides objects with meaning, and understanding the 
meaning implies taking in account objects’ social value. 
Further, Locke needs to say that similarities in perceiving value in objects is 
accounted for by use. First, and quite obviously, if language provides objects with 
meaning, which implies social value conferred onto objects, then perceiving objects in 
accordance with language leads to understanding the use of objects in society. This must 
be the case because language tells us what the object is and how the object should be 
used in accordance with social norms. There seems to be an intimate connection between 
language about objects and understanding the usages of objects. 
Beyond this quite obvious point, however, Locke seems to rely on objects’ usages 
when reflecting on transvaluation, which is significant for understanding changes in 
objects’ value. Locke tells us that the transvaluation of values is: “The process of 
reflective reconsideration of given values [that] continually leads to changes in their 
status.”  For Locke, transvaluations are normal and legitimate occurrences wherein the 82
value attributed to objects in a community changes. Locke argues that “valuations 
 Alain Locke, “Value,” 474.82
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necessarily vary according to the changes in the organic needs which condition them.”  83
What Locke claims here is that the value of objects changes in accordance with whether 
they satisfy certain needs, which is to say how we use them. That we no longer need to 
use particular objects in a useful manner, in Locke’s view, causes changes in the way that 
we value the objects. Thus, Locke must think that use contributes to similarities in 
perceiving value in objects.  
In fact, Locke’s thinking on transvaluations seems to give us insight into the 
necessity (along with his understanding of the role) of language for similarities in 
perceiving value in objects that was discussed above. Locke writes that: “Every society, 
and nearly every soul, is full of conflicts between opposing valuations, and any variation 
in their relative strengths may entail a change in values. The chief agency in which blinds 
us to these transvaluations is the stability of words; for these change their form much less 
rapidly than their meaning.”  Here, Locke is concerned with our difficulty in 84
understanding the frequency and degree of transvaluations. Locke thinks that we fail to 
see the constant transvaluation of our values because the definitions of terms in our 
language remains the same. Still, what the object or state of affairs that is being 
reevaluated means, which seems to accord to our use, changes after definitions have 
become set. Now, this in no way means that language is not necessary for perceiving 
value in objects. For Locke, language is necessary in our inheriting a world of value. 




affairs, but also involves usefulness, which can change even after language defines and 
communicates terms.  
So, I think that we have good grounds to infer that Locke is able to ground a sort 
of value-objectivity in similarities of perception, which relies on language and use. 
Communities teach their members how to perceive objects by defining objects and telling 
members how objects are to be used. One might say that when objects are perceived, they 
are perceived as something specific, and what they are perceived as accords to language 
and use. Thus, when looking at some object, say some material that is termed a “tree” or 
a “book,” we perceive the material under certain social constraints. We engage and value 
it in certain ways because of what we see it as. Ultimately, however, Locke’s thinking on 
value is grounded in its relation to emotion, which is how the object as some particular 
object perceived under social constraints, affects members of the community. I now turn 
to the third component of Locke’s harmony, which regards the relationship between value 
and emotion. 
A Lockean Harmony: Value and Emotion: 
Alain Locke defines value in a multiplicity of ways and at a multiplicity of times, 
all with the common understanding that “values are primarily rooted in human 
attitudes.”  In his Harvard dissertation, Locke tells us that:  85
Our view…is that value kinds or types represent for the most part psychologically 
differentiated modes of valuation and that appropriate principles and units for 
value classification can only issue from a general theory of value which succeeds 
 Jacoby Carter, “Alain LeRoy Locke,” 6.85
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in proving that affective factors discoverable and psychologically operative in the 
primary process of valuation are determinative of value type.  86
What this amounts to is that Locke thinks that value regards human psychology, or more 
specifically human emotions. Now, it is not exactly clear as to what an emotion is, or 
whether “preference,” “attitude,” “emotion,” “disposition,” all represent equivalent ideas. 
Locke uses all of these words when speaking about value as being psychological.  On 87
one occasion, Locke defines value as “a personal attitude, as a recognition of the 
supremacy of the category of personality.” Value is a “personal attitude, of welcome or 
the reverse, towards an object of interest.”  What this means is that for Locke the 88
experience of valuing is fundamentally an emotional experiences. Locke writes that: “In 
fact, the value-mode establishes for itself, directly through feeling, a qualitative category 
which, as discriminated by its appropriate feeling-quality, constitutes an emotionally 
mediated form of experience.”  Here, Locke wants to ground a theory of value in the 89
experience of valuing, which he takes to prior to logical judgments made about objects. It 
would seem that Locke thinks that perceiving an object produces an immediate 
impression on the agent. This impression either inclines the agent towards, or disinclines 
the agent away from, the object. If the former, then the object is perceived as having 
 Alain Locke, “The Problem of Classification in the Theory of Value” (Unpublished 86
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positive value. If the latter, then the object is perceived as having negative value. Thus, 
we might infer that for Locke, one perceives an object, person, or state of affairs under 
particular social constraints of language and use, which immediately impacts upon the 
feelings/emotions of the agent, who then either values or devalues the object, person, or 
state of affairs. Value, through perception of some representation under determinant 
social constraints of language and use and the affect that it has on feelings/emotions, is 
immediate and requires no logical judgments because it is prior to them.  
In arguing the critical need to reject both objectivism (absolutism/dogmatism) and 
subjectivism (anarchism) Locke writes that: 
This [the in-between position that solves the problems of value-anarchism and 
value-absolutism] calls for a functional analysis of value norms and a search for 
normative principles in the immediate context of valuation. It raises the question 
whether the fundamental value modes have a way of setting up automatically or 
dispositionally their end-values prior to evaluative judgment. Should this be the 
case, there would be available a more direct approach to the problem of value 
ultimates, and we might discover their primary normative character to reside in 
their functional role as stereotypes of feeling-attitudes and dispositional 
imperatives of action-choices, with this character reenforced only secondarily by 
reason and judgment about them as “absolutes.” We should then be nearer a 
practical understanding of the operative mechanisms of valuation and of the 
grounds for our agreements and conflicts over values.  90
Locke argues that in value-experiences, values “set-up” prior to making evaluations, 
which seems to amount to something like a judgment about either the fittingness of an 
object’s possessing some value. In my view, given what was discussed in the prior two 
sections, in order for Locke to maintain that objective values are grounded in the way that 
community causes us to perceive objects through language and usage, Locke must think 
 Ibid, 454.90
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that perceiving an object (which includes perceiving objects as particular objects––which 
implicates its perception under communal constraints of language and use) triggers an 
emotion that produces a value prior to judgments being made about objects or the 
fittingness of objects being valued in a certain way. If Locke thinks that objectivity is 
grounded in similarities in emotions, then Locke would, much like Segun Gbadegesin 
suggests, be committed to value-objectivity.   91
So, it would appear that Locke is committed to this in-between position on value 
that seeks to displace value-hierarchies. What Locke wants to end with is the idea that no 
values and value-systems are superior to others because they all owe their being and 
seeming objectivity to perception under constraints, which is to say that they all owe their 
being and seeming objectivity to a social process. For Locke, value and values are not 
ontologically objective, real, or intrinsic.  
Now one might think that this is inconsistent with the view that there are cultural 
constants. Cultural constants seem to be both real and objective. They are seemingly 
necessary conditions for any collection of individuals becoming a community. Yet, as we 
have seen, Locke explicitly wants to deny value-realism and value-objectivity that is not 
communally caused. Thus, there seems to be a bit of an impasse in Locke’s thinking. 
Locke claims that we need cultural constants in order to establish a cosmopolitan 
community, which might lead us to the conclusion that we need value-objectivity in order 
to establish a cosmopolitan community. And likewise, Locke seems to claim that we need 
 Segun Gbadegesin, "Values, Imperatives, and the Imperative of Democratic Values," in 91
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to reject value-objectivity in order to displace racial superiority that denies the possibility 
of establishing a cosmopolitan community.   
It is clear to me that I have not mistaken Locke’s commitments. Locke is clearly 
committed to the idea that there are cultural constants that are objective values that ought 
to be embraced. Further, Locke is clearly committed to a denial of value-realism and 
ontological value-objectivity. What I suspect Locke would say about cultural constants 
given his relativism is that, firstly, cultural constants are not natural or real values. They 
are values that must condition progressive human interaction. They are values that allow 
the socio-historical contexts out of which overlaying values are constructed. Thus, 
cultural constants condition social values, which can gain an objective status in 
community. Locke’s relativism regards these overlaying values, which cause many of our 
conflicts, and which “cover up” cultural constants for one committed to racal superiority. 
Locke sees there to be certain conditions that must be in place in order for you to get 
values. And further, Locke would perhaps say that cultural constants should condition the 
overlaying values that have socio-historical contexts, insofar as they would seemingly 
stabilize the community. In short, Locke’s denial of value-objectivity regards overlaying 
socio-historical values, which are only possible because of cultural constants.  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Conclusion 
The Price of the Cosmopolitan Ticket: 
“[C]osmopolitanism shouldn't be seen as some exalted attainment: it begins with the 
simple idea that in the human community, as in national communities, we need to 
develop habits of coexistence: conversation in its older meaning, of living together, 
association.” 
––Kwame Anthony Appiah, Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers 
“Now there are many who swear it's true, That brothers all we are, Yet it seems there are 
very few, Who will answer a brother's call.” 
––Abbey Lincoln, “Brother, Where Are You?” 
So, we have seen that Locke is committed to cosmopolitanism, and likewise we 
have seen that racial superiority is a problem that challenges the establishment of a 
cosmopolitan community. Again, for Locke, we have both a practical and theoretical 
reason to commit to cosmopolitanism. Pragmatically, our survival as a “race” depends on 
peace. What this implicates is that every individual also has a reason to commit to the 
establishment of a cosmopolitan community. Theoretically, Locke thinks that establishing 
a cosmopolitan community completes our move from individual families into larger 
communities, which satisfies a basic human desire to assemble. Cosmopolitanism is 
blocked by theories of race that shape, reshape, and justify racial superiority. Racial 
differences are seen as inherent and permanent products of either nature or God, and 
racial differences reduce to value-differences by way of cultural differences. Because 
cultural differences can be rank-ordered, value-differences can be rank-ordered. And 
insofar as this is the case, certain races are taken to be inherently and permanently better, 
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or more worthy of respect than others. This poses a problem for Locke because a 
cosmopolitan community requires respect that is denied by racial superiority, which relies 
on these theories of race. Locke’s response to this problem posed to the establishment of 
a cosmopolitan community is two-fold. First, Locke attempts to rebut theories of race that 
ground the racial superiority that denies respect for certain races. Second, Locke attempts 
to deny the ontologically objective status of value, which seeks to displace value-
hierarchies that these theories rely on. 
I would like to end this examination of Locke’s work with a few brief remarks 
about the limitations of Locke’s thinking. First, Locke fails to mention a problem that 
appears to be both older and more pervasive than the problem of racial superiority. Locke 
never mentions the problem gender superiority. One might expect Locke to have said 
something about the position in society that women occupy, given the rise of feminism, 
his relationship with women during the Harlem Renaissance, and his relationship with his 
own mother.  Still, I do think that one can easily raise questions about gender oppression 1
and cosmopolitanism given Locke’s framework. What I mean here is that even though 
Locke is silent about gender superiority as a problem for cosmopolitanism, his thinking is 
still quite useful insofar as it lends itself to an analysis of problems of gender and 
cosmopolitanism. 
Secondly, there is the question of motivation that seems to be a limitation of 
Locke’s work. Terrence MacMullan raises a question about Locke’s pluralistic approach 
that leads to questions about how to change peoples’ values who are committed to racial 
 See Leonard Harris and Charles Molesworth, Alain L. Locke: Biography of a 1
Philosopher (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008).
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superiority. For MacMullan, Locke’s theory of pluralism cannot dissolve the problem of 
absolutism because it does not give the absolutist a reason to engage the project. The 
following question can be raised: “why should I engage in an attempt to articulate values 
that are meaningful to all people when my values are the ones that all people should be 
following?”  Locke’s pluralism cannot answer this question. It seems that if people are 2
committed to racial (gender) superiority, and embrace values that support such 
superiority, then there is perhaps no way to motivate them to give up their commitments. 
In other words, what Locke needs is a separate argument for how to overcome racial/
gender animus. 
Now, Locke will argue that one ought to be consistent in their views. Locke might 
continue by arguing that in both freely associating with other people and valuing 
assembly, one (albeit in a negative way) affirms cultural constants. We saw this in the 
first chapter with regard to democracy, wherein equality is implicated. However, this 
seems to assume that persons committed to values, especially to racial/gender superiority, 
both are and desire to be reasonable. And this assumes something that Locke seems to 
deny in his value theory, namely that people are essentially rational with regard to values. 
However, we just saw how values are emotionally-laden forms of experience that are the 
results of perceptions in accordance with language and use, which is to say perceptions 
under socio-historical constraints. In a community that “teaches” agents to perceive 
certain races and women under these constraints, which is to say reserves certain 
 Terrance MacMullan, “Global Citizenship through Reciprocity: Alain Locke and Barack 2
Obama’s Pragmatist Politics,” in Philosophic Values and World Citizenship: Locke to 
Obama and Beyond, ed. Jacoby Adeshei Carter and Leonard Harris (New York: 
Lexington Books, 2010).
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classificatory terms for (and ideas about) them and how they are to be used (related to/
engaged), it seems unlikely that there will be much effort to value certain races and 
women differently. Further, it appears that appeals to logical judgment or reason will not 
stop certain valuations because “value modes have a way of setting up automatically or 
dispositionally their end-values prior to evaluative judgment.”  What is needed is a way 3
to alter the perception of certain races and women such that they are perceived with a 
particular value, and thus worthy of respect. And this requires a separate argument, a 
more practical theory that goes beyond the theoretical theories of race and value that set 
the conditions for the possible establishment of a cosmopolitan community.  
In short, what is required, in addition to a philosophical anthropology and a value 
theory that combats racial superiority, is a theory showing us how to get past racial/
gender/sexual/religious superiority. My intuition is that Locke gives us useful arguments 
in both his philosophy of education and philosophy of art, which must be engaged (along 
with Locke’s thinking on emotion, as emotion is fundamental to his thinking on art) in a 
separate work. These will provide practical theories of how to change perceptions of 
races (and women if applied to the problem of gender superiority). 
 Alain Locke, “Values and Imperatives,” in The Works of Alain Locke, ed. Charles 3
Molesworth (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012) 454.
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